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INDEX TO VOLUME 30

NO. 1—OCTOBER 1951

United to Enforce Peace . . . . . *Paul H. Douglas* 1
The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy *Lester B. Pearson* 17
The American Tradition in Foreign Relations
Frank Tannenbaum 31
China as a Military Power . . . . . *Hanson W. Baldwin* 51
Hands and Fists Across the Sea . . . . . *Roy Harrod* 63
The Case for India . . . . . *Vincent Sheean* 77
The African Response to Racial Laws . . . . . *Z. K. Matthews* 91
Albania, Soviet Pawn . . . . . *Vladimir Dedijer* 103
American Labor's World Responsibilities . . . . *Michael Ross* 112
The Rise of Industrial Middle Europe . . . . . *Jan Wszelaki* 123
Democracy Takes Root in Turkey . . . . . *Kasim Gülek* 135
France, Still the Third Republic . . . . . *Raymond Aron* 145
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 152
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 170

NO. 2—JANUARY 1952

Security in the Pacific . . . . . *John Foster Dulles* 175
The Pacific Settlement Seen from Australia
Robert Gordon Menzies 188
Generalissimo Stalin and the Art of Government . . . *O. Utis* 197
Guerrilla Warfare . . . . . *Field-Marshal Alexander Papagos* 215
The Near East: The Search for Truth . . . . . *Charles Malik* 231
The Defense of Europe . . . . . *General H. J. Kruls* 265
The Turn of the Screw in Soviet Agriculture . . . . *Lazar Volin* 277
Trade Policies of the New Japan . . . . . *Ryutaro Takahashi* 289
Lord Grey and the Problem of Alliance . . . . *Byron Dexter* 298
Alternatives to Apartheid in South Africa . . . . *J. W. Patten* 310
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 327
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 344

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 3—APRIL 1952

Korea in Perspective . . . . . *Adlai E. Stevenson* 349
The Chimera of German Neutrality . . . . . *Erich Dethleffsen* 361
"Socialist Competition" . . . . . *Isaac Deutscher* 376
Argentina in the Tunnel . . . . . *Z* 391
The World Bank at Work . . . . . *Eugene R. Black* 402
India: Dos and Don'ts for Americans . . . . . *M. R. Masani* 412
Communist Dogma and Jugoslav Practice . . . *M. S. Handler* 426
The Threat of the Soviet Navy . . . . . *Frank Uhlig, Jr.* 444
The Dilemma of British Labor . . . . . *R. V. Sampson* 455
The Soviet Conquest of Rumania . . . . . *Barry Brannen* 466
Revising the History of Russian Colonialism
Solomon M. Schwarz 488
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 494
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 510

NO. 4—JULY 1952

Bismarck's Legacy . . . . . *G. P. Gooch* 517
Organizing Europe: Dissenting Opinions
Germany and Europe: The German Social Democratic Program . . . . . *Carlo Schmid* 531
France and Europe: A Gaullist View . . *Jacques Soustelle* 545
Economic Checks on German Unity . . . . . *Peter Nettl* 554
The Quest of Independence . . . . . *Francis B. Sayre* 564
Modern Nations and Islam . . . . . *Robert Montagne* 580
End of the Marshall Plan . . . . . *John H. Williams* 593
Formosa Today . . . . . *Albert Ravenholt* 612
The French Accomplishment in Morocco
General Augustin Guillaume 625
The Foreign Student in America . . . . . *John W. Gardner* 637
Soviet Pressure on Scandinavia . . . . . *Arthur Spencer* 651
Can Europe Use American Methods? . . . . . *André Siegfried* 660
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 669
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 686

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 30 OCTOBER 1951 No. 1

UNITED TO ENFORCE PEACE

By Paul H. Douglas

THE United Nations is a living political organism, and the principle of its growth is to be seen in the very conflict which perpetually drives it to further development. The conflict, which occurs and recurs among its supporters no less than between its supporters and its enemies, has two aspects—both of which, indeed, were no less evident in the debates about the old League of Nations.

The first is the basic question of international coöperation itself—whether the nations of the world are to act together as partners in a community or whether they are to "go it alone," each for himself and the devil take the hindmost. The second is generally interpreted as a controversy about the basic function of the United Nations, though in truth it, too, presents the question of survival—in short, whether the organization is to have the strength to enforce the collective security of its members. Supported by its entourage of slave states, Soviet Russia has gone it alone within the organization almost from the day she entered it. But the recurring conflicts of opinion among the other members in regard to the organization's nature and functions have resulted always, in the end, in a movement toward closer coöperation and toward placing greater emphasis on its rôle as an enforcement agency. The reason is easy to find. The theory, much favored in 1945, that the primary function of the U.N. is "long-range," namely, concentration upon removing the underlying causes of wars between nations, dissolved when it came up against the hard fact that since 1947 the danger of another world war has not been remote and submerged but immediate and open. The experience of overt and deliberate aggression by Soviet-supported troops against the U.N. itself in Korea has inexorably and correctly made the mediatory function subordinate to the en-

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forcement function. Though some able dialecticians have attempted the task of convincing the member states that they should somehow develop the faculty of mediating between themselves and the enemy who was attacking them, the actual response has, very properly, run in the other direction.

II

The two greatest structural weaknesses in the Charter of the United Nations have been: 1, the veto power given to each of the so-called Big Five on everything but procedural matters; and 2, the failure to create an international force in readiness to resist aggression. The inclusion of the veto clause was probably necessary in order to get Soviet Russia to enter the United Nations, and possibly also to get the Charter ratified by the United States Senate. But the effect was most unfortunate. Russia used the veto on more than 40 occasions, and it became obvious that she would prevent the Security Council and hence the United Nations from taking action to stop aggression wherever the Communist program of expansion was involved. Moreover, by preventing the United Nations from acting, Russia was largely able to prevent its law-abiding members from acting. For without a U.N. mandate it was difficult for a nation to move by itself; the argument could always be made that any such action lacked legal authority of an international character and hence was a unilateral act of war rather than an enforcement of law. Moreover, any attempt to amend the Charter to provide for a more effective way of resisting aggression and reducing the veto power seemed doomed to failure. For the veto itself could be used to defeat any attempt to limit the veto, and Russia served notice that she would do so were the issue raised.

It was originally hoped that an international police force or army could be set up under the United Nations. After the First World War, the French, under the leadership of Léon Bourgeois, had urged the necessity for creating just such a force under the League of Nations to ensure that a nation threatened with attack would receive effective aid. British opposition killed this plea. By the end of World War II, however, the harsh logic of events had convinced both the British and our own representatives that such a police force in readiness should be established. They therefore worked in the Military Staff Committee, set up under Article 47 of the Charter, to create such a body. But they were balked by

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Russia, which was opposed to the creation of an independent army and attached impossible conditions whereby a state could deny to the international army the right to cross its territory in order to get at an aggressor. The Russian power of veto finally prevented any concrete progress toward developing an effective police force.

As a consequence of all this, the United Nations seemed destined to go the way of the League of Nations and to perish in ineffectiveness. The cause of collective security seemed dubious indeed. It seemed as though the Soviet aggressors would be able to take the free nations one by one and break them as the Nazis and Fascists were able to do from 1935 to 1939.

III

Two sets of efforts were made to remedy this situation. The first was the development of a series of regional pacts to furnish mutual protection against aggression, while the second was an effort to create a more effective system of general security within the United Nations itself.

The series of regional treaties to provide for mutual security against attack began with the pact of Rio de Janeiro signed in September 1947. This provided for mutual assistance among and between the states of North and South America (except for Canada). A start had already been made by the Truman Doctrine, giving aid to Greece and Turkey, announced in May 1947. This arrangement was lacking in the full elements of mutuality, however, since while we agreed to help defend each of the nations in question, neither of them agreed to support the other. The big development in the field of regional pacts came, of course, with the negotiation and approval of the North Atlantic Pact in 1949, under which the signatory Powers, namely the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway and Iceland, agreed to come to the aid of any signatory nation which was attacked. Recently has come our pact with Australia and New Zealand, and other possible pacts are in the offing at the time of writing.

There have been two primary reasons for the creation of these regional pacts. First has been the desire to escape from the veto power which the Russians exercise inside the Security Council, so that they could not balk mutual help in time of need. The second was the fact that most nations, like individuals, feel danger much

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more vividly when it is close than when it is far away. They will therefore make more sacrifices to defend a nearby country from attack, lest they themselves should be threatened next, than they will to help peoples who are remote. Many persons felt, therefore, that more effective resistance against Communist aggression would be built up by a series of regional pacts than by an attempt to obtain collective security through and by the United Nations, inhibited as it was by the veto proviso and stripped of any ready force with which it might protect the weak. Moreover, it was pointed out that Article 51 of the Charter expressly permitted the formation of such regional pacts to defend the peace;[1] and it was therefore contended that it was quite possible for peaceloving nations to pursue the goal of collective security inside the United Nations while simultaneously working to build practical structures outside the U.N. to obtain its more immediate and more localized realization.

And yet the fact remains that the regional pacts were outside the United Nations. Necessary as they were in the prevailing circumstances, there was danger that if sole reliance were placed upon them the United Nations would become primarily a forum from which each set of Great Powers could launch propaganda against the other. Since the Russian bloc imposes strict censorship within its own bounds, this meant in practice that they were able to propagandize the Western world while our replies were stopped by the Iron Curtain. If the positive values of the United Nations were to be retained and developed, it was evidently important to devise a new way of investing it with the power to enforce collective security.

The system of regional pacts, moreover, had certain very real disadvantages. One of these was the absence of any impartial way of determining whether or not aggression had actually occurred, in view of the fact that the nations allied in the pacts would themselves decide this question. Outside nations would not feel any necessity of following the decisions since they would not have

[1] Article 51 reads as follows: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

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been a party to them. It was also true that certain states, notably India, though ready to work within a universal system, would not join any system of regional alliances which ranged them in one world camp or the other.

IV

Swayed by these and other considerations, the Editor of this journal proposed in 1948 that the United States negotiate with other U.N. members a supplementary convention whereby each signatory would pledge itself to join in using force against any country declared to be an aggressor by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly of the U.N.[2] By making the projected voluntary convention supplementary to the U.N. Charter rather than an amendment to it, and by shifting the power of branding an aggressor from the Security Council to the Assembly, the author of this proposal seemed to have hit on a feasible and altogether legal way of circumventing the certain prospect of a Russian veto. Moreover, by continuing to lodge the finding of aggression in a U.N. body, namely the Assembly, he kept the system within the structure of the United Nations. A somewhat similar proposal was also developed at about this time by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.[3]

Influenced by these suggestions, Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah and I prepared in the early winter of 1949 a Resolution that the United States take the lead in proposing such a supplementary convention, but we refrained from introducing it for some months lest it embarrass our Government in the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, which both of us approved. We finally did introduce the Resolution in July 1949, after that treaty had been signed and while it was before the Senate for ratification.[4]

[2] Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Coalition for Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948.

[3] See their "Collective Self-Defense Under the United Nations," May 1948, and "The Security of the United States and Western Europe," January 1949.

[4] In drafting our Resolution, Senator Thomas and I received valuable assistance from Quincy Wright, Arthur Holcombe and Clark Eichelberger. The text of the body of the Resolution, following the preamble, was as follows (S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Congress, 1st Session): 9. *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring):* 10. (i) That the Congress reaffirm its faith in the United Nations as the cornerstone of the international policy of the United States and as an institution which can progressively be made more adequate to assure the security of its members. 11. (ii) That to this end the Congress pledges its support to a supplementary agreement under Article 51 of the Charter open to all members of the United Nations, by which the signatories agree, if the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its duties, to come to the aid of the victim of attack if requested to do so by a two-

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The Resolution made two important additions to the original Armstrong proposal. The first was the proviso that in order for a nation to be committed to use force to repel aggression, it was not only necessary that there should be a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, but also approval by three of the Big Five. This was to prevent the small Powers from committing the big countries such as ours to use our armies in unforeseen circumstances and against our will. The requirement of a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for any police action, including assent of three of the Big Five, would make impossible, we believed, any domination by Russia. In the first place, Russia would find it virtually impossible to obtain a two-thirds vote in the Assembly, since the maximum Soviet strength there never amounted to more than eight votes. Secondly, the requirement of the concurrence of three of the Big Five would always enable the United States, Great Britain and France, acting together, to vote down any proposal to which they objected. As long as the Franco-British-American alliance held together, we could always negate Russian attempts at control. If France were ever to join the Soviet bloc, this would mean that Western Europe would in the same moment turn Communist. Under such conditions, we would probably have to withdraw to the shores of the New World and in effect abandon the United Nations. We believed, therefore, that we had adequately safeguarded American interests, while opening up a way by which the United Nations could function collectively to restrain Soviet aggression.

A second development which we made to the original proposal was to make more specific provision for necessary military strength. Our Resolution provided that under the supplementary

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thirds vote of the General Assembly, including three of the permanent members of the Security Council; 12. (iii) That such an agreement should specify the forces that each signatory agrees to maintain, under the spirit of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 43, for immediate use of the United Nations (a) upon call of the Security Council, or (b) upon call of the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote, including at least three of the permanent members of the Security Council; and 13. (iv) That such an agreement should specify that if a matter pertaining to a threat to or breach of the peace, or act of aggression, is on the agenda of the Security Council, and the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its duties, the signatories who are members of the Security Council will take such steps as may be required to remove it from the agenda of the Security Council; and 14. (v) That such an agreement should come into force when ratified by a majority of the United Nations including three of the permanent members of the Security Council. 15. Such an agreement shall not in any way impair the inherent right of the parties to engage in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, individually or through other collective arrangements consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, or the North Atlantic Security Pact, or the Pact of Rio de Janeiro.

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agreement itself each nation should name the military components which it would earmark for an international force and hold in readiness for police action when called upon by the U.N. This was done in recognition of the speed with which modern aggression moves and the need to assemble forces quickly if resistance is to be effective. I personally would have preferred the actual assembling of such an international force in advance of an attack, so that the various contingents might be trained together in manœuvres and be able to take the field more quickly. But we contented ourselves with the more modest proposal that each nation earmark contingents which would be kept within their own national forces until called for. Even this arrangement would have saved a great deal of time and would have represented marked progress toward the creation of a genuine international force in continual readiness.

After some delay, a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was set up in January 1950 to consider this and other proposals for world peace, such as Atlantic Union, World Federalism, the World Republic, and the so-called Culbertson proposal; and nine days of hearings were held in February.[5]

It was urged in support of the Thomas-Douglas Resolution that by removing the blighting power of the veto, the peaceloving aspirations of the people of the world would be enabled to find effective satisfaction through the United Nations. It was also pointed out that while India, and probably Burma as well, would not join a regional alliance directed against potential Russian or Chinese aggression, there was a much greater chance that they would join a universal compact designed to restrain aggression as such, regardless of source.

Under our proposal, Russia and her satellites were to be invited like other U.N. members to sign the supplementary convention. If they did so, they were to be subject to the same obligations as others, without having the power to balk decisions through the veto. If they refused to join, as was overwhelmingly probable, it was argued that they would lose ground in the propaganda war. Even in this case, however, Russia and her satellites would still be members of the U.N. with all the attendant rights and privileges. There would thus be an inner and an outer ring of U.N. members. The outer ring would still be under the veto provision, but the in-

[5] See "Revision of the United Nations Charter, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations," U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. 808 p.

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ner core would have voluntarily subjected themselves to the two-thirds rule. The United Nations would still have all its existing functions, but would be greatly strengthened from within in carrying them out. All this, moreover, could be accomplished without tearing the organization apart by a futile struggle to amend the Charter.[6]

The State Department, speaking through Assistant Secretary Hickerson, adopted a negative and indeed hostile attitude toward all proposals for change, including the Thomas-Douglas Resolution. Essentially its argument was that other nations might not agree to the proposal, and if that happened we would lose prestige;[7] that the Resolution would require us to use force anywhere in the world, whereas our military capacities were limited; that neither public opinion nor the Constitution might permit such a pledge; and further that any such effort might widen the rift between the Soviets and the Western world. The conclusion of this argument was that we should make the North Atlantic Pact more effective and develop further regional pacts under Article 51 before embarking on a universal pact. It also was contended that it would be highly improper to remove the veto by by-passing Article 109, which provides a means for amending the Charter, despite the fact that action under this Article would itself be subject to the veto.[8] After months of consideration, the Committee on Foreign Relations decided on September 1 to make no recommendations.

V

But in the meantime events had moved swiftly and were creating their own logic. The North Korean Communists, without doubt under Russian stimulation, crossed the 38th Parallel on June 24, 1950 (June 25, Korea time). They probably did not expect either the United Nations or the United States to try to check them; but both acted speedily. By a fortunate coincidence, Russia had temporarily withdrawn her representatives from the Security Council and hence was not in a position to use her veto power. Consequently the Security Council on June 25 deter-

[6] See the testimony of Messrs. Wright, Armstrong, Holcombe, Eichelberger, Schwebe and Douglas, "Hearings," *op. cit.*, p. 3–71.

[7] In fact, there was considerable support abroad for the course we proposed. Thus the Canadian Foreign Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, had spoken publicly in general favor of the Armstrong plan, and either formally or informally there had been approval from Norway and several Latin American republics as well as from certain high British officials.

[8] See the statement by John D. Hickerson, "Hearings," *op. cit.*, p. 415–427.

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mined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea constituted a breach of the peace, called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw their armed forces, and asked all members of the U.N. both to give "every assistance" to the United Nations in executing this resolution and to refrain themselves from giving assistance to North Korea. On the evening of June 25, the President authorized General MacArthur to provide the Korean Government with supplies and equipment. This was announced on June 26. On June 27 the President announced at noon that in response to a Korean appeal for help, and in keeping with the Security Council request for every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of its resolution, he had ordered United States air and sea forces to support the Korean Government troops. At a meeting at 3 p.m. on June 27, the Security Council (with Russia again absent) called upon the members of the U.N. to provide "such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." American troops were quickly sent in from Japan and slowly other nations began to furnish additional forces.

I shall not go into the military history of the Korean war. But I think it is fairly obvious that such effectiveness as the U.N. procedures displayed was due to our own determined will, plus two fortunate accidents. These were: 1, that Russia, through pique or otherwise, had withdrawn from the Security Council and hence was not able to interpose a veto; and 2, that we had occupation troops close at hand in Japan who could be quickly sent in to check the aggressors. It was a lucky coincidence that both of these conditions existed. But there was obviously no surety that they would prevail when the next act of aggression occurred. It was indeed fairly obvious that the Russians would learn from experience and would return to the Security Council so as to be able to sabotage from within any further efforts at collective security; and that the next blow would probably be directed at an area where it would be difficult to assemble a U.N. force with any degree of speed.

At the next meeting of the General Assembly, therefore, Secretary Acheson proposed (September 20, 1950) that 1, the General Assembly should be called into session within 24 hours if the Security Council were prevented from acting upon a breach of peace or an act of aggression; 2, that the member nations should

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designate units of their armed forces which would be ready to serve upon call as United Nations troops; and 3, that the U.N. should provide for a "security patrol" to provide independent observation and reporting in areas where conflict may threaten.[9]

These proposals, after seven weeks of discussion and consideration, were in substance adopted on November 3 in the following three resolutions of the General Assembly:[10]

1. That if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within 24 hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission which for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of 14 Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter. . . .

8. Recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.

[9] If the parentage of these proposals was recognized by the State Department, it was not acknowledged by it.

[10] The vote was 52–5. The nations voting against the plan were the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Argentina and India abstained, and Lebanon was absent.

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The final result, therefore, was to provide that the General Assembly be called upon to check aggression if the Security Council failed to act, but to do this by resolution of the Assembly itself rather than by a supplementary convention. By this method a nation is not as closely bound as it would have been under a convention to furnish aid to check aggression, for even the two-thirds vote of the Assembly is purely recommendatory and can be disregarded by any country. Similarly, no contractual obligation was created on the part of any nation to earmark a portion of its armed forces for services under the United Nations; for here again the resolution of the Assembly does not have any binding force.

The reason the State Department preferred to follow this method of building up the General Assembly's power undoubtedly was because it was quicker, and because of a reluctance to bind the United States by a hard and fast rule to support in every instance the decision of even two-thirds of the Assembly. Perhaps it is ungracious to criticize a group of men who had to deal with so many pressing problems as those that faced the officials of the State Department at this juncture. But with the best will in the world, it may perhaps be suggested that if an early start had been made on preparing a draft convention, as our group had proposed, there might have been sufficient time to negotiate it. Secondly, while the course adopted did free the United States of a plainly defined responsibility, it similarly freed the other nations as well. The over-all loss to collective security, and hence the diminution of our own ultimate safety, may therefore have exceeded the immediate gain.

VI

In short, under the battering of the Korean fighting the U.N. has taken certain steps to improve the mechanism for meeting threats of aggression. The General Assembly has been given the power to brand aggressions and to call on member nations for aid in resisting aggression—a duty which formerly belonged to the Security Council alone. This is a distinct constitutional improvement. But the mechanism for collective action is still far from certain. The actual response of U.N. members to the call for armed forces to check and defeat an aggressor has been very uneven. In the Korean affair the United States has been carrying too large a share of the burden. We do not ask that oth-

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ers prepare to increase their shares of the load simply in order to relieve us; we should still do as much, or more. But we would like others to undertake to do more in order that, when a new aggression threatens, the joint effort may be instant and more effective. That will be the test of whether the U.N. is able to fulfill the noble function which it undertook at San Francisco: to keep the peace—by mediation if possible, if necessary by force.

I believe this purpose might be better attained if our Government had favored in time the plan for a supplementary protocol, open to all U.N. members, the signatories of which would have promised that if the peaceful procedure laid down in the Charter failed and a veto in the Security Council prevented action against an aggressor, they would themselves live up to the principles and purposes of the Charter and restrain the aggressor by force. It would seem that this might have had a beneficial result in three directions. It might have impelled all the signatories to greater efforts to attain the armed forces needed in order to fulfill their obligations. It might have encouraged weak and menaced nations to count on the arrival of help from their more powerful partners, and thus to avoid either falling into the grasp of an aggressor nation or attempting to find safety in the shallow pit of "neutrality." Above all, it might have deterred would-be aggressors from their final gamble by arranging an overwhelming show of contrary force. But this is now water over the dam, and swimming in it, though tempting, is a futile exercise.

Useful progress has in fact been made, by the measures adopted November 3, 1950, toward the goals which we all seek; yet we are constantly being reminded that more remains to be accomplished. In our recent experience, for example, we have found that two nations in which we have signified our interest by advancing them large sums of money for defense and by sending them advisory military missions—Greece and Turkey—have nevertheless continued to feel dangerously exposed to possible assault from the East. They are members of the United Nations; yet they have begged to be allowed to give and receive the additional pledges connected with membership in the Atlantic Pact. In other words, the Atlantic Pact has been carried so far in the direction of an over-all reinsurance for U.N. members, regardless of their geographic position, that these two states, one lying in the Eastern Mediterranean and one commanding the entrance to the Black Sea, must still be described as members of a so-called At-

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lantic community in order to be assured that they will receive the benefits to which they are fully entitled simply by virtue of their membership in the United Nations. Recently the efforts of our Government in this connection seem to have prevailed on various hesitant members of the Atlantic Pact, with the result that Greece and Turkey, distant as they are from the Atlantic Ocean, may soon be recognized as important segments in the defense of Western Europe and admitted to the corresponding rights and duties. The long discussions and delays involved would have been avoided, and the necessary planning for bringing the efficient armies of these two countries into the Western defense system would not have been so dangerously postponed, had they been signatories of the supplementary pact envisaged in the Thomas-Douglas Resolution.

What has happened in the case of Greece and Turkey may happen at any time with other nations on the periphery of Europe, or in the Middle East. Indeed, we have now before us another concrete instance of the difficulty of attempting to deal with general security questions on an *ad hoc* and regional basis. At the time the Atlantic Pact was negotiated, nobody would have thought of suggesting that a Communist country like Jugoslavia be invited to join; and if she had been invited she would certainly have refused. But since 1948, when Marshal Tito broke with Stalin as a result of Soviet attempts to dominate and exploit his country, Jugoslavia has been threatened with invasion by the armies of neighboring Soviet-satellite countries and by the Soviet armies which are stationed in those countries. We in the United States realize that a Soviet or Soviet-sponsored attack on Jugoslavia would be the beginning of a series of inevitable events which would sooner or later—and more than likely at once—end in a general war. We have demonstrated that we have special interests in Greece, which would of course be directly threatened by a satellite invasion of neighboring Jugoslavia. We maintain forces of occupation in another of Jugoslavia's neighbors, Austria. A Soviet conquest of Jugoslavia would seriously imperil the present constitutional and democratic régime in Italy, one of our chief partners in the Atlantic Pact. For these and many other reasons we are all too sure that a war which Moscow might imagine could be "localized" in Jugoslavia would in fact spread like wildfire. In face of this we hear that the men of the Kremlin are debating the pros and cons of a war against Jugoslavia in the

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near future. Obviously, Jugoslavia cannot join a restricted instrument like the Atlantic Pact, which almost inevitably seems to have assumed some of the characteristics of an anti-Communist agreement. But had opportunity offered, she would probably have adhered after 1948 to a protocol simply binding U.N. members to resist aggression; for she asks nothing better than to be helped in resisting aggression, and she would have less fear that the Soviets might retaliate against her for joining a group of states promising merely to live up to the Charter—an instrument to which the Soviet Union itself subscribed and which it still pretends to cherish.

How can this general objective best be achieved today? How are we to give a sense of added security to United Nations members which are not members of any special regional arrangement? It can be done only, it would seem, by providing visible backing to the Charter's promises of help. One useful step in this direction would be to emphasize the character of the United Nations as an independent entity. As Mr. Austin recently noted, we may hope that "in time" a U.N. fighting force may emerge from the efforts of the Collective Measures Committee. The history of past efforts, however, does not suggest that such a coördinated force is sure to be ready when the next emergency occurs. If the Secretary General is determined to put the organization as rapidly as possible into a position where it can fulfill its function not merely as a mediator but as an agency of enforcement, he has various opportunities to do so. The resolution of last November authorizing the sending of Peace Observation Commissions to areas of tension where there seem grounds to suppose that aggression might occur provides a case in point.

Suppose the Secretary General, without waiting for an armed conflict to occur, requested the General Assembly now for authority to send armed guards with any Peace Observation Commissions which the General Assembly may dispatch to areas of tension. Since the existing armed guard of the U.N. is small he might at the same time urge that it be enlarged and also request authority to supplement it in an emergency by asking U.N. members conveniently located to supply armed planes to transport the Mission and guards to the point of emergency and to supply additional soldiers to reënforce the guards already available. In these circumstances, a Peace Observation Commission would not (like the first mission sent to Palestine in 1948) go as "five lonely

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pilgrims," but as a visible symbol of a decision already taken by loyal members of the U.N. to use force if necessary to uphold the Charter and repel aggression. The size of the guard would not be important apart from the fact that it should be able to perform police duties and protect the Commission from ambush or molestation by guerrilla forces. It would not be a striking force. It would, however, demonstrate alike to the threatened nation and to those who were threatening it that the United Nations was officially present on the spot and that its loyal members were united in a coalition to enforce peace.

To take a practical example, what would be the effect of the arrival of such a mission today in Jugoslavia? It may be asked whether Jugoslavia would welcome it. I imagine she would, for its presence would amount to a certification that any attack against the country would be considered by other United Nations members as an attack on each one of them; and since this is just what is in doubt (in Moscow at any rate), any action revealing the actual determination of the United Nations must be eagerly desired in Belgrade. The arrival in Jugoslavia of an armed United Nations mission, representative of a number of the organization's most powerful members, could not properly be resented by Jugoslavia's neighbors. Unless they had bad consciences they would have nothing to fear from its activities; and since Soviet Russia and several of her satellites are themselves members of the United Nations they could not consider a United Nations mission as a hostile agency. And if, finally, it is true that one of the chief risks of war today comes from the existence of "twilight zones," where one side assumes that collective security exists and the other believes that it does not, then Jugoslavia and other nations similarly situated outside the scope of regional pacts would not constitute such risky areas any longer, but would be brought formally and openly within the full scope of United Nations responsibility.

I believe that the United Nations possesses the potentiality of serving as the common denominator among the various secondary agencies—economic and military—which have been brought into being in recent years to serve the cause of peace. Pacts are indeed proliferating at an astounding rate. Each serves a commendable or even, as things stand, essential purpose. But we saw before the last war that it is not enough to try to meet each new dangerous situation by a special new pact. The chief task now (as

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it was then) is to strengthen the central organization, to provide a firm matrix around the nuggets of good intentions and separate good deeds. Today many members of the United Nations are not willing to commit themselves to act against an aggressor outside their own particular orbit, and in consequence there are members who do not trust that their efforts to defend themselves against aggression will be aided actively by all the other loyal members of the organization regardless of geography. So long as this is true collective security is halting and incomplete. Divorced from enforcement the term itself is meaningless. To give the United Nations added determination and strength is today an all-important objective. This is in part because it might deter a specific Russian aggression, but also because if the United Nations is to survive and develop to meet future challenges it must in truth be determined and strong.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Lester B. Pearson

IN May of this year, 5,500 additional Canadian troops arrived in Korea to join the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry which were already there as part of the United Nations forces. At Valcartier, near Quebec City, another brigade group is now in training and is scheduled to become part of the North Atlantic force commanded by General Eisenhower in Western Europe before the end of the year. The presence of these Canadian forces in areas so far distant from Canadian shores, and in a period of at least nominal peace, will provide perhaps the best indication of the development that has been occurring in Canadian foreign policy.

In some ways this change is as remarkable as the parallel and vastly more important one that has transformed the foreign policy of the United States. The break made by the United States with the policy of isolation—which has already produced so many acts of imaginative statesmanship—is one of the most important facts in the history of our time. Nevertheless, in spite of the abruptness of the transition, there are some aspects of American experience which have helped American people to adjust themselves to the tremendous responsibilities they now shoulder. The United States has been a Great Power for at least half a century. During that period it has held a number of overseas possessions; and in many areas of the world its political influence has been of great importance. The effects of its economic and commercial policies have long been apparent everywhere. Furthermore, its power now matches its responsibilities. It is the unquestioned leader of the coalition of free states.

Canada, on the other hand, is neither a great nor an overseas Power; and only occasionally can her voice be influential in deciding the policies of the free world. The key to Canada's present position in international affairs and to the special problems of Canadian diplomacy may be found in the fact that, notwithstanding these limitations on its power and influence, it has accepted heavy international responsibilities.

Before the Second World War the activity of Canadian governments in external affairs was to a considerable extent con-

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cerned with the development of Canada's national position in the international community. But the period ushered in by this successful effort (during which it was theoretically possible for Canada to remain neutral in a general war) was of short duration; lasting, indeed, only from the early 'thirties until September 10, 1939, when Canada declared war on Germany. After that date, Canada for six years committed her resources without reserve to the prosecution of a world-wide war; later became increasingly involved in world problems; and recently has accepted far-reaching collective security obligations. In this process, questions of national status have been subordinated to the necessity of thinking in terms of national security, and to attempts to realize this security through international collective action. Our experience in this regard has been shared by other states which have had far longer participation in international affairs.

The main reason for this growing emphasis on national security through collective action has been, of course, the threat to the free world which is presented by Soviet imperialism. The gravity of the danger has been unveiled in successive stages, so that now it is impossible for any country which values freedom to be unaware of it or to overlook its implications. The danger is complicated and multifold. It is complicated because international Communism is now used as a weapon of Soviet imperialism. It is multifold because the conspiracy with which we are confronted works sometimes through plausible propaganda, sometimes through espionage and subversion, sometimes through the threat of force, and sometimes, as in the case of Korea, through naked military aggression. The response to such a challenge, it is clear, must show not only strength, but wisdom and versatility. But the need for proper tactics cannot obscure the brute fact that military aggression is included in the armory of Cominform weapons and that, if the expansive force of Soviet imperialism issues in armed attack against other countries, it must be met by collective and armed resistance. The armed forces of the free world must, therefore, be increased in the face of the much greater forces which are now at the disposal of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Even more important, however, is the justified conclusion that the creation of adequate military strength, under collective control and for collective use, is now our best hope of deterring the Soviet Union from attempting further acts of aggression. As clearly as any other people, Canadians realize the

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jeopardy in which their own freedom, and indeed the cause of freedom throughout the world, has been placed by the imperialist ambitions of the Kremlin. It is for this reason that no substantial body of opinion in Canada has advocated a policy of isolation or "neutralism." All parties have been united in support of Canada's efforts, in coöperation with other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the United Nations, to preserve peace by building collective strength as a deterrent to aggression.

II

The part that Canada is playing in this concerted international effort would not be possible were it not for the remarkable industrial growth which has been taking place during the last ten years. During the Second World War, the base of Canadian production was greatly widened by the establishment of new industries. Since 1945, our economy has shown exceptional resilience. The commercial dislocations produced by the war inevitably created difficulties for a country so heavily dependent on foreign trade. Nevertheless, though many of Canada's traditional markets have, unhappily, been curtailed, we have been able to find new markets in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, great new natural resources, such as the oil fields of Alberta and the iron ore deposits of Labrador, are being opened up. Perhaps the most comprehensive index of Canada's increasing industrial maturity is provided by her progress in the field of atomic energy. The country's natural resources and its scientific and technical competence have been such as to permit the construction of an atomic energy plant at Chalk River in Ontario to house what is perhaps the most advanced atomic reactor in the world today.

Even before the worsening international situation had led Canada into wider defense commitments, the growth and soundness of the Canadian economy had made possible a vigorous foreign economic policy. Between 1946 and 1951, for example, Canadian contributions for relief and development in other countries totalled 2 billion dollars. The bulk of this took the form of loans to the United Kingdom and other countries of Western Europe. In part, these loans were designed to finance Canada's export surplus during the years immediately after the war and to prevent the domestic dislocation which would have occurred if traditional customers had been forced by exchange difficulties to re-

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duce drastically their imports from Canada. The loans were also, however, regarded in Canada as a contribution toward the re-establishment of a multilateral world economy based on liberal, nondiscriminatory trade policies and stabilized exchange rates, which would make possible a steady expansion of trade and the maintenance of high levels of employment in all countries.

Although Canada's foreign lending after the war was largely concentrated in Western Europe, some of it was directed to the Far East. Loans, for example, were made both to China and to Indonesia. And previously, during the course of the war, the Chinese Nationalist Government had been the recipient of some Canadian Mutual Aid.

In making the detailed arrangements for these transactions, the Canadian Government for the first time was involved in some of the general problems of the Far East. During the last three years that involvement has increased at a very rapid rate. Far Eastern questions now absorb much of the attention of the Canadian Parliament and Government. The increase in interest in Asian matters among the public and the press has also been remarkable. In our Far Eastern relations we have not so much been opening a new chapter as opening a whole new volume; for, until recently, Asia to most Canadians was a closed book. One of our provinces is on the Pacific and through its ports for many years missionaries, businessmen and travellers had passed on their way to and from the Far East. There had been a Canadian Legation in Tokyo before the war and substantial Canadian economic interests in Japan. The Canadian Government had participated in a number of negotiations on particular questions dealing with commerce, with the position of Canadian missionaries and with Asian immigration. But none of these concerns made it necessary for Canada to have what could conceivably be called a Far Eastern policy.

The extent of the recent change may be illustrated by Canada's active participation in the Colombo Plan for economic development in South and Southeast Asia. Unlike previous Canadian financial assistance, it is not expected that this participation will be of direct economic benefit to Canada, since our export surplus has now dried up and any grants or loans must inevitably compete with the demands of our own economic development. The purpose of the Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan is, simply, to assist in raising the standard of living of friendly peo-

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ples on the other side of the globe whose well-being and stability are of importance to the whole of the free world—ourselves included.

As the area covered by the Colombo Plan would suggest, the main avenue of approach for Canada to the problems of Asia has been by way of the Indian sub-continent. India, Pakistan and Ceylon are all members of the Commonwealth, and Canadians have watched with close and sympathetic attention their achievement of independence. Precedents from Canadian constitutional history were not without value in arranging for the transfer of sovereignty to India and Pakistan which occurred in 1947; and the Canadian Government was able at a Commonwealth conference in April 1949 to offer some suggestions which made it easier to find a formula which would permit India to remain within the Commonwealth even after it had become a republic. The meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers which was held in Colombo in January 1950—the first Commonwealth conference to be held in Asia and the first to consider chiefly Asian issues—not only witnessed to the success of the constitutional evolution which had been taking place but also provided a further opportunity for Canada and other Commonwealth countries to become better acquainted with Far Eastern problems.

It will be noticed how significant a rôle the Commonwealth of Nations has played in this reorientation of Canada's interest toward the Far East. Of late years, Canada's attitude toward the Commonwealth has entered, I think, on a new phase. During the period when Canadian political leaders were achieving and consolidating autonomy for Canada in her external relations, it was perhaps natural that appreciation of the value of the Commonwealth association should not exclude, in many quarters, some considerable grain of wariness. This diffidence was kept alive by repeated proposals for centralized machinery which would have given institutional form to the very close and continuous, but often informal, coöperation already existing between members of the Commonwealth; proposals which were primarily designed, in the eyes of many who favored them, to enable all Commonwealth countries to have a single foreign policy. Canada consistently opposed these proposals, partly because, to many Canadians, collective action in those days seemed likely to be overly influenced by imperial interests; partly because such Commonwealth arrangements might have appeared to be an obstacle to

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closer coöperation with the United States. Canadian opinion is, I think, as strongly opposed as ever to a centralized commonwealth; though for different reasons which arise out of the different circumstances of today. The problem, however, is no longer a serious one, because the new Commonwealth, with three Asian members, lends itself even less to centralizing proposals than the old one.

The nature of the present-day Commonwealth is now well understood, I think, in all of the member countries; and, for that reason, the reservations and even suspicions that have sometimes marked Canada's attitude in the past have largely died away. At the same time Canadians have been discovering new and positive advantages in their membership in this family of free nations. The lifeblood of the modern Commonwealth is constant exchange of information and constant consultation. This process brings Canada into close and friendly touch, not only with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which share with us the heritage of Western civilization, but also with some of the most important countries of Asia. In a world so plagued by divisions and misunderstandings as ours, it is no small advantage, I think, that Asian and Western leaders should be able to sit down together in Commonwealth meetings in an atmosphere of intimacy and complete equality. There are other links which connect the countries of Asia to the West—and in the course of time I hope there will be many more. Of those which exist at present, the Commonwealth of Nations provides, in my opinion, the most important. It is essential that it should be maintained, in the interest not only of its members but of all free states.

III

The Commonwealth, then, has helped to make Canada more conscious of Asia. We recognize that the growth of freedom in Asia is primarily the responsibility of Asian peoples themselves. There is much, however, which the countries of the West can do either to help or hinder this process; and it is clearly vital that their policies should be so designed as to promote development of free political institutions on a sound basis of social and economic well-being. If, through aggression or folly or inertia, the whole of Asia were to be allowed to fall under Communist domination, the free world would be tragically maimed and would be

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exposed to even greater dangers than it faces today. The problem of what Western countries, including Canada, should do is difficult, since the Asian panorama is so broad and, to Western eyes at least, so confused. Nevertheless, there are a number of landmarks which stand out through the mist and which have been taken by the Canadian Government as guides for policy. In the first place, in some Asian countries as elsewhere social changes are required. It is essential that nothing done by Western countries should impede in any way changes which are thought necessary and desirable by Asian opinion. Secondly, the standard of living throughout most of Asia is pitifully low. If ordinary men and women in the free countries of Asia are to feel attached to the new political institutions which they have established, they must be given hope of receiving some tangible benefits for themselves in the form of more food, more clothing, better housing and better protection from disease. This can be done only if the wealthier and more highly industrialized countries of the West are willing to assist. In honesty it must also be added, however, that economic help from abroad will have little effect if political animosities between Asian countries prevent them from making the best use of their own resources in the work of economic development. Third, the countries of Asia must be encouraged to take a large share in settling the many vexing political issues which cry out for solution. There is a complex network of racial, religious and cultural affiliations among the countries of Asia which cannot safely be ignored and which can be of great use in the search for a stable and acceptable settlement of Asian problems. Fourth, the forces of nationalism are probably the most powerful influences on Asian opinion today. The achievement of national independence by these countries was to them an essential prerequisite for further progress. Any action by the West which could be interpreted as showing a desire for their retrogression to subordinate or colonial status would be bitterly resented. Absolute equality is now the only possible foundation for friendly relations between the countries of East and West. We must not let Communism become the accepted champion of nationalism and racial equality in Asia.

We in Canada have built a nation based on equality between two different cultures. I think that in working out a satisfactory and fruitful relationship between Asia and the West, this principle may prove as valuable as the doctrine of universal human

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rights. Certainly, we must remember that the civilization of the West has now to be regarded as only one of the independent civilizations to be found throughout the world. After a sleep of many centuries, the civilizations in the Far East, which had long lain quiescent or subdued, are stirring. They have had glorious achievements. They still have their own values; and they are demanding the right to develop them in their own way. The reemergence in a modern political form of these ancient civilizations, with their own individual traditions, should enrich the life of all men throughout the world.

If the Western world is successful in convincing the peoples of Asia that its policies are not dictated by considerations of pride or power, but are intended to create a world in which Far Eastern civilizations can develop freely; if we can show them that collective action against aggression does not mean support for reaction, or resistance to necessary change, then I think we may be confident of retaining the friendship of those Asian countries which are still free. We may also be bold enough to hope, I think, that the people of China will not indefinitely be willing to have their national interests subordinated to the imperial interests of Russia, and that the present unnatural alliance between Chinese nationalism and Soviet imperialism may be broken. In our determination, however, to meet the menace of Communist aggression in Asia or elsewhere, we should not be led, or misled, into policies which harness us to reactionary forces or blind us to the sincere gropings of millions of Asians for more bread and more freedom.

IV

Canada's North Atlantic policy comes closer home, because that area includes the three countries that are nearest to us historically, politically, and even geographically: the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Our policy here is to help build up a cohesive group of states, closely coöperating in all fields of activity. That objective will not be achieved quickly or easily. It will never be achieved if we do not succeed in renewing and maintaining the vigor and progressive character of our common Western civilization and if we do not strengthen its unifying forces.

The restless intellectual energy of the West has created cathedrals, philosophic systems and turbo-jet engines. It has greatly

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extended the frontiers of knowledge and has spread Western science and trade throughout the world. The national states which have been formed during this process have sometimes through their own rivalries come close to destroying the civilization of which they were all a part. Yet, in spite of the wars in which they have been engaged, they have always recognized that they had much in common. They all acknowledge, for instance, their debt to Greek speculation, to Hebrew prophecy, to Roman law and to the Christian faith. The countries of the new world all share in these traditions and form a part of the same civilization. Canadians are never likely to forget the fact, since we have two mother countries in Europe. With one of them we have maintained, by our own deliberate choice, a political connection. With the other, we have kept close cultural relations. The bells in the steeples along the St. Lawrence round which the villages cluster still ring out to remind us that Paris and Chartres are as much a part of our heritage as Canterbury and London.

The wealth of this common civilization—material, intellectual and moral—carelessly dissipated though some of it has been, is, nevertheless, immense. To work toward the establishment of a North Atlantic community of nations, all sharing in this great legacy from the past, all with their own special contributions to make in the future, all pledged to be of mutual assistance to one another, is surely a task worthy of our finest effort and of our greatest zeal. The goal of such a society, strong, varied and secure but not self-centered or exclusive, and anxious to profit by contact with other civilizations, is an ideal, it seems to me, which can support and encourage us through all the difficulties of the present time.

No country has a greater stake in the success or failure of this great movement than Canada. For we are both North American and European. Before the last war, the spectre haunting Canadian policy-makers was that the United States would remain aloof from British and French efforts to protect the peace against Nazi and Fascist aggression. Today the spectre is that the United States may feel it necessary to pursue policies inside our coalition which the other members cannot wholeheartedly follow; or that inadequate coöperation from the other members may discourage American effort and leadership to the point where Washington may decide to "go it alone." Any Canadian government is bound to do what it can to exorcise these dangers; and this may

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mean at times expressing its own views forthrightly in London or Paris or, above all, in Washington, where the center of power now lies. This is the first principle of Canadian diplomacy. It is founded on the inescapable fact that no country in the world has less chance of isolating itself from the effect of American policies and decisions than Canada. If Washington "went it alone," where would Ottawa go?

We recognize, however, that a diplomacy of this kind, depending as it does on the influence Canada can exert with greater Powers, can be carried out successfully only if our interventions are restrained, responsible and constructive; and if we act, in discharging our own obligations, in a way which receives and deserves the respect of our friends in the coalition. For us the very essence of the North Atlantic coalition, and of its developing sense of community, is that the coöperation which it makes possible bridges the ocean.

Though it has deep roots and is a natural creation, the North Atlantic community is still in its infancy as an association commanding loyalty and support. It is, as yet, only an incipient entity, and, so far as I am aware, has made only one appearance in an international instrument—in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Canadian Government sets great store by that Article as an earnest of future coöperation in the North Atlantic area in other than military fields.

It may be that, while the North Atlantic community is gradually developing, an even more tightly-knit grouping in Western Europe may emerge. The arguments for closer coöperation among the countries of Western Europe as a method both of muting old antagonisms and of increasing economic efficiency by providing a larger market are strong. It is for European countries themselves to decide whether they think that integration of this kind would be in their own best interests.

The Canadian Government has followed with great interest and sympathy these moves toward European unity. We hope, however, that they will be made within the framework of that wider movement toward a North Atlantic community. It would be premature at this stage, I think, to attempt to decide whether such a community could grow more rapidly if the countries of Western Europe were first to form a closer association among themselves, or were to move toward membership in the North Atlantic community as national entities, retaining as high a de-

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gree of national sovereignty as the United States and Canada. However, even now it seems clear to us that the creation of an exclusive and probably high-cost trading bloc in Western Europe would be unwise and unfruitful. It is equally clear that an attempt to form a solid neutral political grouping in Western Europe which would weaken or even break the defense links which now bind North America to Western Europe would in the long run be disastrous both to Europe and to the cause of freedom itself. It would also be highly dangerous for North America since, in the view of the Canadian Government, Western Europe is of greater strategic importance than any other area in the world. Indeed, it was that strategic appreciation of our own security interest which above all else led us to accept the military obligations contained in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Canada regards its NATO commitments as a particular means for implementing the general doctrine of collective security embodied in the United Nations Charter. The first Article of the Charter enunciates a universal obligation which rests on all members of the United Nations alike "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." That obligation must be honored if the morale of countries in exposed positions is to be maintained, and if the melancholy story of the 'thirties, when one victim after another was picked off by the aggressor, is not to be repeated. On the other hand, under present circumstances when the military strength of the free world, although increasing, is much less in many important categories than the military might of its adversaries, and when we are living through a period which is neither peace nor war, the general obligation stated in the forefront of the Charter cannot always be automatically interpreted as a cast-iron commitment to resist aggression anywhere it may occur with unlimited military force. If that reasoning were accepted, the theory of unlimited collective action everywhere might mean in practice no real security anywhere. While recognizing aggression always for what it is, and while taking appropriate action against it, we will yet need to exercise judgment in any particular case to determine how the obligation of collective security can most effectively be implemented so that aggressors may not exploit the provisions of the Charter to dissipate more than would be advisable the presently limited military forces of the free

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world. In certain regions aggression must obviously be countered with every military resource that can be mustered. To ensure the protection of these areas, the general obligation of the Charter must be put in more precise and automatic form. This, I believe, can best be done by the negotiation of security pacts for particular areas; indeed that is the immediate purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The need to exercise judgment in deciding how the security obligations of the Charter can be discharged to the best effect does not mean that we can ever afford to turn a blind eye to any act of aggression, or can pick and choose among possible victims, helping some and leaving others entirely to their fate. Nor does it mean that there is one law to be applied to the strong and another to the weak. It does mean, however, that the responsibility of defending the free world in the present circumstances is so grave that those who share it will require the highest qualities of intelligence as well as the most sensitive consciences in deciding where the limited forces at their disposal should be applied. For the time being this principle may seem of not much more than academic importance since any armed attack on a large scale, no matter where it occurred, might easily precipitate a general war, and since one of the most pressing tasks of diplomacy is to convince would-be aggressors that they cannot count on immunity from instant retaliation if they move against their neighbors. But there have been situations, even within the present year, when the necessity for careful judgment has been highly relevant; and it is quite possible that similar situations may recur.

v

Let no one think, however, that this attitude indicates that the Canadian Government is, or has been, under any temptation to abandon the principle of collective security. The facts speak for themselves. The contingent which we have contributed to the United Nations forces in Korea is the third largest of all those which have been provided by members of the United Nations. Our troops, our ships and our planes have been sent to Korea to maintain the principle of collective security. That will also be the purpose of the brigade group and the 11 squadrons of aircraft which we have undertaken to station in Western Europe.

Let no one think, either, that we have lost faith in the United Nations. We believe that the United Nations has still a central

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rôle to play in security matters, and we welcome the inquiry now being made in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of last November to see how the organization can be put in a position where it can carry out this rôle more swiftly and effectively than in the past. The United Nations has, of course, other important functions to perform. But it is probably true that unless it can prove itself as a security organization its vitality will be sapped. Under the strong and resolute leadership of the United States it has met the challenge in Korea and has shown its value as a means of organizing collective resistance to aggression. It should not be expected, however, that the theory of collective security can be translated into practice without encountering complexities and special problems. One of these problems, to my mind, is how to make the best use of the free world's growing, but still limited, military resources for the maintenance of world-wide security.

Another problem which has been revealed by this first attempt to organize collective security on a large scale is how to devise a mode of association which will allow for effective leadership and yet give a strong sense of participation to all those countries which are contributing military forces. The same problem has also risen within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Canada shares with her allies a real concern in finding a solution to this problem. The field of our foreign interests and the extent of our military commitments have in recent months been almost visibly stretched; and such a process can never be accomplished without discomfort. This will be eased and Canada's participation made most effective only if Canadians can be made to feel that their share in the vital decisions which must be made is proportionate to their contribution. But that is a necessity for many other countries besides Canada. Indeed, it is a requirement to which great importance is attached by all countries which, like my own, have voluntarily and wholeheartedly accepted the leadership of the United States.

There is, I think, no task more difficult of accomplishment than the leadership of a coalition of friendly but free nations, agreed on objectives but not always agreed on how they should be reached. The operation of a coalition in wartime, as all history teaches, is difficult enough. It is more difficult in peacetime when the absence of external danger accentuates the importance of smaller conflicts of interest and advantage between the various

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allies. It is most difficult of all in a time such as the present of "partial peace"—or, if you like, "phony peace"—when the threat to security is present but when the willingness to strive and sacrifice which accompanies an all-out armed struggle for survival can be maintained only with great effort. The problem is complicated by the necessity of basing our association on a theory of sovereign equality of states, which is sometimes hard to square with the fact that the states concerned are unequal in power and in responsibility. The reconciliation of fact and theory will require among all of us qualities of restraint, understanding and tolerance; a vision wider than our own national boundaries.

Mr. Acheson put the point wisely and succinctly when he said on June 29 in Washington that "the pattern of responsibility within which we operate is a responsibility to interests which are broader than our own. . . ." We in Canada are confident that such a pattern of responsibility and such a mode of freely accepted association can increasingly be realized. In that confidence, we will continue to make our contribution to the creation of a peaceful world in which freedom can be secure.

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THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Frank Tannenbaum

A GREAT people weathers a period of stress like that through which Americans are now living if its institutions are sound and express its deepest convictions. The American institutions, molded by time and experience, contain values that give meaning to the things we do. Time, place and fortune have wrought their own special imprint upon the American conscience and endowed our folk with an ethical bias peculiarly their own. The indefinable something we call the American outlook adds up to a philosophy of life and a political morality. But Americans are inclined to take their ethical notions for granted and busy themselves with immediate issues. They do not worry about their ideology and would not recognize the meaning of the word if used to describe their beliefs. If in the present crisis they are troubled and confused by the contradictory policies urged upon them, it is because some of their counselors speak a language alien to American experience and indifferent to the inspiration of American polity. We seem to have lost sight of the recognizable drift of our own history and of the sweep of its great energy.

This exuberant and restless power, so recognizably descriptive of the United States, has been disciplined by an equally strong moral bias which has not only canalized and contained it within bounds, but humanized it as well. How else explain this crude and boundless might, which fought two great wars 3,000 and 6,000 miles distant from its own shores, and then, at the height of its military glory—with the enemy defeated and the world helpless to resist the strength of its armies—dismantled its gathered force and returned to the pursuit of peaceful ways, asking only that the other nations of the world do the same? It has placed no other people under duress and has exacted neither homage nor obeisance from the weak and the powerless, as well it might have done. Nay, more than that. It has not only denied itself any compensation for the burden and cost laid upon it by two wars, but at the end of the fighting it has offered its resources and its skill to help bind the wounds and assuage the pain that the wars had imposed upon other peoples—including the enemies it had just

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defeated. The Hoover Commission, in the First World War, UNRRA and the Marshall Plan at the end of the second, are but parts of the effort by the American people to make life livable again for those who had suffered in the conflict. But the story does not end there. After the First World War, Wilson became the architect of a League of Nations that would protect the weak against the strong—against ourselves in fact; and, after the Second World War, Roosevelt and Hull became the chief movers to do over again through the United Nations what had been attempted after the First World War by Wilson. To say that a people that on two such occasions behaved in this way has no philosophy of politics, no sense of direction, and no international policy is to speak the sheerest nonsense. What may be said is that the United States has never elaborated its implicit values into a conscious doctrine. This, however, is an evidence of strength and vitality. A formal ideology is an unconscious apology, a claim for validity that needs to be defended. A vigorous, spontaneous life calls for no explanation and overflows any doctrine.

The tenor of American polity, both internal and external, is clear enough if we will only look at it. If we have not looked at it in recent times, this is in part due to the distorted doctrines in which our generation and the one before it have been caught up. Many of those doctrines are not descriptive of our behavior and do not stem from American experience. We have—and here our intellectuals and teachers are perhaps more guilty than others—permitted ourselves to be beguiled by theories of economic determinism and "power politics." We have attempted to explain American foreign policy on grounds in which we really do not believe—the proof of which is that we do not act upon them. Our behavior is a standing contradiction of the theories taught us in books based upon the beliefs and practices of other peoples. And when—as happened on occasion—our government through the executive departments has behaved as if the theories of "power politics" and economic determinism were true, the American people repeatedly repudiated the policy, and forced a return to the traditional though inadequately formulated American belief that the little nations of the world have the same right to live their own life as the strong and powerful. In fact, our sympathy for the weak has always been greater than our admiration for the strong. The "big stick" formula of Theodore Roosevelt is an anomaly in our experience, was condemned by large numbers of Americans

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from the beginning, and formally repudiated within a few years after his death. The Reuben Clark memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, written inside the State Department in 1928, represents the official demise of the big stick theme in American foreign policy. But even Theodore Roosevelt explained many times that he meant to strengthen the weaker states in the Caribbean rather than permanently to control them.

In short, the American people have always had a principle of foreign policy. They have had it from the very beginning. The basic motivation that has governed American relations with other states became evident during the earliest dissidence that led up to the War of Independence, was the chief cause of the Revolution itself and (to use William H. Seward's phrase) "is in reality the chief element of foreign intercourse in our history."

The controlling proposition in American foreign policy was clearly enunciated by James Madison when he said: "The fundamental principle of the Revolution was, that the colonies were coördinate members with each other and with Great Britain, of an empire united by a common executive sovereign, but not united by a common legislative sovereign. The legislative power was maintained to be as complete in each American Parliament, as in the British Parliament. . . . A denial of these principles by Great Britain, and the assertion of them by America, produced the Revolution." The "fundamental principle . . . that the colonies were coördinate members with each other and that . . . the legislative power was . . . as complete in each American Parliament, as in the British Parliament" has remained the unbroken popular theme in American foreign relations. It was this inspiration that ultimately made Rhode Island and Texas equal within the American federal union. The Pan American system of equal states rests upon the same fundamental principle, and to this basic motivation we must ascribe the gradual evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from unilateral to multilateral policy. It explains the "hands off" injunction imposed upon European Powers in regard to the Western Hemisphere and is the reason for the non-aggressive attitude in the Monroe Doctrine. This fundamental principle was the keystone for our advocacy of the Open Door in China, as it was the justification for a continuing opposition to Japan. We accepted the challenge of a war in the Far East rather than yield the governing principle in our foreign policy.

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The American commitment to the ideal of the juridical equality and moral integrity of states explains our participation in two world wars. It explains our effort to develop a League of Nations so as, in Woodrow Wilson's words, to expand ". . . the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world . . . that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and the powerful." In such words President Wilson was simply restating the version of the "fundamental principle" which Madison knew was the chief cause of the War of Independence. But the same motivation was also one of the chief reasons for the defeat of the League of Nations. One need but turn back to the debate in the Senate to recognize that what defeated the League of Nations was in no small degree the conviction that America's belief in the "coördinate" membership of all peoples had been repudiated. There is a peculiar consistency in this belief of ours that the little nation has the same rights as the big one. Our quarrel with Russia is upon this ground. The Truman Doctrine is a modern version of the basic propositions of President Monroe; and our defense of Korea is explainable only on the grounds that the only kind of a world the American people can comfortably live in is one in which Korea has no more right to attack and dismember Russia than Russia has to attack and dismember Korea—or Finland. We really believe that Ecuador and Haiti are coördinate with the United States, just as we believe that Poland and Bulgaria are coördinate with Russia.

To some these American notions seem impractical and foolish. Influential scholars and counselors would have us abandon them. They suggest that we cease being childish and idealistic and recognize that the national interest requires us to become disciples of Machiavelli, take our lessons from Richelieu, Bismarck or Clemenceau. The fact that Germany and Japan have committed national suicide by consistent adhesion to these doctrines seems not to dampen the eloquence of those who would persuade us to abandon the beliefs and practices by which we have lived and prospered from the beginning.

II

The United States is the oldest international society (excepting Switzerland) in existence. It is also the largest. It is composed of 48 "indestructible," "sovereign" states, greatly differing in

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wealth and population. How great the difference between them is can be seen by comparing Rhode Island to Texas in area, and Nevada with about 160,000 population to New York with more than 14,000,000. And yet there is no invidious distinction between them, and a Senator like Borah from a small state could be a dominant voice in the foreign policy of the United States for some 20 years. In the United States, the representative of the smallest member of the Federation can speak for the entire system without anyone being aware that he represents the least of the states. This is a profound political miracle and was made possible by our acceptance of the principle of equality. Without it, no nation based upon a federal system could have been built to span an entire continent and grow to be not merely the most powerful but perhaps the stablest political entity on the face of the earth.

The issue of juridical equality had to be settled first in the history of the United States, or this nation might never have been born. The Constitutional Convention which advised a "more perfect union" found, as had already been shown in the Continental Congress, that the little states would not yield their juridical equality, their equal sovereignty, or their territorial integrity. This was the stumbling block to union. The warm debates revealed the danger of a permanent dismemberment of the newly-born nation. Oliver Elsworth from Connecticut said on June 29, 1787: "If all the states are to exist, they must of necessity have an equal vote in the general government. Small communities when associating with greater can only be supported by an equality of votes." And Luther Martin from Maryland laid it down that "you must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business is at an end." The course of the debates need not be reviewed here, but the compromise—reluctantly agreed to by the large states—adopted the older practice of Connecticut, that of an equal vote for the political units and a popular vote for the governor. Each state was to have two members in the Senate; representation in the House was to be determined on the basis of population in the states. In effect, this means that the smaller states can outvote the larger ones in the Senate, and that in any crucial legislative issue the states are equal, because a bill has to be passed by both houses. It also means that in foreign relations the smaller states could play the decisive rôle if they voted as a bloc. But they do not vote that way. Equality has eliminated jealousy.

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The extension of this principle of equality to the new states to be carved out of the Western Territories is, next to the formation of the union, the most important political decision in our entire history. Without it there would have been no federal union that spans a continent. It was recognized that in time the new states would outnumber the original 13, it was argued that the East would be surrendering itself into the hands of the new states, and among other limitations it was proposed that the representatives of the new states should never be allowed to outnumber those of the original 13. But the principle of equality prevailed. Madison insisted that "the Western States never would nor ought to submit to a union which degraded them from an equal rank with other states." The resolution adopted by the Continental Congress to govern the admission of the new states said that new districts "should become and ever after be and constitute a separate, free, and sovereign state, and be admitted into the union as such, with all the privileges and immunities of those states which now compose the Union." This is what coördinate membership means. This same principle was applied to the lands that came with the Floridas, the Transcontinental Treaty, the Louisiana Purchase, and those ceded to the United States as a result of the war with Mexico. The principle was further evidenced by the agreement that no large state could be divided, and no small state united with another without its own consent.

The juridical and political equality of the "indestructible" states has made possible sharp difference of opinion over questions of interest and policy without undermining the union. What we have not quarreled about is the right of each state to its full share in a common judgment and in the formation of a common policy. And herein lies the basic issue in international relations. We forget that the United States is an international society because we do not quarrel over the right to partake in common decisions.

The principle of equal membership within the federal union ultimately eventuated in Calhoun's doctrine of a dissoluble compact between the states, and in the Civil War. The South still speaks of the War Between the States. But it also explains the even more remarkable political event of the readmission of the defeated states on a par with the victors. If the union was to survive, no other course was possible. A federal union built upon the principle of equal sovereignty is not a proper instrument for

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military government nor for the arbitrary denial to others of the rights and immunities which the individual states claim for themselves. The American ideal of coördinate states is in its essence anti-imperialist.

III

This is well illustrated in our relations with Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine is woven of many contradictory strands and influences, but the firm hand of John Quincy Adams, more than that of any other, shaped its final form. Two years before it was given to the world, Adams had declared that "colonial establishments cannot fulfill the great objects of governments in the just purpose of civil society." They were, he said, "incompatible with the essential character of our institutions;" they were "engines of wrong," and in time it would be "the duty of the human family to abolish them, as they are now endeavoring to abolish the slave trade." The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, has in its background the broad proposition, again in Adams' own words that: "The whole system of modern colonization is an abuse of government and it is time that it should come to an end."

Our government chose to act separately when announcing the new policy rather than with Great Britain, as originally proposed by Canning. But it is worth recalling that John Quincy Adams urged the British to follow our example and recognize the independence of the Latin American nations because "upon this ground . . . a firm and determined stand could now be jointly taken by Great Britain and the United States in behalf of the *Independence of Nations.*"

President Monroe before issuing the declaration consulted Jefferson and Madison, who had preceded him in office. Jefferson thought that it was a good occasion "of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations" begun by Bonaparte and "now continued" by the Holy Alliance. Madison suggested that it might encompass not merely the Western Hemisphere but Spain and Greece as well. The full significance of the Monroe Doctrine must be read against the anti-imperialism of its chief American sponsors. And William H. Seward, writing to the French Government, declared that: "The practice of this Government, from its beginning, is a guarantee to all nations of the respect of the American people for the free sovereignty of the people in every other State."

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This same theme comes, surprisingly perhaps, from Richard Olney, famous for his boast in the Venezuelan dispute that a fiat of the United States "is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition" in this continent. He added, however, that the Monroe Doctrine "does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American state." And in what seems like a reminder of the great debate in the Constitutional Convention here transferred to a debate between nations, he said that "the United States would cherish the territorial rights of the feeblest of those states, regarding them . . . as equal to even the greatest nationalities."

It was left to Theodore Roosevelt temporarily to twist the Monroe Doctrine beyond its historical intent. He argued that, "however reluctantly," the United States might be compelled "to the exercise of an international police power" in the Caribbean area. But even Roosevelt's exuberance was modulated by the basic American tradition, and he declared that the Doctrine did not imply or carry "an assumption of superiority, and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate" over the Latin American countries. It was during Theodore Roosevelt's administration that Elihu Root, speaking as Secretary of State, made the ever-memorable statement: "We wish for no territory except our own. . . . We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire." And it was during Root's administration of the Department of State that the United States' delegates to the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague sought "a limitation upon the use of force" in the collection of public debts, because such a practice was inconsistent "with that respect for the independent sovereignty of other nations which is . . . the chief protection of the weak nations against the oppression of the strong." In 1915 Wilson proposed the formalization of the idea of coördinate membership in the hemisphere by a treaty which would guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of the American nations, "so that," to use Colonel House's words, "the Monroe Doctrine may be upheld by all the American Republics instead of by the United States alone as now." Hughes, when Secretary of State, said that "our interest does not lie in controlling foreign peoples; that would be a policy of mischief and disaster," and quoted Jefferson on "the advantages of a cordial fraternalization among all Ameri-

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can nations." While Reuben Clark in 1928 declared that "the so-called 'Roosevelt corollary' . . . is . . . not . . . justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine."

The Good Neighbor policy is the logical sequence to a tradition as old as our government. Bolivar's effort of 1826 to form a federation of American nations was resuscitated by Blaine when he called together a Pan American Congress in Washington in 1889. These nations, to use Blaine's words, "shall meet together on terms of absolute equality." Secretary Hull's definition of the coördinate position of the American states as consisting of "the absolute independence, the unimpaired sovereignty, the perfect equality and the political integrity of each nation large and small" has a classic finality about it. The Non-Intervention Doctrine enunciated by Franklin D. Roosevelt in Montevideo in 1933, and the series of resolutions beginning with the Havana Conference in 1940 and culminating in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947, converted the Monroe Doctrine from a unilateral to a multilateral policy. Wilson's hope, embodied in the proposed treaty of 1915, had been fulfilled. The growth of the Organization of American States extends to the Western Hemisphere the ideal of a federation of "indestructible states" upon which the United States itself is founded.

IV

The more than a century-old history of our relations with the independent countries of this hemisphere illustrates the slow and sometimes painful working out of this doctrine. When, during the Grant Administration, an attempt was made to annex Santo Domingo, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts vigorously opposed the project because: "Santo Domingo is the earliest of that independent group . . . towards which our duty is as plain as the Ten Commandments. Kindness, beneficence, assistance, aid, help, protection, all that is implied in good neighborhood—these we must give . . . their independence is as precious to them as is ours to us, and it is placed under the safeguard of natural laws which we can not violate with impunity." After the War with Spain, when the question of Cuba came up for consideration, President McKinley wrote: "I speak not of annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression;" and he instructed the military commander to administer the island for the benefit of the Cubans.

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The controversy with Mexico, which began in 1912, when Taft was President, and continued almost unabated for 30 years through periods of great tension, ended in a peaceful settlement because the people of the United States would not destroy a nation in defense of material interests. Wilson said: "It is none of my business and none of your business how long they [the Mexicans] take in determining their form of government. It is none of my business and none of yours how they go about the business. The country is theirs, the government is theirs, the liberty, if they can get it—God speed them in getting it—is theirs, and whilst I am President nobody shall interfere with them." His statement prevailed in the end in spite of Coolidge's assertion in 1927 that, "The person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the nation, even when abroad."

Theodore Roosevelt's boast, "I took the Canal," is less impressive than the fact that Panama was encouraged to set up as an equal member within the American family of nations. And after the Second World War it exercised its equality by requiring the United States to surrender, much against its will, the use of air bases which it had constructed for the defense of the Canal. In some ways the Panamanian rebellion is comparable to the secession of West Virginia during the Civil War. It is not a good instance of imperial conquest. And to appease our bad conscience we paid $25,000,000 to Colombia.

The series of interventions in the Caribbean and Central America that followed the Roosevelt Corollary are fruitful demonstrations of the workings of the American fundamental principle. The significant point to remember is that intervention is taken to be a temporary intrusion. No one believed—neither the Americans, nor the Haitians, Dominicans or Nicaraguans—that the United States was there to stay. In each case the President was placed on the defensive. The Senate appointed investigating committees, individual senators attempted to attach riders to the naval appropriation bills denying the use of public funds for the payment of the Marines in the occupied countries. The different administrations were compelled repeatedly to justify their activities before the country, and for half of the time were busy explaining that we were trying to withdraw the Marines from foreign soil. The Clark memorandum officially denied the legitimacy of the government's policy of intervention, and Hoover said in 1928 that "dominion of other people is repugnant to our ideal of

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human freedom," and in 1929, that "in the large sense we do not wish to be represented abroad [by Marines]." The liquidation of the policy of intervention was begun under Coolidge and Hoover and was completed by Roosevelt. The Platt Amendment, supported and opposed with so much heat, was also repudiated. The American adventure in imperialism in this hemisphere evaporated in one generation.

The one real deviation in the application of the fundamental principle in our foreign relations in this hemisphere is to be found in the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico. Both of these events are so closely tied to the struggle for position between the slave-holding and free states that they do not really make a clear case of repudiation of the principle. The opposition to both was bitter. John Quincy Adams, "the architect of American foreign policy," signed a public manifesto opposing the annexation of Texas; Lincoln, Webster and Clay, among many others, condemned the Mexican War and the acquisition of Mexican territory. Clay said: "This is no war of defense, but one of unnecessary and of offensive aggression. It is Mexico that is defending her firesides, her castles, and her altars, not we." He then compared the war with Mexico to the partition of Poland. American historians have generally criticized the war with Mexico. H. H. Bancroft calls the war "a deliberately calculated scheme of robbery on the part of a superior power" and contemporary historians repeat Lincoln's accusation that President Polk simulated an attack by Mexico. One unhappy historian attempts a defense of the war because "every American father ought to be able to say to his boy: 'Your country never fought an unjust nor an inglorious war.' " The question has continued to trouble our conscience, and Henry L. Stimson, speaking in New York before the Council on Foreign Relations in 1931, while Secretary of State, referred back to this period as an aberration "directly attributable to the influence of slavery in this country, then at the height of its political power."

V

This same doctrine has worked its way into the Far East. After the Spanish-American War, President McKinley was sorely troubled by what we ought to do about the Philippines. He explained his decision to a delegation of the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church: "I went down

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on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance. And one night it came to me . . . to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died." But this explanation failed to convince the American people. The Anti-Imperialist League declared that "the subjugation of any people is criminal aggression and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our government. . . . A self-governing state cannot accept sovereignty over an unwilling people." And while the President was explaining the inspiration that led him to disregard the fundamental principle of our foreign relations, one of his chief supporters in the Senate was saying that, "I do not know of anybody, from the President to his humblest follower, who is proposing by force and violence to take and hold these islands for all time to come." The bill for the annexation of the Philippines passed by a majority of one vote and that slim victory was due to the news of the rebellion of the Filipinos against the United States; it arrived the day before the vote was taken. Still the act was on our conscience. Taft, who became Governor General of the Philippines, spoke of "our little brown brothers," and implied an attitude that expressed itself by gradually including in increasing proportion Filipinos in the local administration. The Jones Act of 1916 promised the full autonomy that was given the Filipinos in 1936.

The Filipinos were saved their self-respect, the leaders of the rebellion against the United States became our chief supporters, and when the American flag was lowered and the Filipino flag raised the people of the islands spoke of *Ang Ulalin Watawat*—the orphan flag. When the crisis was upon us in 1941, instead of joining our enemies, they fought on our side. In spite of conquest, annexation and foreign administration, the basic American belief in coördinate membership had made itself felt in the relationship that had grown out of the original conquest. In some ways this is the most eloquent testimony to our inability to treat any nation as a "subjugated" people. The episode came to an end with complete independence in 1946.

VI

The much older story of the Open Door in China led to the tragedy of a great war and to the contemporary heartburning of

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a lost cause. But what we have done in China through more than a century is so typically American that we probably could not have acted differently.

Our fundamental attitude toward China antedates the Open Door Policy of Hay by nearly 70 years. In 1832, when Edward Livingston wrote out the instructions to Edmund Roberts, our first diplomatic agent to the Far East, he told him to inform the rulers of those strange countries that "it is against the principles of our nation to build forts, or make expensive establishments in foreign countries," and "that we never make conquests, or ask any nation to let us establish ourselves in their countries. . . ." This statement of American policy toward China reappears over and over again in the instructions from the Secretary of State to our representatives in China. Caleb Cushing asked our Minister to make it clear to the Chinese that they need stand in no apprehension of territorial ambition on our part. W. L. Macy informed Robert M. McLean, who had urged our joining Great Britain and France in a more aggressive policy, that there was "no hope that such authority could be obtained from Congress." Lewis Cass told our Minister that "this country, you will constantly bear in mind, is not at war with China, nor does it seek to enter that empire for any other purpose than those of lawful commerce. . . . You will, therefore, not fail to let it be known to the Chinese authorities that we are not a party to the . . . hostilities and have no intention to interfere in their political concerns." Hay's well-known statement of 1900 that our policy is one "which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity," is but a logical sequence to what had originally been stated in 1832.

The only major deviation in a century-long policy toward China is to be found under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, who made so many others as well in American relations to the world. In the Taft-Katsura memorandum of July 1905, Japan was given a free hand in Korea, and the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 1908 "suggests," to use Professor S. F. Bemis' words, "that Roosevelt was preparing to give to Japan a free hand in Manchuria as he had done already in Korea." It is worth noting that both of these were executive agreements and were not submitted to the Senate for confirmation. But Taft, when he became President, sought to safeguard China against further depredations. He suggested a loan to China for the purchase of the

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Manchuria Railroad, as "perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria."

President Wilson opposed the International Consortium. Within two weeks after he took office—on March 18, 1913—he made the far-reaching public statement which reasserted the traditional position of the American people toward China: "The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself. . . . Our interests are those of the Open Door—a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter." And Bryan in 1915 told the Japanese that "the United States cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the . . . Open Door policy."

The Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 brought the principles so long maintained by the United States into a formal international agreement of the signatory Powers, including Japan, Great Britain and France. Those Powers agreed: "To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

To Japan, however, the Nine-Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were in the nature of plausible sentiments uttered to satisfy the mood of the moment. As others have done and still do, she made the profound mistake of assuming that we could not really mean what we said. And when she saw the opportunity—when the Western World was distraught by the economic and political difficulties of the Great Depression, when the League of Nations was a council divided, when the United States and Great Britain had both permitted their navies to fall below even the permitted strength under the Washington Naval Treaties—she attacked Manchuria.

China was weak, the United States was pacifist and isolationist, and Great Britain could not and would not fight alone against Japan in defense of China. The United States protested, Secretary Stimson reminded Japan of her signatures to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but the Japanese pursued their fateful adventures, regardless of the judgment of the world.

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On January 7, 1932, the American Secretary of State announced the now famous Stimson Doctrine that the United States does not "intend to recognize any treaty or agreement . . . which may impair . . . the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China . . . or the Open Door policy. . . ." America gave her adherence to the Lytton Commission's report which condemned Japanese actions in China. Japan walked out of the League. In 1940–41 the old story was drawing to a dramatic close. We had frozen Japanese assets and had placed an embargo against oil shipments. Japan had occupied most of China and had invaded French Indo-China. On November 20, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador handed a note to Secretary Hull containing the conditions of peace for the Pacific. Japan promised to withdraw from French Indo-China in return for the lifting of the embargo, removal of the order freezing Japanese assets, and restoration of normal commercial relations. Those were the things Japan asked from the United States as a condition of peace. They seemed very simple and realistic. Surely they would serve the national interest of Japan and would not injure that of the United States. But Secretary Hull and the American people thought otherwise. The American Secretary of State replied on November 26, 1941. The reply was as follows: "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that . . . they will actively support the following fundamental principles . . . : (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. (4) The principle of reliance upon international coöperation . . . and pacific settlement of controversies . . . and that the Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China."

Japan's answer was Pearl Harbor, December 7. And so the climax had come. The statement made by Hull in November 1941

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is not unlike the first one made by Livingston in January 1832. Roosevelt and Hull fulfilled an original American commitment: the pledge that we would not be a party to the destruction of another nation.

Why were we so idealistic as to insist upon an affirmation of national integrity at a moment when the "wave of the future" seemed so overwhelming? Our acceptance of the Japanese challenge involved us in mortal danger and the staggering military expenditure that no possible benefits from an Open Door policy would have justified. Our investments in China in 1914 were smaller than those of England, Japan, Russia, France or Germany, and in 1931 they were only about equal to those of France, representing only 2.8 percent of our investments abroad; our exports and imports to and from China hovered between one and two percent of our international trade. To argue that we accepted so dangerous a challenge in order to defend so small a material interest is a conclusion which could only be drawn in an age when economic determinism is the great obsession. When the Japanese offered us peace in the Far East, after they had already occupied most of China and a large part of French Indo-China, we refused. They even agreed to evacuate Indo-China if we would but recognize their conquest in China and Manchuria. We declined. Because of economic interests? No. Because Roosevelt and Hull, speaking for the American people, recognized that no settlement which compromised Chinese political independence and territorial integrity would be acceptable to our sense of justice or consistent with our basic tradition. No American President could have satisfied the Japanese demands without risking repudiation, not merely by the opposition, but by his own party as well.

The fundamental principle of the coördinate state ruled this decision as it has most others in our foreign policy from the beginning.

VII

This attitude does not imply any special virtue on our part. It has not saved us from serious errors in dealing with other nations, and it has not endowed us with any special grace in cultivating the good will and friendship of foreign people. On the contrary, our record for irritating our friends by saying the wrong things in the worst way is well above the average. Our good intentions are a small excuse for the unwelcomed preachments we like to

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indulge in, and the "holier than thou" tone which we often adopt does not add to our persuasiveness in the world of diplomacy. Nor is our record for coöperation, even by our own standards, by any means above reproach. But our failings are within a consistent historical tradition that leads back directly 150 years—and indirectly much further. The policy derives from the assumption that security rests upon coöperation, that coöperation is possible only among equals, that equality eliminates the basic reason for political disruption because those equal politically are coordinate in dignity and in rank.

The doctrines of "power politics" now being preached by such persuasive scholars as Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago are a denial of this tradition and a repudiation of the lessons of American experience. The advice offered is exactly that which has ruined half of the nations of the world. Historically these doctrines have always led to war, and often to national suicide. The new school of *Realpolitik* advances its arguments for a settlement with the Soviets on the basis of "spheres of influence," and in terms of the "national interest." The "national interest" is a beguiling phrase: everyone desires to advance the interests of his country. But what country, concretely, is to be sacrificed in the power deal which would determine the *quid pro quo?* Which national interests do not count? Intellectuals abroad who urge upon us this "return to diplomacy" (as the fashionable slogan goes) should be sure of one thing—that we will not bargain away the independence of any other nation.

Fortunately, with all our errors and misjudgments, Americans have never successfully been persuaded that in foreign policy might makes right, or that Machiavelli was a great moral teacher or even a good guide for an understanding of human motives. Our repudiation of "power politics" in this sense of the term does not mean that we do not believe that policy must not be backed by strength, or that we do not possess strength. Germany and Japan can testify to that. When Dean Acheson speaks of a "position of strength" he means strength to resist aggression. To assume that this position is mere sentimentalism and utopianism is to miss the basic point of American history. We are a strong nation because we are an "indestructible union" of weak states. The very essence of American international relations rests upon the idea of a coöperative relationship.

The United States entered the First World War because we

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were convinced that we could not abide a world dominated by such brutal disregard of the rights of other nations as imperial Germany displayed. The German attack upon Belgium was seen by the American people with absolute horror. Here was a little peaceful nation bound by treaty to remain neutral, cultivating its fields and following in quiet its own affairs, suddenly destroyed without a declaration of war, without cause and in complete repudiation of a solemn treaty. The declaration that the treaty was a scrap of paper merely confirmed the callousness of the German Government. The burning of the library of Louvain, the unrestricted submarine warfare, the braggadocio, and the contempt for the small and the weak all confirmed the American people in the belief that the German régime was a present danger to all nations. And we went to war not to increase our power, not to expand our territory, not for aggrandizement, but to end such practices. That was the meaning of the Fourteen Points; that too was the purpose of the League of Nations. And paradoxically that too was one of the major reasons why the League was defeated. One needs but read the debates in the Senate to recognize that the bitter feeling that turned on Wilson stemmed in part from disillusionment at a peace which repudiated the moral purpose that had taken us into the war.

Our entrance into the Second World War was no less an expression of the great tradition. The surrender at Munich had made it seem that there was no moral principle left in Europe that was worth defending. The spheres of influence settlement at Munich was a yielding of the basic principle of national integrity and political equality for which we had gone into the First World War and crossed the ocean a million strong to maintain. It would have been infinitely easier for the American people to have joined Great Britain in war if she had in 1938 thrown herself against Hitler on the grounds that she would not be a party to the destruction of an independent nation. When Britain became the small bastion that resisted destruction by the evil reborn in Hitler, the attitude of the American people changed. In 1939 when Roosevelt, who clearly saw the meaning of the Nazi threat, had addressed himself to Hitler and Mussolini to exact from them the terms of a possible peace, he spelled out the old American tradition in favor of the security of the independent nation by listing separately all of the nations within the possible reach of the European dictators. Again when in 1940 Russia occupied the Baltic

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countries, Sumner Welles reasserted the old tradition on the grounds that the very basis of our civilization rested upon the respect for the little nations. This same doctrine of the equality, freedom and independence of the small nation along with the great reappeared in the Atlantic Charter and gave the Second World War the meaning that the First World War had had. Those ideals reappear in the Moscow Declaration, in the statements issued after the Teheran Conference, and are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations: "The organization is based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members." These same principles reappear in President Truman's speech on the fundamentals of American foreign policy delivered in October 1947, "We shall not recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power;" and in the Truman Doctrine the same old proposition is reasserted. It is implied in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the national defense assistance policy. The fundamental principle of the coördinate state with which our history as a nation began has remained a continuing philosophy of international relations to the present.

No swing away from it lasts long. The deviation in some of the Yalta agreements has, characteristically, met bitter and continuous opposition. The announcement that the United States had asked for three votes in the General Assembly to offset Russia's demand for three votes was made on March 29, 1945, and repudiated April 3: a major policy reversal in five days. The Great Power veto has been widely criticized in America from the beginning. It since has lost much of its effect by the transfer to the Assembly of issues that could be blocked by the Russian veto. The fact that that transfer of jurisdiction was made in an effort to protect the sovereignty of an independent nation—Korea—is eloquent testimony to the soundness of the American tradition. The provisions for permanent membership of certain Powers in the Security Council seem to Americans just as unreasonable as it would have been for the Constitutional Convention to have named the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Virginia as the great states of the Union with special power and privileges—a proposition which was indeed made and rejected. One may predict that if the United Nations is to survive it will in time adopt, perhaps in stages, the proposition of "coördinate" membership in the fullest sense. On this point the lesson of American experience is plain, for, as we have noted, the American Federal

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Union and the Pan American system have grown stronger with the years: the principle of equality, by providing an equal opportunity to participate in a decision which affects all members, removes the fundamental obstacle to international coöperation. International security can stem only from the loyal coöperation of people associated in the enterprise of peaceful existence in a recalcitrant universe. Power derived from conquest, exploitation and abuse is insecure precisely because it is unjust. There is neither an alternative nor a substitute for the strength that comes with union. But a true union depends upon voluntary adhesion, only possible among those possessed of equal dignity.

It would be good for the world, and for ourselves, to be clear about the concrete significance of this tradition at the present moment. Americans want peace with Russia, but will not buy it at the expense of other nations. The American tradition has no room for a settlement which would divide the world into spheres of influence. It has no room for the sacrifice to Russia of any nation, small or large, for the sake of securing an abatement of the "cold" war or for the sake of avoiding a hot one. The only kind of peace acceptable to it is one based on collective security—again, the principle of the coördinate membership of all states in the family of nations. Much misunderstanding would be avoided if, in their reasoning about us, our friends began with that simple fact.

The enormous energy of the United States has been disciplined by the ethical conception of political equality, and harnessed to the ideal of collective security resting upon a federation of coordinate states. These are the grounds of our difference with Russia. We are not quarreling over economic interests, political doctrines or her internal policies, even if we do not like them. We cannot accept Russia's denial of the coördinate character of other states. We do not believe in the Big Five, the Big Three or the Big Two. The day the Soviet Union learns, if it can, to accept its neighbors as of equal rank with itself, the world will be united again and the Iron Curtain will melt into thin air. Our quarrel is not about Russia, but about her contempt for the independent sovereignty of other nations.

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CHINA AS A MILITARY POWER

By Hanson W. Baldwin

TWENTY years ago, as Major John Magruder noted at the time in these pages,[1] the Chinese proudly called themselves pacifists. They have spent the better part of the intervening two decades in fighting major wars, and probably they no longer think of themselves as pacifists any more than others so regard them. The martial spirit of China, indeed, was never dead. It now has been rejuvenated by a renascent nationalism inspired by the Japanese aggressions, and, since the Korean war, by the dialectical rationalization of Communism. Peking, echoing the familiar rodomontade of Moscow, issues a call to arms in "defense" of the Fatherland and stirs the masses with visions of China's latent strength transformed into dynamic political and military energy.

That the world no longer thinks of the Chinese in terms of pacifism is a measure of the change in China. Two decades have exposed China, not only to the surge of nationalism and "anti-Westernism" which so many observers have noted in Asia, but to vast and profound social changes. The oligarchy of wealth and wisdom (or Oriental shrewdness) which once ruled China has gone; the intelligentsia are harnessed to the chariot of Communism, which is essentially a dynamic and aggressive philosophy. The picture we once entertained of the somewhat benign, inscrutable but wise and civilized Chinese, too intelligent for war—an oversimplified caricature 20 years ago—has even less validity today. For the future China is in the hands of peasant stock, of patient men who have shown on many battlefields that they *will fight*. We have learned this, somewhat to our surprise and at heavy cost, in Korea. There for almost a year American troops, for the first time since the Boxer rebellion (save for skirmishes with river pirates and bandits), have been fighting organized Chinese armed forces. We have met face to face and often hand to hand the modern Chinese soldier, and few Americans who have faced them will deny the Chinese will to fight.

Is the new Chinese soldier a major factor in the world political

[1] "The Chinese as a Fighting Man," by John Magruder, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1931. At that time he was Major Magruder; now he is Brigadier-General Magruder, Retired.

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equation? Is he a potential world menace? Are we beginning to witness the transmutation into fact of that old bogey of 50 years ago—"the Yellow Peril?" Can China's vast manpower be harnessed—possibly by Communism, possibly by a virulent nationalism, possibly by a blend of the two—to a militaristic purpose, object aggression?

No one, of course, can answer such questions with precision, but today we have far more first-hand experience of Chinese combat potential than we had 20 years ago.

In an assessment of the Chinese as a military power the first obvious fact is that their greatest present weakness is in matériel. For the first time in their modern history the Chinese encountered in Korea a Western army, and the results have demonstrated that in the age of the plane and the tank massed manpower is not enough to constitute great military strength. Victory today is more on the side of the big factories than the big battalions, and China is lacking the big factories. Her industrial weaknesses, her inadequate and vulnerable (to bombing) communications, her lack of sea power and her limited air power are such major military deficiencies that China today is not in the first rank of military powers. Her foot soldiers, toiling over mountains and through swamps barefoot or in straw sandals or tennis shoes, might be able to dominate by sheer force of numbers areas contiguous to China on the Asiatic mainland. In the sense that an Eastern Asia dominated by Communist China would be a threat to the world, the modern Chinese soldier could be said to be a potential "world menace." But China is still cabined and confined by the seas; even Formosa, only 100 miles from the mainland, still defies Peking. Lack of adequate communications—particularly with her neighbors in Southeast Asia—also would attenuate Chinese military effort beyond her frontiers; we have seen in Korea that the further south of the Yalu the Chinese advanced, the more difficult it was for them to supply themselves. "The Yellow Peril" in the sense we once used the term cannot exist until China is organized, developed and industrialized—a process that will surely require not years, but decades.

Yet a qualification must immediately be entered to this comforting assertion. China may already have started the process of acquiring modern military strength. Her railroads are now more efficient than they were a decade ago; she has proved her ability to move thousands of troops from the extreme fringelands of her

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vast country to Korea. Some limited industrial development has started. The Communists have centralized administrative and military control in Peking to perhaps a greater degree than any modern Chinese government and their hold over North China is already strong. Moreover, some of the modern implements of war—tanks, artillery, jet planes (unverified reports even say submarines)—have been supplied Peking by Russia, and the Chinese have demonstrated their ability to employ them. Probably most of the MIG-15 jet fighters, flown from Manchurian bases, have been manned by Chinese,[2] who are plainly less skilled than our own pilots. But they have again demonstrated, as did the Chinese trained in this country, during World War II, that as far as human material is concerned China has the potential of air power.

It is possible, moreover, that the same process so well advanced in Europe in the satellite states—the Russianization of the armies—is occurring in China. A joint Sino-Russian command appears to have been established in Manchuria; Russian "advisers" are reported in many parts of China as far south as Canton; and Russian equipment—notably jet aircraft—has been funnelled into Manchuria and Korea. Some Chinese troops are known to be training in Manchuria under Russian as well as Chinese instructors, and one of the many reported secret protocols of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship is said to promise Russian equipment for more than 1,000,000 Chinese soldiers. Obviously, such a completely Russianized Chinese Army—like the modernized armies of the satellites in Eastern Europe—would be a potential threat of tremendous importance to most of Asia.

Just how far Moscow—or Peking—would be willing to carry any such "Russianization" process is uncertain. Reëquipping and reorganizing administratively and tactically the whole Chinese army after the Soviet pattern would be a huge task which might represent a drain upon the Soviet economy, and which, once accomplished, might establish Peking, in Moscow's eyes, as undesirably independent of the Stalin brand of Communism. It seems more likely that Russia would prefer to keep China in her present dependent status—dependent upon Moscow for equipment and industrial support—and that the best way to do this is to keep a

[2] The pilots of some of the MIG's (specifically the so-called "Red Nose Squadron," which have been most effective in their attacks upon our B-29's and our fighters) are believed to be Polish or German "volunteers," with perhaps a few Russians.

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trickle of equipment flowing to China (but never enough modern equipment for the entire army) and to increase the numbers of Russian "advisers" and military and political personnel in China.

II

With these *caveats* firmly in mind, we may now try to take the measure of the Chinese soldier—his individual attributes, his will to fight, his degree of literacy, his equipment, his tactics, his organization and his leadership.

There probably exists no better description of the Chinese fighting man than the one penned by Major Magruder in his article, already cited, of 20 years ago:

> The Chinese soldier is the most docile material from which to build a disciplined unit. He will stand an indefinite amount of hardship and discomfort without grumbling. He can march tremendous distances on footgear that would ruin a western soldier in the first mile. Whereas our own soldiers wear themselves out nervously during rests and while engaged in duties which to them seem useless, the Chinese soldier recuperates as soon as physical exertion ceases. He cares little where he is or how long he stays, provided he has the bare necessities of food and clothing. He does not worry, as does the American soldier, about the difficulties or shortcomings of the hierarchy of command, from the squad leader to the President. . . . By the same token, however, the Chinese soldier is too content with his just-sufficient rice bowl.

It is well to remember that the Chinese soldier springs from a land of conflict where human life is cheap, in peace or war. In the Orient, it has been well said, the only difference between peace and war is the degree of tension.

The Chinese soldier is fatalistic, with little regard for human life. In the opinion of men who have fought them both he is like a Japanese soldier but less effective. His "extremely strong sense of blind obedience," which makes him attempt any mission, no matter how hazardous, is a formidable combat quality, but it is coupled with a general lack of individual initiative and—like the Japanese—a sometimes blind adherence to plan or orders. Sometimes in Korea this iron discipline—stupid automatism, from one point of view—was responsible for huge casualties. Night after night the enemy would attack over the same well-defended ground in reckless wave assaults, only to be beaten back, when a slight alteration of his axis of attack might well have exploited one of our weak points and might have resulted in a breakthrough. On some occasions both pilots and ground troops noted how enemy troops marching along a road would preserve road

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discipline even under fire. Strafing planes would riddle the ranks, yet the Chinese marched on, stepping over the bodies of their slain, scarcely lifting their eyes to the heavens from which death came. In another instance, in the Changjin (Choshin) Reservoir fighting, the Marines took a body of marching Chinese under machine gun fire at point blank range. A Chinese officer blew a whistle; the survivors jumped into ditches alongside the road. When the fire lifted, the whistle blew again; the men reformed and marched on. Again they were brought under fire and the same performance was repeated. This continued—blindly—until there were only a handful of survivors.

Demonstrations such as this, and a quite different Chinese version of the Japanese "Banzai" charge, have led to reports (for which this observer has seen no verification) that the Chinese in battle—particularly in the extreme cold of last winter's fighting—were "hopped up" with opium. Since addiction to opium is not uncommon in China such reports may well have been true in some instances, but opium is almost certainly beyond the economic status of most Chinese soldiers, and no artificial stimulant furnishes the main motivation of the bulk of their troops.

The will to fight of the Chinese soldier has been proved in Korea. The reasons why men of various nations and races fight have always been a complex medley of pragmatic and emotional tangibles and intangibles. Major Magruder noted in 1931 that "where the vital, personal interest exists, or can be made to appear to exist, remarkable demonstrations of fighting spirit have temporarily been developed [in the Chinese] even by unscrupulous leaders for unscrupulous ends. Ideal causes are not sufficient to stir such spirit. The appeal must be made on the score that a menace exists which affects the material livelihood of the individuals concerned."

In other words, at that date the economic motive was the dominant one in the Chinese soldier's thinking. He was preoccupied with the full rice bowl, the unleavened ball of dough, the concept of soldiering as a way of living rather than as an ideological profession. To a definite extent this is still true. The Marines noted that their enemy's blind discipline sometimes was exceeded by his desire for gain. Enemy attacks, after scoring initial successes, sometimes halted in their tracks as the Chinese soldiers paused to loot and pillage, thereby sacrificing the opportunity for decisive tactical gain.

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Yet it should also be noted that ideology *does* motivate some of the Chinese soldiery. An army's will to fight frequently can be gauged by the number of prisoners it yields, yet in Korea the Chinese (in distinction to the North Koreans) have not been quick to surrender. We claim a prisoner toll, up to June 25, of only 17,039 Chinese. Interrogations of these prisoners reveal there are predominantly two types in the "People's Liberation Army" (the official Communist title), or the "C.C.F." (Chinese Communist Forces), as our G-2's prefer to designate the Chinese Army. The one might be termed the Chinese professional soldier —many of them ex-Nationalists—good fighters but motivated by the full rice bowl and the bonds of discipline more than by ideological concepts. But the second type is the convinced and even fanatic Communist, who is full of the (for the Chinese) sophisticated cant of the Russian Communist—the hatred for "capitalist aggression," the hope of the "brotherhood of man." These latter seem to be the cement that binds the Chinese armies together; officers and non-coms are almost invariably—when in trusted positions—convinced Communists.

Communism aside, it would in any case be a mistake to discount too much the emotional and ideological motive in assessing the Chinese will to fight. For that motive always has played some part in Chinese history; even Chiang Kai-shek used the political commissar system and intensive propaganda to try to bind his armies to him. True, there has been relatively little sense of personal loyalty on the part of the Chinese soldier to great leaders or high causes in the past; often he would fight for the general who could offer him most tangible rewards. But there always has been, along with this pragmatic motive, an occasional strain of idealism. Major Magruder also noted that induced feelings of hatred were especially effective in stimulating the Chinese soldier's fighting spirit. The Communists have made the most of this. The Chinese soldier's credulity makes him a pliable instrument. To quote a U. S. Army Field Forces report: "In general, Chinese soldiers have a very low standard of education, lack of ability of discerning the truth, and are easily misled through false propaganda—factors which the Communists have exploited to the utmost."

Yet puzzling contradictions have been noted. Many Chinese prisoners-of-war in Korea have proved to be amazingly well informed—far more so than the private soldier of most armies—

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about the unit to which they are assigned and the military designation of superior units, even up to army level. In numerous instances prisoners have known the detailed plan of the campaign. One prisoner, captured by the Marines at Choshin, told his interrogators *before the fact* about the Chinese plan for cutting the Marine's supply route and trapping them in the frigid mountains of the north.

Detailed battle maps and masses of written orders are not the norm in the Chinese Army; the bulk of its soldiers are illiterate or barely literate, so that most of the instructions must be verbal. Yet the Chinese soldier has a retentive memory and a good sense for terrain; he can, and does, follow his orders literally.

These contradictory trends extend to the enemy treatment of prisoners-of-war and wounded. This treatment varies from brutality so callous as to indicate that, measured by the standards of the Orient, it is the norm, to calculated kindnesses with obvious propagandistic objectives. Prisoners and wounded are sometimes treated with care and consideration and then released bearing messages of good will to the "capitalistic aggressors." On one occasion, Communist soldiers occupied the same native huts with American wounded who had been left behind when their comrades retreated from the Choshin reservoir. The Chinese paid no attention to the wounded, gave them nothing to eat or drink, but did not object when the wounded fed themselves. They even allowed Korean agents to give them messages informing the wounded about the details of a rescue party, and made no attempts to stop the walking wounded from escaping when they left the huts. On the other hand, ambulances seemed to be the special objective of the Chinese in many ambushes, and the enemy frequently tossed hand grenades into trucks full of our wounded.

This, then, is the man. Like other soldiers he is bound by discipline, though for him it is a discipline more rigorous, more harsh, more blind than most. Its components are simultaneously economic and ideological, the carrot and the stick, the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. There is the natural subservience of the Chinese soldier coupled with the fanaticism of the Communist political commissar, and the gun-in-the-back, the fear of the punishment of the defector's families. No matter what its components, it is an effective discipline and no one can doubt the battlefield courage and combat persistency of the Chinese.

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Yet lack of initiative and blind adherence to orders make for great tactical weaknesses. Indeed, these attributes probably explain in good part our ability to beat back repeatedly superior masses of Chinese in Korea.

III

The variegated equipment of the Chinese troops and their limited firepower also explain their inability so far to achieve a decisive success in Korea. Though reëquipment of the People's Liberation Army with Soviet matériel is well under way, the bulk of the equipment available is still heterogeneous. The following incomplete catalogue of the artillery they employ sufficiently indicates the variety of their arms:

U. S.	*Japanese*	*Russian*
75 mm. pack howitzer	75 mm. mountain gun	76 mm. mountain gun
105 mm. howitzer	75 mm. gun, type 38	76 mm. gun (1902)
155 mm. howitzer	75 mm. gun, types 90, 92	76 mm. gun (1942)
57 mm. antitank gun	105 mm. howitzer	122 mm. howitzer
	120 mm. mortar	45 mm. antitank gun

This variety of calibers complicates ammunition supply and tactics. Yet the Chinese are adept at using what they have or can get; they immediately turn captured equipment against the enemy.

Essentially an infantry army, the C.C.F. uses primarily rifles, "burp" guns (submachine guns), hand grenades, automatic arms, machine guns and mortars to fight its battles. It has artillery, but relatively little of it, and the ammunition supply is limited. It has a few tanks—the most recent probably the World War II Russian-type T-34, still an excellent tank. It probably now has more than 1,000 aircraft, including 400 to 600 modern jets, many of them of the MIG-15 type. Its Navy, so far, is negligible, but it includes some U. S. and Japanese-type landing craft and U. S., Japanese and Russian-type torpedo craft and destroyer escorts. Moreover, the thousands of Chinese junks, with their resistance to gunfire, constitute a ready-made amphibious force.

The Chinese have limited motor transport, although they utilize all they can get. The Chinese are not mechanical-minded; their maintenance of vehicles and motorized equipment is poor; breakdowns are numerous, yet many trucks are kept running literally with baling wire. Mobility is chiefly by foot, and to that extent is limited; yet the Chinese foot soldier—like "Stonewall"

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Jackson's famous foot-cavalry of our Civil War days—can easily make a march of 20 to 30 miles in a night. Supply is often by porters or animal pack trains. Like the Russian Army, the Chinese use anything and everything that is available, from trucks and school buses to Korean porters, oxen, camels and horses.

The tactics of an army of this type—still primitive in one sense, but utilizing some modern weapons—is fitted, as might be expected, to the horde. In the Orient, human lives are cheaper and less valuable than equipment. The Chinese sacrifice a replaceable company or a regiment far more readily than an irreplaceable tank. If the enemy's strength is too great, they resort to attrition—guerrilla onslaughts, Fabian tactics, a sudden rush and a fading away. They try to isolate small enemy units by ambush —at which they are adept—by "infiltration, double-envelopment, isolation and piecemeal annihilation." They are excellent primitive engineers and are adept at constructing road blocks behind enemy lines or in building bridges with whatever native material is at hand. When a unit has been isolated, the Chinese invariably try to overrun and destroy it by "human sea" frontal attacks, which are attempted again and again regardless of the costs. But a stout defense seems to frustrate them, and their tactics are often inflexible—in part due, no doubt, not only to national characteristics but to the paucity of communication equipment which makes a sudden change in battle plan difficult to convey to a large army.

As might be expected in these circumstances, the Chinese count on a heavy superiority in manpower—usually at least three to one. Also as might be expected, they are adept at camouflage and concealment; where other cover is lacking they shelter in native huts during the daytime, or in abandoned mine diggings. Their preference for night attacks is well known; this preference is partially explicable on psychological grounds (the terror instilled in the enemy), partially on tactical grounds (night aids infiltration of enemy lines). There is usually much blowing of bugles and whistles, sometimes calls, taunts, jeers or shouts. This "war by sound" serves a threefold purpose. It may at first confuse and frighten the enemy (as it did in the initial enemy attacks against Army units in Korea last year; as it still does when the Chinese attack the Koreans). It serves as a substitute for radio and telephone and directs the attacking troops. And it draws fire from the enemy positions, thus identifying for the attacking Chinese

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the enemy strongpoints. Ruses, and deception—the attack screened by civilian refugees, the fake surrender—are all a traditional part of Chinese Communist tactics.

As a whole, these tactics are well adapted to their mass manpower infantry army, and are generally rather well conceived down to company level. But there is little flexibility or originality, particularly at lower levels.

The Chinese logistic system, like their tactics, is geared to mass. Whole villages are impressed to carry ammunition or to build field fortifications. Chinese communications have proved particularly resistant to air attack since the Chinese—using prodigious amounts of manpower—repair at night what we destroy by day.

The strategic grasp of the Chinese Communist leaders in Korea appears to have been, on the whole, good. They bided their time and carefully chose our weak spots for their attacks. Their intervention in Northern Korea, when the C.C.F. turned the "Home-by-Christmas Victory Drive" into a disastrous U. S. retreat, was a model of careful planning and concealment. The enemy demonstrated then, and he has demonstrated since, his ability—by utilizing large masses of manpower—to break through defense positions (though in his two spring offensives the weak points he chose were the South Koreans). His failures to exploit his successes were not so much an indication of strategic myopia as of the limitations of an army of foot soldiers possessing few tanks, very limited road mobility and no close air support against an army inferior in numbers but vastly superior in road mobility and fire power. The Chinese Communists learned in Korea the same lessons both sides learned in World War I's trench stalemate—that the foot soldier by taking enormous losses from the machine gun might be able to break through a fortified position, but that he could not keep the attack moving and exploit his successes (before the enemy moved up reserves to plug the gap) without the aid of the tank and the plane.

The organization of the Chinese Army is geared to its weapons and tactics. Its basic component is the infantry division—usually from 8,000 to 10,000 men at full strength—armed chiefly with rifles, automatic weapons, grenades, machine guns and mortars, but with organic artillery in most divisions. There are generally three of these divisions to what the Chinese call an "Army"—that is, 20,000 to 30,000 men, not much larger than one of our

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war-strength divisions. A variable number of these Armies are in turn organized into "group armies," roughly corresponding to our corps or army. The major grouping in the Chinese Army is the Field Army—of which there were four when the Korean fighting started. There may now be six. These are great concentrations of manpower, each numbering from 150,000 to 750,000 men. Heavy equipment such as tanks and heavy artillery is usually concentrated in special "columns" or special group armies, which are a part of each field army. Horsed cavalry is still used.

To an army like this, utilizing both the most ancient and the most modern equipment and tactics, employing at once primitive peasants actuated by the hope of loot and fear of reprisal and fanatic and arrogant zealots, leadership is the leaven which can mold the whole into an efficient fighting machine or can permit breakup and disaster.

The top Chinese Communist leaders are well versed in the theory of war, ancient and modern, occidental and oriental. They understand Clausewitz as well as Sun Tze and Stalin. They merge the psychological and the political with the military; there is, for them, no fine line of demarcation. Since the victory of Communism in China, training for leadership has been emphasized at all levels. Nevertheless there still remain weak links in the chain of command. Many junior leaders—particularly company and platoon commanders—though fanatically fervent are deficient in military knowledge.

The real key to the future effectiveness of the Chinese Army is leadership. In the words of a U. S. Army Field Forces report: "The inherent fatalistic attitude of the Chinese makes them seemingly fearless in combat as long as their leadership does not falter. The loss of leadership or confidence in their leaders has in many instances resulted in entire units becoming lost, defecting, or surrendering to the enemy. Arrogance and presumptuousness become the keynote of the Chinese soldier when he detects weakness or unguardedness in any enemy. . . . However, confronted with a strong and determined enemy, their (the Chinese) stability is dependent upon strong and inspired leadership, without which their will to resist is often weak."

These observations are further emphasized by the fact that traditionally the loyalty of many Chinese soldiers is personal in nature. In the past they often followed a man rather than an ideal. Today the political commissar, a fixture in the Soviet military

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structure, is an important part of the apparatus in the C.C.F. He provides personal leadership as well as insurance against disloyalty to the cause of Communism.

The military potential of China may thus have approached a turning point with the Korean war. There are signs that the Chinese Communist hierarchy have recognized the military weaknesses there revealed and are commencing to try to remedy them. There are various remedies at hand, and it is probable that the more obvious weaknesses will be alleviated within the next few years and that gradually better equipment, more standardization, better leadership and organization and modern tactics will add mobility and fire power to the C.C.F. But the real long-term weakness of China as a military power arising out of her lack of industry and adequate transportation will remain. It can be remedied only by time—much time, so much, indeed, that we are unlikely to see a Red China colossus emerge, fully helmeted and armored, in our lifetime. More dangerous is the possibility—still only that—that the Chinese Army may gradually be Russianized. This might add materially to its short-term offensive and defensive strength, even though perhaps not so much (failing comparable industrialization) to its staying power.

Meanwhile these conclusions cannot be gainsaid: The Chinese Army, little regarded in the past, is now a major political factor in the Orient. The Chinese soldier has demonstrated his will to fight.

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HANDS AND FISTS ACROSS THE SEA

By Roy Harrod

IT IS impossible to enter into a rational discussion of Anglo-American relations without reference to the basic and very simple human issue involved. On one side is a rich and prosperous family, already established for a long time, occupying great positions in the land, highly esteemed and treated by all with much consideration. On the other there is a younger generation; one may think of them as nephews, or perhaps as cousins, who have struck out on their own line and become far richer than the established senior branch. They have made their own connections and proceeded from strength to strength, increasing their wealth to a fabulous extent, while the senior branch has remained comparatively static. The pattern is familiar enough. There is danger of friction and lack of mutual appreciation; jealousy plays its part, generating feelings of impatience and resentment. But jealousy is not admitted, and the basic emotions find vent in every kind of criticism.

Whatever the younger generation do must be wrong. The houses that they live in are hideous, their furnishings tasteless; at the parties which they give, everything is done in the way it ought not to be done. They comport themselves in a flashy style, and in all their social relations they say the wrong thing and do the wrong thing. These criticisms are, of course, not grounded in reason. If the young people did everything in quite a different way, they would be criticized no less; in the nature of the case they cannot do right. They, on their side, find the older people stuffy and tedious, attaching great importance to a thousand and one things which are of no real significance, hidebound in meaningless etiquette, pompous and conceited beyond endurance, spoil-sport in their attitude to life and basically stupid, but retaining a certain wily cunning by which they still seem able to continue to feather their nests to a moderate extent. It seems clear that no love will be lost between these groups.

The position appears hopeless, and the advisor may be strongly tempted to suggest that they would be happier if each one went its own way, without paying the slightest attention to the other. Luckily that is not the only possible solution. Human nature is ambivalent; emotions can easily be transmuted into their op-

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posites. By only a slight change of approach, feelings can come to run in quite a different direction. The primary solvent in this case would be a touch of mutual pride. Beginning as the mere suspicion of an idea, it can be greatly magnified if properly cultivated. The one group can come to view the far-reaching successes of the other with growing wonder and applause; the younger group can cultivate a sentimental feeling for the other's old-world attachments and out-of-date mannerisms.

Oddly enough it is the older branch which, despite its apparent rigid conventionality, finds it easier to be appreciative. Just because it is somewhat riper in experience, it can understand that human nature has, and should have, many diverse manifestations. In some remote past, obscured by the starched routine of their present way of life, but green perhaps in their own memories, they too may have had to be rough and tough. It is the younger progressives, breaking new paths, who are more obstinately inclined to the conviction that their own way of doing things must be the only right way; it is indeed this conviction that carries them forward. What the old branch especially craves for, if a good relation between the two is to be established, is an occasional kind word, since it is fundamentally in the weaker position. Or do both sides need that? Happily for the matter which we are concerned to illustrate, Americans are very generous and open-hearted in their bestowal of praise where they feel it due. The great unstinted tribute by the American Commander to the exploit of the Gloucestershire regiment in the Korean war is engraved on all British hearts, and will be remembered as long as the exploit itself.

Thus it may well be that, in the majority of cases of mutual criticism as between British and Americans, what is needed to dissipate the critical feeling is not a change of policy on either side, but a continual frank recognition that what gives rise to the critical feelings is a peculiar family relationship, of which we have all had instances among our circle of acquaintances.

There is no doubt that in recent years the Socialist Government of Britain has been an additional stumbling block. This has been greatly magnified by misconceptions on both sides. Many Americans appear to believe that a form of Socialism has already been set up in Britain that corresponds to the Socialist blueprints of an earlier generation. To those living in Britain, on the other hand, it is obvious that what one might call "true" Socialists,

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namely those who seek state ownership and control of all the means of production and distribution, have little power in the Labor Party. Not only has Socialism in this sense by no means been realized in practice, but Britain is now going through a vital transition in which this view of society is losing its place in the minds of the Socialists themselves even as a remote ideal. British Socialists are in fact quite rapidly ceasing to be Socialists in anything like the historic sense of that word. Good political judges believe that this process will continue, unless some quite catastrophic setback occurs in the economic affairs of Britain.

As against this, it is perfectly true that British citizens are harassed and oppressed by a network of controls. It is probably safe to say that the greater part of this control has little to do with the specifically Socialist character of the Government, but is the consequence of postwar difficulties. It may be due to lack of a daring resolve to cut through all those difficulties and make a bold bid for freedom—but that is a different matter. For good or ill, it has been thought by many in and outside the ranks of the Labor Party that, when a nation must carry heavy burdens necessitating a restricted standard of living, a modicum of control is essential. It is interesting to observe that when the United States resolved last year to undertake heavy burdens for the sake of defense, Congress was willing to hand over large powers to the Executive, although there has since been some reaction. Yet it is probably true that the projected defense effort will not involve so great a sacrifice in American standards of life as was caused by the heavy burdens which a malignant fate has successively imposed on British citizens. If the projected American defense effort really justified the granting of all those powers of control, then by like reasoning the controls that have been operating in Britain since the war may be justified also. In fact, when faced by the need for exertions altogether beyond the normal, the two countries seem to react in precisely the same way.

American economic freedom is an object of criticism by "true" Socialists. It must be remembered that these are only doctrinaires, a minority in the Labor Party. The fact that the American economy has succeeded under capitalism in providing a far higher standard of living for workers than the "true" Socialists could ever hope to achieve by their methods is naturally a cause of the utmost vexation and fury. It is particularly exasperating to have one's theory killed by a fact. The rage finds vent in all sorts of dis-

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ingenuous and fallacious attacks upon the United States. There is no cure for this, except the hoped for and expected decline of "true" Socialism in Britain. This decline is masked by the fact that the "true" Socialists who still remain occupy more than their proportionate share of journalistic space.

Among more moderate thinkers, there is much misconception about the actual state of affairs in the United States. Just as many American citizens suppose that "Socialism" has been "introduced" into Britain, so many British imagine that in the United States a degree of laissez-faire amounting almost to anarchy prevails. Thus Americans imagine a Socialism where there is none, and the British imagine extreme laissez-faire where there is no such thing. In practice it does not seem likely that the two countries will in the coming years differ very much in regard to the degree of state interference. Both are likely to be prepared for governmental action to prevent inflation on the one hand and massive unemployment on the other. These will be the main actuating ideas, and they will be implemented, whatever may be said in advance. For the rest, there will be differences of detail.

Marshall Aid not only benefited Britain materially, but much improved British feelings toward the United States. Americans must not suppose that it has passed unnoticed.

The British Government is to be very strongly criticized for having allowed a technical situation to develop in 1950 which made it appear that the British position had greatly improved and that the aid, while still vouchsafed to other countries, was no longer needed in Britain. It is true that the British gold reserve rose rapidly in 1950; this was due to the world-wide ramifications of Britain's banking position and had little relation to the condition of her own internal economy or her own balance of external trade. Actually, Britain's basic position was deteriorating through 1950, and she has now reached a position in which the economic strain and danger will be greater than at any time since the end of the war. This is partly, but not wholly, due to the rearmament effort which she has undertaken.

The current British-American problem that is receiving most attention is the shortage of certain basic materials. The British suppose, not without reason, that Americans have been buying up everything around the world in order to create a good stockpile. This leaves the British without the wherewithal to keep their factories running. Meanwhile the Americans expect the British

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to make a sizable contribution to the pool of arms, and the British are endeavoring, in difficult circumstances, to do so.

This matter has been sufficiently discussed. The international allocation of materials may be the right remedy, although allocation always has serious disadvantages. It may be that the greatest contribution that could be made to victory in the world-wide fight against inflation would be for Americans to devise adequate machinery to curb the demands of their own defense departments; for it is precisely in that quarter that we have the greatest danger of extravagance. It is an awkward point, because to deny to the defense departments what they claim they require seems to be cramping the defense effort. But it really does not. All armed services have a tendency to overstate the amount of reserve equipment needed. Britain experienced this difficulty during the war, and was so hard pressed by shortages that she was driven to devise methods for applying a sour scrutiny to alleged service requirements. Strict economy in this field might make a very big difference to the world-wide availability of materials for current needs. If carried far enough, it might even avoid the need for international allocation.

The trouble about international allocation is that it seems to necessitate apportionment among different uses within the nation. In conditions in which there is a strong all-round inflationary pressure and all materials are in short supply, this may be the inevitable, although unsatisfactory, solution. But if only a limited number of materials are scarce, it may be better to let their prices skyrocket, because this will promote rigid economy in their use and an active search for substitutes. Under a system of allocation, on the other hand, these forces cannot operate so strongly; important users know that they will have all or most of their needs satisfied in any case.

The shortage of materials is by no means the end of the story of British economic difficulties. There are internal difficulties and still more serious external ones. Britain has had to undertake a large defense program, beginning at a time when many thought that taxes had already been raised to the full limit of capacity. To push them much further up would give rise to very serious problems of tax avoidance and loss of incentive. Consequently, Britain has so far made only a moderate increase of taxes, hoping to fight inflation in other ways, which have not yet become clear.

A word must be said about the high level of taxation already

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existing at the outbreak of the Korean trouble. Americans are apt to attribute it wholly to the expansion of social services. There were other causes also. The national debt that has to be serviced was, in proportion to Britain's national income, about three times as large as the American national debt. Also, at about £800,000,000 a year, Britain was spending more on defense in proportion to her national income than the United States before Korea. It is admitted that the social services have been a heavy burden. For good or ill, Britain decided in 1911, in the days of the old Liberal Government, to turn to compulsory social insurance as a means of meeting certain types of primary need. The system has been expanded by successive steps. The postwar legislation constituted another step forward, and the desirability of a step of this kind was agreed to by the Conservatives as well as the Socialists. The Socialists may have shown extravagance, but the burden on the taxpayer would have been heavy, however efficient the government had been in administrative economy. Critics may hold that this new advance was badly timed, considering the exigent conditions of the postwar world; in fact it was a psychological necessity. The question was not one of party or creed, but of simple human nature. The British workers had been bombed and blitzed and had endured austerities in regard to food, dwellings, transport and fuel for six years. The deterioration in living standards was unprecedented. After these mighty exertions and endurances, the British people could not be told that there would be no easement whatsoever for a long time.

It is difficult for Americans to appreciate what it feels like to be entirely dependent on foreign trade for the basic necessities of life. Between two-fifths and one-half of the total output of all British factories have to go abroad to buy them. This is Britain's primary economic problem. Since the devaluation of sterling in September 1949 an appalling calamity has occurred. The terms on which Britain must trade have turned against her by about 30 percent. This means that to pay for the same quantity of imports as before, she will have to export, on the present terms, about £500,000,000 more goods. This addition to her exports represents about 12 percent of the total manufacturing capacity of the country. This cause alone would impose a strain upon her economic resources comparable to that imposed on the American economy by the current defense effort. And Britain has to make a large defense effort as well. This is no laughing matter. The

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strain may imperil the stability of the British economy and frustrate the arms effort. The United States too has suffered by a worsening in her terms of foreign trade since the Korean outbreak. This is a regrettable fact, but the small degree of dependence on vital imports make it a factor of much less importance to Americans than to Britain.

In this matter of the rate at which manufactured goods are exchanged for primary products, the interests of the United States and Britain lie together. There has been some confusion of thought about it. It is true that the rise in the prices of products in the outer sterling area has caused an inflow of some gold to Britain as central banker for the sterling area, and that is in itself advantageous. But it is far outweighed by the fact that Britain has to pay these higher prices for her imports; and she has to pay for them by means of her manufactured exports just at a time when industry is taking on new defense burdens. The detriment to Britain as a trader far outweighs her gain as a banker.

Britain's position is complex, and indeed is not perhaps sufficiently understood by her own Treasury, which assesses the effect of changes too much by reference to the dollar balance and too little by reference to the possible strain on industrial production. Increased demands on factories set up internal inflationary pressure, cause delays in delivery and reduce efficiency. What should be Britain's normal pattern of trade may, by an oversimplification, be said to have the shape of a triangle. Britain should have a deficit with the dollar area and a surplus with the rest of the world; the rest of the world should have a surplus with the dollar area; and from all this part of the world Britain should receive sufficient gold or dollars to make good her deficit with the dollar area. In the period 1947–1949 this system broke down. After 1947 Britain had a sufficient surplus with the non-dollar world to cover her dollar deficit, yet could not do so because she was not paid in cash for that surplus. Nations inside and outside the sterling area paid her in old sterling which they had accumulated during the war. And she was even obliged, as banker for the sterling area, to pay out dollars for the deficit of that area. She had also to pay out gold or dollars to particular non-dollar countries with which she happened to have an adverse balance. But she never received any gold or dollars for her surpluses; Marshall Aid was of vital importance to her in this period, although she did not herself have a deficit on an over-all balance of trade. She used Marshall Aid to

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finance her dollar payments. But since Britain was in over-all balance, she was in fact passing on her share of Marshall Aid to other countries. She got no net contribution from it for her own reconstruction or for relief of the strain on her manufacturing capacity. During the time that she was receiving Marshall Aid she was self-supporting on her over-all account.

Now the position has changed. Partly from normal postwar recovery in other countries, and partly, in a later phase, from the rise in prices of primary products, she has been able to obtain more hard cash from other parts of the world. The recent turn of events has imposed a double strain on her manufacturing capacity. She has to produce more in order to pay for her imports—the main point; and also, since the balance of the outer sterling area has become favorable, she has been receiving more gold than has been needed to pay her dollar deficit. She is expected to pay by manufactured exports for this gold also. In so far as Britain uses the gold to pay her deficit to the United States she cannot complain: that is the normal triangle; but still more gold puts a strain upon her manufacturing capacity.

To the extent that she does not pay for the gold by her manufactures, the sterling claims against her accumulate. She may allow this position to continue, especially during the rearmament period; but there is danger in this course. Too great an accumulation of claims against her may tend to break up the sterling area —a calamity for Britain. It would also be a misfortune for the whole world, since the sterling area is now generally recognized to constitute a usefully stable region in a world of all too disorderly currency arrangements. It is quite clear that unless the situation changes in a rather spectacular way in her favor, Britain will be in dire need of assistance.

I cannot pass these matters by without referring to my own opinion, which does not necessarily represent the British view, that the devaluation of sterling in 1949 has been a disaster for Britain. The fact of the matter is that devaluation was not called for at that time by the condition of Britain's own economy. It could be justified only as a mode of disciplining her customers, who were using the sterling claims accumulated from the war, first to finance their trading deficit with Britain herself, and secondly, in the case of the outer sterling area, to pay for an unwontedly large volume of imports from the dollar area. It is not commonly understood in America that the accumulated sterling

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balances could be freely converted into dollars throughout the sterling area, to meet the deficit on dollar account. Americans tend to suppose that the sterling area currency arrangement constituted a wicked way by which Britain closed markets to American exports. In fact the opposite is true; the sterling balances could be used by the sterling area to finance dollar imports, and they were in fact used to finance a larger volume of dollar imports than that area would have been able to finance had the sterling balances been blocked as the Americans advised. The British authorities from time to time urged upon the sterling area restraint in dollar purchases, but it was only in July 1949, shortly before devaluation, that real earnestness was put into this appeal.

While the worsening in Britain's terms of foreign trade cannot be attributed wholly to devaluation, there is no doubt it was exacerbated by that step. Devaluation put sterling out of equilibrium with the dollar. Now the world situation has changed completely. Britain can now collect good value for many of her export surpluses outside the dollar area. This improvement in the position of her debtors on current account has not mainly been due to devaluation itself, but to the improvement in the position of many countries through postwar reconstruction and to the rises in the export prices of primary products since the Korean outbreak. What is now required is to put sterling back into equilibrium with the dollar.

The impetus to devaluation came largely from the United States. The motive was altruistic. There were persistent doubts that the countries receiving Marshall Aid could become self-supporting after the end of the prescribed period. Why not, it was reasoned, attempt to rectify the world-wide "dollar shortage" by increasing sales in the dollar area by means of a fairly widespread devaluation? The idea was not in itself unreasonable. It was not altogether in tune with the policy of the British authorities; yet, since their policy seemed somewhat wobbly and was anyhow kept locked within the breasts of the British officials, the Americans may be excused for having thought it needful to tender some well-meant advice. The mere rumor that the Americans were of that way of thinking impinged on Britain's international banking position, which, as we have seen, was vulnerable at this time, and, by causing a run on the bank, made devaluation inevitable.

This whole course of events points to the need for closer continuous coöperation between the financial authorities of the two

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countries. It is true that Sir Stafford Cripps visited Washington before devaluation. But an isolated conference of this kind cannot remove cross-purposes. What is needed is a regular sequence of meetings. Surely there would be no constitutional difficulty in arranging that a body such as the American National Advisory Council, which maintains liaison with the International Monetary Fund, meet a similar British body at regular intervals. Such conferences might even publish a joint report. There would be no harm in publishing also some differences of opinion, since these would provoke thinking which would probably iron out the differences in the long run.

Americans tend to oppose the revaluation of sterling on two grounds. It is sometimes regarded as a clever British device for making American imports from the sterling area still more expensive in dollars. This should by no means be the British intention. Anything tending to aggravate inflationary tendencies in the United States is contrary to British interests. The object of revaluation should be to reduce the sterling prices of primary products (which Britain has to buy and pay for with her manufactures) in full proportion, not to raise dollar prices. The extent to which this result was in fact achieved would depend on the timing of the revaluation. A lull in inflationary pressure, such as has occurred this past summer, would be a better occasion for revaluation than when American buying has regained momentum.

Secondly, Americans may feel that if the British are really sufficiently flush of reserves to risk revaluation, they had far better use their margin for another purpose, namely to reduce restrictions on imports from the United States. The implication here is that revaluation would worsen the British balance with the United States. But this is quite a doubtful matter; it is possible that revaluation would improve that balance. As one who has written in season and out of season since 1945 in favor of a relaxation of import restrictions, I can, without blushing, express a doubt whether this point is of great importance in the conditions of 1951–52. It seems to me to be small by comparison with the vast difficulties with which Britain is now struggling and which a revaluation of sterling might serve to reduce. Furthermore, when the great arms program of the United States and the generous defense aid which she proffers to other free nations will impose a maximum strain on her economy, it may really not be in her interest to have her ordinary non-defense commercial exports stim-

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ulated. While one should admire the heroic struggles of the State Department against restrictive practices in international trade, one may wonder whether insistence on this point is relevant in the present very critical and peculiar circumstances.

Furthermore, revaluation might in the event prove to assist the purposes of the State Department. If it turned out that after revaluation (or successive revaluations) Britain's dollar position remained fairly strong, as I believe it would, she would be much more likely to contemplate reducing restrictions than she is now when floundering in a sea of difficulties. I write in terms of what is psychologically and politically probable. Certainly if her gold balance continues to be on the right side, as it may, it would be in Britain's own immediate interest—quite apart from wider considerations—herself to relax restrictions on dollar imports and to prevail upon the sterling area to relax them. Thereby she would reduce the unwelcome accumulation of sterling balances by the sterling area and her own needless accumulation of gold.

Reference to the State Department may lead our thoughts back to wider issues. Many hold that Britain has failed since the war to give her proper lead in implementing the international economic policy that was agreed upon with the United States and set out in Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement. I hold that view myself. Many Americans appear to believe this failure due to sinister imperialistic motives. That, however, is unfair. Rather it has been due to fear, or, should one call it, caution, in the face of a succession of difficulties which have appeared vast and were certainly unmeasured. Britain was faced with the problem of winning a steady flow of food and materials by means of foreign trade in a changed world, in which she had certainly lost long-standing advantages. No one could gauge how great the difficulties would be. It may be correct, and I believe it to be, that she would have been wiser to have taken encouragement from the doctrines of Adam Smith—from which, however, Americans most signally lapse in their own traditional way—and to have proceeded straightaway to a more open commercial policy. That she has not done so has been due to a conviction that it would be far too dangerous. The imputation of a sinister motive, which is often on the lips of Americans, is certainly a cause of irritation.

At a slightly earlier date there was trouble of a similar kind. There were many arguments during the war about whether Britain would be able to risk returning to a more open trading system

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when the war was over. The American initiative in international economic matters was so encouraging that it should have been possible to secure a wholehearted agreement by a substantial majority of the British that the risks of the experiment were worth taking if buttressed by American coöperation. A fearful stranglehold of restrictions and bilateral clearings had been fastened upon foreign trade in the 'thirties and it certainly seemed worth making great efforts and taking risks to free the world from it. But from an early date it came to be understood that, in the American view, British Imperial Preference should be abolished at the same time. Apparently no distinction was drawn between it and the restrictive devices designed by Dr. Schacht and others in the 'thirties. Once this became clear, it meant that it would be impossible to secure a really wholehearted accord by a majority of the British to the program. A great opportunity was jeopardized.

Again I can write without blushing because I was strongly opposed to the Ottawa Agreements and believe that this British lapse from the more austere doctrine of free trade to have been a great mistake. It is one thing so to think, quite another to hold that Imperial Preference should be lumped indiscriminately in the class of trade restrictions where lie quotas, bilateral clearings, etc. Imperial Preference is more analogous to the straightforward tariffs that the United States imposes on imports, although not so restrictive. The British Commonwealth and Empire is a fact, and general principles relating to the regulation of commerce between sovereign states do not necessarily and without further examination apply to commerce between its members. The fact of the existence of the Commonwealth and Empire was of some importance in 1939–41. Even if it were difficult to draw a constitutional distinction between intra-Commonwealth commercial dealings and those between sovereign states (which it is not), surely an exception could be allowed to stand for a few decades in favor of Britain, the foremost ally who had gone through so much and was faced with unprecedented postwar difficulties in the task of keeping her people alive.

The persistent objection to Imperial Preference in the circumstances of today seems to the British most perverse. The wiser heads deem that the State Department must have a maxim in a copybook laid up somewhere, written in letters of gold, which, after the manner of governmental officials, it is psychologically compelled to apply automatically, without regard to special cir-

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cumstances or human feelings. The majority of British do not think in terms of the State Department, but of the United States itself. To understand their feelings one must revert to the great obsolescent family and its richer go-ahead collateral branch. These British suspect, no doubt wrongly, that since Imperial Preference cannot seriously be deemed to do the Americans vital injury, the reiterated attacks on it are made just because they are cruel and because it is known that they will hurt. Such are the suspicions that spring up naturally in the complex family situation which I have tried to analyze.

The British Commonwealth and Empire itself continues to undergo rapid evolution, and this may prevent contentious problems ever coming to a head. Yet if the world continues to be troubled in many parts in these coming decades, friction may arise from continued misunderstandings about it. When I was a youth I was taught that this British Empire represented a mission for extending the frontiers of civilization comparable with that achieved by ancient Rome. As things have turned out, the claim perhaps has to be reduced. The British would still, I think, contend that as a civilizing mission it has been second only to that of Rome. Americans may yet place far greater achievements on the unwritten pages of the future. But when Americans refer to these British achievements, the fruits of the devoted toil of many generations, they invariably use pejorative terms—"colonialism," "exploitation." Indeed to the British ear it sounds as if many Americans had accepted wholesale and uncritically the Marxist interpretation of British history. Here are the Americans and British, planning to coöperate according to their respective strengths to protect the world against the potential threat of aggressive Communism. The Communist characterization of American capitalism is agreed by both parties to be a pack of lies; but when it comes to the achievement of which Britain is most proud, the Americans appear to accept the Communist criticism and even to adopt the jargon of Marxism. This is not a happy basis for friendship.

That is the sentimential side; there is a severely practical side also. Britain has shown herself fully ready to allow autonomy to replace British rule, when the time is ripe. She should surely be beyond criticism in that matter. But in cases where the time is not ripe, the British believe it to be most important that their authority should be retained, and they need the fullest

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possible American moral support in the task of government. A premature surrender of power leaves a vacuum into which Communism is only too likely to enter; or, if not Communism, then perhaps some new "ism" equally dangerous to the peace of the world. Who had heard of Fascism before 1922? Furthermore, political stability is a prerequisite for that raising of the standards of backward people to which we all now aspire; Britain has in the past spent many hundreds of millions of pounds to that end, but still larger sums may be needed. Those projects can go forward only if there is political security.

If the fight for freedom shifts from place to place over the surface of the world—and we see no surcease from it yet—it may be in the general strategic interest for Britain to surrender some position. She will not hesitate to do so for good reason. But if she is asked to surrender some position which embodies the sacrifices of many generations of her people, merely in accordance with a copybook formula—because Americans regard a British overseas interest as null and void and of not the slightest relevance—"mere colonialism"—it is hard to see how coöperation can fail to be damaged.

I have often been told that it is quite in vain to appeal to American opinion on this issue, since there is an ineradicable belief that the British Commonwealth and Empire, as established in the nineteenth century, merely represented a continued application of the policy of George III to peoples who were mugs enough to put up with it. I cannot believe that Americans are not amenable to reason on this topic, since amenability to reason in general is one of their most striking virtues. But it is useless for the British to plead their own case; American leaders must be found who are convinced of the importance of a better American understanding about the British Commonwealth and Empire. American suspicion of British imperialism has exerted a constant corroding influence on many matters of detail in recent years. It enters constantly into the discussion of British trade restriction and policy in regard to sterling, and has frustrated many attempts at economic coöperation, thereby weakening the collective strength of the two countries.

Britain and America are in fact champions of the great cause of freedom, and in this cause they are heart and soul united. This is the truth which deserves the emphasis.

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THE CASE FOR INDIA

By Vincent Sheean

THE Americans in their intercourse with strangers," says Tocqueville, "appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise. The most slender eulogium is acceptable to them; the most exalted seldom contents them; they unceasingly harass you to extort praise, and if you resist their entreaties they fall to praising themselves. It would seem as if, doubting their own merit, they wished to have it constantly exhibited before their eyes." In this passage toward the end of his great work, and in others earlier, the astute but sententious Frenchman was perhaps yielding to an impulse of irritation aroused by chance encounters on river steamers or stage coaches or in taverns, where no doubt a good many of his comprehensive generalizations had their origin. The phenomenon to which he refers is recognizable just the same, a century later, as being characteristically, although not exclusively, American. Disagreement with American foreign policy, even when it comes from our oldest and best allies, is fiercely resented both in private and in public expressions. It sometimes seems that the right to free, honest difference of opinion, which was the principal basis of our Republic at its foundation, has come to be restricted more and more to our own citizens, and perhaps not even to all of them. A difference of opinion from abroad is repelled as if it were an attack.

This is a time of tension and strain, when feeling runs high and when, above all, tremendous efforts and sacrifices are being demanded of the American people. Most of the effort is asked on behalf of countries of the free world, by which is meant practically any country not harnessed to the Soviet machine. Criticism of American policy is taken particularly ill when it comes from the beneficiaries of the policy. That is, the criticism of our enemies may be disregarded, but that of our friends strikes home.

The government of the new Republic of India has criticized little, but that small censure has been much resented. American impatience with Indian policy is shown both in the press and in private talk, in the halls of Congress and in the United Nations. It dates from December 1950 in its more pronounced manifestations, although it began to be perceptible some weeks earlier with the crossing of the 38th Parallel in Korea. During these months

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the general American feeling has tended towards an axiom quite new in our foreign relations—an axiom new in all foreign relations—which propounds an extreme: "Those who are not with us are against us." There would be little or no room for diplomacy if this principle came to be permanently accepted.

II

What, in fact, is the foreign policy of the present Government of India? As often stated in Parliament by Mr. Nehru, who is Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, India's policy is that of friendly relations toward all countries which are willing to reciprocate, and along with this a firm refusal to join any military alliance of one group against another. As a corollary, Nehru claims to take each decision on the merits of the question involved, no matter what the alignment of other Powers.

This policy is indistinguishable from the declared foreign policy of the United States during the first 150 years of its existence. It was sound American doctrine up to only three years ago. It is American doctrine no longer, because the changed situation of the world has compelled the United States to engage in vast enterprises of reconstruction and defense for other countries. But India's situation is in no respect comparable to that of the United States. India has no geographical security, appended as she is to a continent overwhelmingly engulfed by Communism. India's army, although good, is small; her resources are extremely limited and her population lives on the brink of famine at all times. The principal strength of India is psychological: it comes from the prestige won in a great national revolution accomplished by nonviolent means. It comes from the moral interest of all Asia in that national movement, and from the leadership under which it was achieved. There is probably also a feeling of pride on the part of all Asian peoples in the spectacle of a free, self-governing nation of such size and importance making its own way in a time of trouble, and doing so against the dire prognostications of most European observers. This, and similar considerations, constitute the strength of India: none is material and none could go into a balance-sheet of military, industrial or economic power.

The danger to India from a Communist Asia is obvious. If it is apparent to every editorial writer on every newspaper in the United States, it is also apparent to the Government of India. But the whole question in foreign policy is not the recognition of

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a danger but the choice of method by which that danger may be faced. India's geographic position is such that any military alliance with the United States would be, to say the least, delusional. For the sake of that delusion, and in order to take a place at the bottom of the list of applicants for military and economic assistance, would any sensible Indian government invite an invasion from the immense Communist territories of the Eurasian continent?

This is roughly the way the question presents itself to those in India (both Indians and foreigners) who look at it "realistically." They do not see the likelihood of American assistance in valid quantity or quality, or in time. Therefore to plunge into a military alliance against the neighboring Sino-Russian power, to proclaim it an enemy, would be rash and perhaps fatal. And in addition to all these "realistic" considerations, there is the further fact, important in India if nowhere else, that the country has a moral legacy of considerable persuasiveness which sets its mind against military combinations and involvements.

III

Well, says the American, what about Kashmir? With great frequency this question arises in just this connection. How does the Kashmir struggle fit the inherited principles of non-violence?

In principle, the action taken in Kashmir at the end of October 1947, and continuing to the cease-fire of January 1, 1949, with occasional outbursts since then, has been violent action. The Indian position all along has been that it was done in self-defense, *i.e.* to defend the Vale of Kashmir and its capital, Srinagar, from imminent destruction by the Pathan raiders from the northwest. Mr. Nehru and his Government improvised an action in great haste: the first Indian troops—three companies only—were flown to Srinagar and dropped there within 24 hours of the decision to defend. The accession of the Maharajah of Kashmir to India took place, it is clear, only under the immediate threat of these raids of the Pathans: he turned to India for defense. All the subsequent questions involved in the interminable debates at Lake Success and elsewhere, matters of population and religion and plebiscite, along with innumerable atrocity tales, are subsidiary in the judgment of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the one main decision. At a press conference in Delhi three years ago he said to a roomful of correspondents: "I do not see how at any point we could have

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done differently from what we did do. Were we to sit by and watch Kashmir be devastated without lifting a finger?"

Mr. Nehru's governing motive in the whole Kashmir dispute—a thoughtful observer might guess—may be something rather more than the personal devotion to the land of his ancestors that has so often been imputed. He may, rather, see in the accession of that great state, with its large or predominant Moslem population, a contribution of supreme importance to his supreme aim, the creation of a secular Indian republic—not "Hindu Raj" or "Hindustan" at all, but an India in which Moslems, Hindu, Christian and Parsi shall be equal citizens. Pakistan is by definition a Moslem state; India is by definition secular. This can hardly figure in the international debate but it can hardly fail to figure in the play of motive.

Relations with Pakistan have been bad, as bad as possible in peace, from the moment of the partition and liberation of India in 1947. At frequent intervals they present the danger of open war. But for those of us who lived through the awful days of 1947–1948 in India it seems little short of incredible that war was, in fact, averted, and that the cease-fire of January 1, 1949, could be arranged at all. The Kashmir dispute, painful though it is, has been held to limits so far by the sheer obstinate truth that the Government of India does not want war. The Government of Pakistan may be, and probably is, in like case, but has a more belligerent population to control.

A foreign policy conceived largely is susceptible of minor contradictions, and can hardly be carried out without them. Life is not in the least logical. Our own foreign policy (or any other) would afford many examples. A policy intended to apply to the entire world is most likely to be contradicted near at home, where the difficulties are always more irksome. Thus it was with the United States in the nineteenth century, when a general world-view which tended toward isolationist pacifism was forever being contradicted by thrusts at Mexico. Thus it was with the Pax Britannica in the reign of Victoria, which had all sorts of moral pretensions (or even aspirations) but fell off around the edges into innumerable small wars of acquisition. The Kashmir case is not as sharp a contradiction to India's general pacifism as has been contended, for it has always seemed, to the Government at Delhi, a case of self-defense: and even Mahatma Gandhi through the great part of his life admitted the right of self-defense.

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IV

American resentment of Indian policy at the United Nations is the real essence of the situation we are discussing, in which, since December 1950, a store of American good will towards India seems to have been diminished and partly dissipated. Remembering the long debate over a cease-fire in Korea in December and January last, remembering it *modo grosso* and not in detail, Americans say that India "opposed" us, that India was "in favor of" Red China, and that India "vacillated" or was "unrealistic" in the matter.

This is a trick of the American memory which recalls Tocqueville's dictum at the beginning of this paper. India's position in favor of collective security and against aggression has been made clear a large number of times since the United Nations came into being. When the original American proposal was presented to the United Nations in June 1950, calling for a united stand against the aggression upon the Korean Republic, India supported that proposal (Cabinet decision of June 28). The Indian Parliament gave Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru a unanimous vote of approval for his stand: and unanimous votes are rare in the Indian Parliament. So long as the resistance to aggression was the main or only question at issue, India's support was assured. No Indian troops went to Korea for obvious reasons—they could not be spared from a country so threatened. But the moral support of India was invaluable at the time, for the plain reason that India has had a truly independent line in world politics for three years and could not be accused of acting under economic pressure, as could be said of Marshall Plan countries. The Egyptian refusal to take a similar stand was due, as may be remembered, to Nahas Pasha's contention that the aggression involved in the partition of Palestine was just as bad as the North Korean attack but had been approved by the Western Powers.

A slight cloud came in mid-October. At this point Mr. Nehru expressed himself publicly in favor of calling a halt at the 38th Parallel. This had always been his view, it seems, although privately expressed. From Sardar K. M. Panikkar, his Ambassador in Peking, he received a formal warning from the Chinese Communist Government that if our troops passed the parallel they, the Chinese, would take "defensive" action. The warning, as simple information, was relayed immediately to the State Depart-

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ment. It should be mentioned that Mr. Panikkar, so far from being a "Red sympathizer" as some American papers have stated, is in fact a conservative far to the right of Mr. Nehru himself; he was formerly counsel for the Indian Princes, the most reactionary body in India. There was no actual attempt at "mediation." Mr. Nehru denied in Parliament that he aimed at any such rôle. He had, during preceding weeks, exchanged some views on peace with both the State Department and Stalin: those exchanges were published.

When the 38th Parallel was passed, Mr. Nehru's comment to the journalists in Delhi was that he had nothing further to say: "the military mind has taken over." The Government of India did nothing further until December, when its delegation at Lake Success, working with the delegates of all the free countries of Asia and the Middle East (including Egypt), proposed a cease-fire. At this time the cease-fire, so far from being regarded by anybody as anti-American, was openly characterized by Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate, as an attempt to "save the American troops" from disaster.

The long debate collapsed because of the obstinacy of the Chinese Communist responses. In the end the American delegation, obeying resolutions of both houses of the Congress, introduced a resolution branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors. To this resolution India and many other countries were opposed. The Marshall Plan countries fell into line at last, but India voted in the negative to the end. The final vote in the Political Committee took place at ten in the evening of India's day of national mourning, the anniversary of the death of Mahatma Gandhi.

This, it seems, was India's great crime in American eyes. No American I have ever met seems to realize that our approach to the Yalu River was genuinely alarming to the Chinese. Repeated public declarations on the Peking radio by spokesmen for the Chinese Communist Government (including the Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai) to the effect that China would not passively watch us come to the Chinese frontier were, it seems, regarded as bluff. The Chinese intervention was therefore, from the American point of view, aggression.

But even if it was aggression, an Indian might say—even granting the fact—how on earth can you negotiate with somebody you have branded so publicly as aggressor? What is the point of naming the Chinese aggressors? This was argued at Lake

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Success not only by Indians, but by many others, including representatives of most of the states of Asia and, earlier, Europe. Eventually the American resolution obtained the necessary votes. The performance was regarded with dismay by many Americans, since it seemed futile in a high degree—an expression of temper. The unfortunate fact is that from the time the United Nations troops passed the 38th Parallel the issue of resistance to aggression had been obscured, rightly or wrongly, in many minds both in Europe and Asia. The approach to the frontier of China looked, from an Asian point of view, unlike resistance and indeed rather like aggression. This unpopular fact can hardly be stated with safety in the United States, and yet it is a political reality.

And so, rightly or wrongly, India came in for its present wave of disfavor in the United States: India more than any other country because she had never changed her views and maintained her vote to the end. It is hardly necessary to recall the debate in the American Congress on wheat for India, in which a humanitarian proposal was dragged through the political mire for week after week. But even this episode, unsavory though it was, cannot give the full flavor of the anti-Indian remarks one hears in private discussions.

And yet, truthfully speaking, can anybody deny that what India wished to see in October is what we were seeing in August? At each step in the long development of the Korean drama, considered not as a military conflict but as a tremendous psychological evolution for thinking men everywhere, the aching question has been this: where and how will it end? India wished to see it end at the 38th Parallel: that was in October 1950. And somewhere in that neighborhood is probably where it will end—after travail and loss, sorrow and destruction.

Americans regard the principle of collective security as valid only if some method of enforcing it can be made operative; India, which fully accepts the principle, has in American eyes been lagging in support for enforcement. I have tried to show that India's support was assured during the whole first part of the Korean campaign and grew tepid only as we approached the frontier of China; but the points of view here are wide apart and it may be years before they are thoroughly reconciled. It is important that each should recognize the grounds for honest disagreement. If an observer may speak personally, I never did see how an army in motion could stop at an imaginary line like the 38th Parallel, but

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I do understand how from an Asian point of view our progress toward the north appeared to be something new and genuinely disquieting.

v

The other complaints heard against Indian foreign policy in this country are, seriatim: that Mr. Nehru recognized Mao Tse-tung before anybody else did; that India wished to see Mao Tse-tung's Government take the permanent place allotted to China in the Security Council; that Mr. Nehru has a weakness for Communism. Below that level the complaints trail off into absurdity.

It is true that India was first, by a hair's breadth, in recognizing the Peking régime, but there is reason to believe that this was all decided at Colombo in concert with the other Powers associated with the British Commonwealth. The recognition of the Peking régime would naturally imply support for its claim to sit as the existing Chinese Government in the Security Council. It is well worth remembering that at the time of these events, March–April–May of 1950, they did not seem so startling even to Americans as they do today. Had it not been for tempests in internal policy, attacks upon the State Department and the like, the American Government itself might have felt quite differently upon both questions. By May 1950, six weeks before the Korean aggression, American opposition to the Peking régime had solidified and the diplomatic situation with regard to Peking had become the hodgepodge that it is today, with the British in particular well out on a limb. They, in the pre-McCarthy era, had recognized both Bao Dai and Mao Tse-tung—Bao Dai to please the French and the Americans, Mao Tse-tung to face the facts and try to save what could be saved of British trade in China. The blatant truth is that the United States made no serious attempt to keep Britain and India from recognizing Mao Tse-tung.

Mr. Nehru's speech to the Indian Parliament on the recognition of Mao Tse-tung in the spring of 1950 states plainly that India is not concerned with the nature of an existing government, but merely with its existence. Once the entire mainland of China was under the rule of the Peking Government—for the first time in 40 years—there was no point, in this view, in ignoring that fact, especially on the part of an Asian Power which fundamentally and primarily thinks of Asia as a wronged, exploited continent. This last point—Asian anti-imperialism—is such a pervasive ele-

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ment in the politics of every country from the Mediterranean to the Pacific that it tends, much of the time, to make the issue of capitalism versus Communism, as presented by some in the United States, irrelevant. Asia, by and large, is neither capitalist nor Communist: it is peasant. Starving peasants take little account of our paleface ideologies.

But to suppose that Mr. Nehru has a weakness for Communism is arrant nonsense. He has been personally responsible—and has publicly accepted responsibility—for the imprisonment without trial of practically every Indian Communist organizer or agitator of any consequence. The number is not precisely known. It changes constantly, but I have heard that some 12,000 to 15,000 Communists are in prison. This is done with the utmost severity and without bail, habeas corpus or any of the other constitutional safeguards which are observed in the United States. Mr. Nehru bitterly dislikes putting anybody in jail, having spent so much of his own life there, but he also acknowledges his responsibility for public order and for the food supply of the country, both of which have been sharply threatened by Communist activity. Had the threatened Communist-led strike on the railroads taken place in the spring of 1950, it would have thrown whole provinces into total famine. It was this which determined Mr. Nehru to utilize those emergency regulations (Defense of the Realm) under which he himself was confined for so many years.

True, Jawaharlal Nehru is a Socialist in theory, but he never has belonged to the Socialist Party of India, although he showed it sympathy in its early days. His own party, the National Congress, has traditionally taken in anybody who wanted to work for the freedom of India, regardless of theoretical views on society or economics. His Socialism does not seem to me much more radical than that of Theodore Roosevelt, who also believed in conservation of national resources and was much more of a "trust-buster" than Mr. Nehru has proved to be. Woodrow Wilson was not a Socialist, and yet the origins of the T.V.A. must be traced to him: and the T.V.A. is precisely the kind of government enterprise towards which Nehru most aspires. As Stanley Baldwin and many Liberals and Conservatives before him have remarked, "We are all Socialists now," and the labels refer to degree rather than to kind. Mr. Nehru has formally deferred even the consideration of possible nationalization for ten years, which indicates how gradually he approaches the enactment of any Socialist theory. He is

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exempt from the worst vilifications of Indian politicians—excepting always the Communists—because he inherits some of Gandhi's immunity. But the Communists and their close allies in and out of India never lose a chance to arraign him as the "Chiang Kai-shek" of India, the "tool of Wall Street" and so on. When he travels abroad it is customary for the local Communist parties to make demonstrations against him.

Mahatma Gandhi has also become anathema to the Communists. They supported him during his life in spite of his anti-materialist philosophy, because in fact they could do nothing else. They had to support him or cease to exist in Indian politics. Once he was safely dead, however, the pundits of Moscow set to work, and as readers of the Soviet press know, it has been officially ruled that Gandhi was a "reactionary Utopian," which condemns him by bell, book and candle.

Prime Minister Nehru, of course, does not hesitate upon occasion to depart from the Gandhian rules. He never did follow the dietary and religious regulations of the Mahatma. He gave up meat-eating on his return from England, but with some difficulty, and has not adhered to the rule with any noticeable fanaticism. He smokes cigarettes as constantly as President Roosevelt used to do; he has no devotional habits or practices that I have heard about. One of his most notable departures from Gandhian teaching has just recently occurred when he sponsored a bill in the Indian Parliament which would legalize instruction in birth control. This victory for Mrs. Sanger's thesis occurs more than 20 years after her celebrated three-day debate with the Mahatma on that question. Gandhiji was greatly in favor of birth control—the population of India increases 5,000,000 a year in spite of appalling mortality—but he wished to obtain it by sexual abstinence, which is no more practical in India than anywhere else.

One of Mr. Nehru's most notable departures from Gandhian teaching has been the First Amendment to the Constitution of India. This amendment authorizes the Government to put "reasonable restrictions" on the liberty of the press. There was a furor in India over this measure, and our press in the United States duly reported the furor without ever adequately explaining what it was about. The purpose of the restrictive powers is partly, and perhaps even chiefly, to defend the United States Government against the fantastic inventions and accusations of the Communist and crypto-Communist press of India. There are papers in In-

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dia—sheets or broadsides would be a better description—appearing erratically once a week for six months or so, which go further in gutter-language and sheer inventive filth than anything it has been my privilege to see in America. The United States is under constant attack in these sheets, which, following the Moscow style of invective, surpass even their models in vulgarity and untruth. Mr. Nehru has been concerned to save "friendly nations" (*i.e.* principally the United States) from this kind of vicious attack. Indian journalism as a whole rose in its wrath against the First Amendment in the name of "freedom of the press," though nobody contended that Mr. Nehru could not be trusted to administer it: the objection was that he might some day have a successor who would utilize his powers otherwise. He then accepted the addition of the tremendous word "reasonable," which, of course, will subjugate every litigation to review by the Supreme Court of India; but the amendment was passed, anyhow, on June 1, 1951.

VI

A final specific criticism of India's policy by Americans should be mentioned, although it is not valid—that the Chinese annexation of Tibet was accepted without protest. It is insufficiently understood here that Tibet never has been an independent country under international law. It was always a vassal state of the Chinese emperors, and in the nineteenth century, when our codes were evolved, this was universally recognized. The most the British Government of India could claim was the right, as an interested party, to be represented at any negotiations. Even this had a very shadowy legal basis. Just as Mr. Nehru inherits the historic responsibilities of the British, so Mao Tse-tung inherits those of the Chinese emperors: that is the juridical fact unless the existence of the Peking Government be denied. Mr. Nehru does not deny its existence; he has in fact recognized it. So what legal basis could he have for any kind of intervention? Certainly he has not been rendered happier by the Chinese action, since he had actively endeavored to bring about a peaceful settlement without military occupation. And it is extremely apparent to him, as one of the most percipient men ever to attain great power, that the huge natural plateau of Tibet can, in an air age, dominate Asia. Tibet has become, at this time, what the British always foresaw that it would become: a military position of high importance. The two young boys in whose names all these ma-

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nœuvres have taken place are incarnations of the enlightenment of Lord Gautama Buddha. The older, the Dalai Lama, is now 16 and has been considered in some quarters to be backed by Mr. Nehru; the other, the Panchen Lama, was only 13 a year and a half ago when the stars, omens and portents picked him out, so conveniently for Mao Tse-tung, in Chinese-occupied territory. The Chinese-Tibetan Agreement (published in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* May 29, 1951) guarantees the existing political system of Tibet, its religious freedom, habits and customs, the income of the lamaseries, and all the "existing status, function and powers" of both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. Article 11 guarantees that no reforms will be introduced in Tibet by the central authorities, but must occur when and if the local Tibetan government desires. This is pretty much what any Chinese emperor would have done, up to this point, and is almost exactly what Chiang Kai-shek also did. It should be stressed once more, however, that the Panchen Lama is Mao Tse-tung's instrument and that there is no limit to the possibilities of such an instrument in Tibet. The powers of the two great lamas are defined as being those which pertained to the thirteenth Dalai Lama and ninth Panchen Lama "at the time of friendly and cordial relations between them."

However, the agreement also reserves Tibet's foreign relations to the central Chinese Government and contains military clauses which will integrate the Tibetan forces into the Chinese national army, will introduce Chinese military committees into Tibet, etc. It is these military clauses which have occasioned anxiety in Delhi. The Dalai Lama has now returned to Lhasa, and it is hardly to be doubted that henceforth he will be unable to appeal to Mr. Nehru on anything of consequence. The Panchen Lama's authority, which has at times in history surpassed that of the Dalai Lama, must now be considered to be a part of the political apparatus of the Peking Government.

Mr. Nehru and his Ministry of External Affairs realize all this far more precisely than do their numerous critics in the United States. They are also fully cognizant of the means at their disposal, and, roughly speaking, of the practical limits thus put upon their action. Jawaharlal Nehru perhaps underrated the Chinese nationalist sensibilities of Mao Tse-tung; I think he did. All Chinese are nationalists; some may be Communists as well. No Chinese government could be pleased to see a negotiation over the

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future of Tibet being conducted in Delhi under the auspices of the Government of India. The Chinese Communist leaders are nearly all the children of imperial (and Confucian) mandarins. They must have felt that the Indian Prime Minister was overreaching himself in patronizing, for well over a year, the negotiations between the Dalai Lama's representatives and the Chinese Embassy in Delhi. That is why Mao Tse-tung invaded Tibet in October and imperiously summoned the negotiators to come to Peking. He was doing just what Chiang Kai-shek would have done and just what the Empress Dowager would have done, if it had been within their means.

Mr. Nehru's strength in foreign relations, even if he did fail in Tibet, arises from the fact that he fundamentally understands the tangle of elements in Asia better than any other democratic statesman of the day. All other democratic leaders, believers in freedom under law, seem to be hypnotized by technology and economics. There are more vital forces, even though totally unreasonable from a Western point of view. Stalin has been making some rather belated efforts to acknowledge this, probably on the best advice available to him: his tremendously important contributions to the linguistics debate (May–June–July 1950) opened a new era in Soviet theory. He is at present engaged in a strenuous effort to acknowledge also the special agrarian character of the Chinese Communist movement, its independence and its difference from Russian development: this shows up in such productions as the official analysis, 11,000 words long, published in *Voprosy Filosofii* in January 1951, of his entire attitude towards Chinese Communism for 25 years past. The Russians are now insisting on a general relativity theory under which the old Marxist dogmas do not apply at all, and China is studiously invited to be herself. We may be quite certain that Mr. Nehru understood the linguistics debate: can we be certain that any other democratic chief of state did?

Therefore he and his government represent an ideal force, if not a material one, indispensable to all who believe in freedom. We need him very much. Nobody else can speak to the free nations of Asia as he can. He carries with him every Asian government and all Asian opinion outside of Communist areas. Once he has refused to sign the Japanese treaty few others in Asia will sign it. The reservations which he suggested to it would make no practical difference to the American arrangements since those could

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be carried out bilaterally with Japan. He insists that the sovereignty of Japan and the sovereignty of China be not impaired. On such a point there would be no difference of opinion in the whole of Asia.

But Mr. Nehru's government, too, has a number of items to remember. One is that the thing Americans cannot endure, above all things, is moral condemnation. We think we have been brave, generous and as good as any great nation could be. We approve of our own conduct. Therefore it irks and hurts and harasses us to be accused, as we think, unjustly. Mr. Nehru does not give himself any airs of special virtue, and he has gone very far to disclaim any intention of leading or teaching the world. But the snippets and snatches of his speeches which our press system permits us to see are often, half a world away, construed as preachment. In March 1948, when some enthusiastic member of Parliament got up and asked him if India could not "lead" Asia, he replied: "What right have we to lead Asia? Have we shown ourselves worthy of any such task?" He has quite humbly said, over and over, that the task of his government is to guard India's independence and improve the lot of her people. In second place comes his desire to save the peace if possible, since the disaster of war might engulf everything that has evoked the energies of man since time began.

The Government of India carries with it, on international questions, so vast a section of the political terrestrial globe that it acquires an importance far out of proportion to its material strength. It has therefore some general responsibility akin to, although different from, that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its strength is moral, its words and deeds tend to have a moral overtone which is (rightly or wrongly) not acknowledged in the words or deeds of others. This can be harsh upon the ears of those who, with all due allowance for human weakness and error, are doing the best they can. The cause of peace would be best served if India and America, without military alliance or commitments hostile to other states, could become firm friends in the international arena, and above all at the United Nations. This would permit disagreement in detail—how else can friendship operate?—but should acknowledge that what unites us, our common devotion to democracy and peace, is immeasurably greater than anything that could divide us.

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THE AFRICAN RESPONSE TO RACIAL LAWS

By Z. K. Matthews

TO THE obvious embarrassment of the democratic nations of the world, race problems in South Africa attract constant and bewildered attention beyond the borders of the Union. The Western nations earnestly desire cordial relations with the Union of South Africa, and she has done much to earn their friendship. Her soldiers fought magnificently both in World War I and World War II, under the leadership of Field Marshal Smuts. Her reputation as a nation pledged to defend the cause of freedom, peace and international security in the modern world was enhanced when she became a signatory to the United Nations Charter. And her recent contribution of an air squadron to the forces of the United Nations fighting in Korea showed that she was once more prepared to play her part in resisting totalitarian aggression.

On the other hand, the categorical refusal of the government led by Field Marshal Smuts, himself one of the architects of the United Nations Charter, to submit an agreement for the transfer of the mandated territory of South-West Africa to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations led to widespread comment; and when the Indian and Pakistan Governments submitted to the U. N. Assembly the question of the treatment of Indians within the Union of South Africa, the Union's color policy evoked much troubled discussion. The change of government in South Africa in May 1948, when the United Party led by General Smuts was replaced by a coalition of Afrikaner parties led by Dr. D. F. Malan, intensified foreign misgivings about the Union's non-white policy.

Repeated efforts have been made in South Africa to find a solution to the racial problem. Commissions of experts have studied the issues involved and made recommendations to various South African governments. Parliamentary Select Committees have heard voluminous evidence. Innumerable individual studies have been made and various schemes have been tried in the search for a political system which would safeguard the rights of all sections of the population. But South Africa is no nearer the solution of her race problems than she was in 1910, when the

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Union was consummated. Indeed, the past 40 years have been characterized by the widening of economic opportunity and the broadening of democratic rights for whites, but by the contraction of economic opportunities and the narrowing of political rights for non-whites. The result is widespread resentment, frustration and disaffection.

The conviction that some way must be found to halt this process of whittling down the rights of natives led the African members of the advisory body known as the Native Representative Council to embark upon the series of adjournments of Council meetings which ultimately led to its abolition. Actually its passing is not lamented by non-whites, since the government had never seriously heeded its advice. The passive resistance movement of the Indians in Natal, about which so much was heard at Lake Success and elsewhere, stemmed from the same feeling that something must be done; so did the widespread boycott of the Colored Advisory Council, a nominated body somewhat similar to the Native Representative Council. Now violence is becoming more and more common. A demonstration of protest against *apartheid* (the policy of complete separation) which took place in May 1950 on the Witwatersrand resulted in disastrous clashes between the police and the demonstrators. A more widespread stoppage of work among non-Europeans took place on June 26, 1950. And after the removal of the colored voters from the common roll, a widely-publicized protest against the trend of legislation in South Africa was organized, on May 7, 1951, by white war veterans who felt that the undermining of the rights of non-Europeans was an abandonment of the principles and ideals for which they themselves fought and their comrades died in two world wars.

II

One must make an effort to see the issues involved in this problem of race relations in perspective. The Union of South Africa is the most powerful and probably the most advanced state on the continent of Africa. It is an independent country, with Dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The wealth of the country in natural resources such as gold, diamonds, iron, coal, manganese and other basic minerals has made possible the development of a relatively high standard of Western civilization. Although large parts of the country are arid, and though it

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is not rich agriculturally, exports of wool, fruit, wine and other farm products are considerable. South Africa also plays an important part in international trade, as a market for the industrial products of Great Britain, Canada, the United States and the European nations. The climate is temperate and the region is eminently suitable for white settlement. The white population consists mainly of persons of British and Dutch origin, but South Africa received in addition an important infusion of French Huguenots in the seventeenth century; and other European countries have also made their contribution to white immigration. In 1952, South Africa will celebrate the 300th anniversary of the landing of van Riebeek and his small band at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The settlement was established, on behalf of the Dutch East India Company, as a halfway house to India and the East. From those small beginnings white settlement at the southernmost point of Africa has grown until today more than half of the white population of the whole of Africa is to be found within the Union.

The white inhabitants believe that they have a great mission in Africa, namely, to work out a basis on which white and non-white can live side by side, to the mutual benefit of both. They are convinced that in South Africa they are destined to develop a form of Western civilization which is appropriate to Africa. They regard themselves as the champions of the white man not only in South Africa but throughout the whole continent, and the influence of the Union's point of view on relations between blacks and whites is felt in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya.

Although the Union contains such a large proportion of the continent's white population, the whites are heavily outnumbered by the non-whites: the former number approximately 2,500,000 while the indigenous African population is approximately 8,000,000. Asians (mainly Indians) who entered the country about the middle of the nineteenth century number some 300,000; and the Coloreds (persons of mixed blood) constitute another 1,000,000. To these figures must be added the populations of the mandated territory of South-West Africa (about 300,000 non-whites and 40,000 whites) and of the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland Protectorate (approximately 1,000,000 non-whites and about 6,000 whites). Altogether, therefore, the non-whites in greater South Africa out-

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number the whites by something like four and five to one.

For many generations the different sections of the population lived together in comparative peace, and by their joint efforts built a state to whose progress and prosperity all have in varying degrees contributed. Their social and economic interests became inextricably interwoven. But the common life of whites and non-whites in the country inevitably gave rise to many perplexing political, social and economic problems. The general problem stems from the fact that a system of government which had grown up among peoples with similar historical background and in countries with fairly homogeneous populations, racially and culturally, was transplanted to a country where there was sharp racial and cultural diversity, but in which all political power over the destinies of other groups was vested in one particular group.

The two great fears of the whites in South Africa are that they will lose their physical identity as a result of racial intermixture, and that they will lose their political supremacy as a result of the social and economic advancement of the non-whites. The history of race relations in South Africa may be said to consist chiefly of the measures proposed or taken by various governments to ward off what they consider the twin evils of physical absorption and political subordination.

There are two main schools of thought among white South Africans regarding the problem of devising an appropriate political system for such a multi-racial country. Both schools proceed on the assumption that it is in the interests of the country as a whole that political supremacy should for all time remain firmly in the hands of the white section of the population. But while one group believes that the attainment of this objective is not incompatible with the grant of a strictly limited measure of political power to the non-white groups, the other is convinced that if anything is conceded everything will be lost.

The principles underlying the moderate point of view were set forth as far back as 1903–05 by the Inter-Colonial Commission appointed after the South African War to inquire into, among other things, a uniform native policy for southern Africa. The Commission concluded that in the interests of both races it was desirable to allow the native population "some measure of representation in the legislatures of the country." It laid down the following main principles as the basis of native representation: (1) That no native should vote in the election of any member or

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candidate for whom a European had the right to vote. (2) That the number of members granted to native constituencies should be settled by each legislature, and that "at least one such seat should be granted in each of the self-governing Colonies in South Africa now, and in each Colony or Possession as it becomes self-governing." (3) That there should be separate voters' lists, and separate candidates for natives only. (4) That the qualifications for the native voters should be the same as for Europeans. (5) That the qualifications of members to represent the natives should be determined by each legislature. These are the axioms to which, in varying degrees, men like Smuts and Hertzog subscribed. They formed the basis of the Representation of Natives Act of 1936 under which the African population was provided with a system of separate representation. The Asiatic Representation Act of 1946 did the same for the Indians, while the Separate Registration of Voters Act of 1951 envisages the same system for the colored population of the Union.

The other school of thought is of the opinion that the inevitable result of such schemes would be equality between black and white. According to the report of the Commission appointed by the Nationalist Party to draw up its color policy, "a policy of equality or any form thereof must necessarily lead to the undermining and eventual destruction of the white race as an independent and ruling people. This is the logical consequence of the numerical superiority and the rapid development of the non-white races. Any other interpretation of the position is wishful thinking and self-deception." In this view, the only policy which will permanently guarantee the racial purity and the political supremacy of the white man is the policy of *apartheid*. Only by following that road can "the character and future of each race within its own area be protected and safeguarded." Each race, "in its own home," will be ensured full opportunity to develop, and "the fundamental right of self-determination and self-realization can be assured without the interests of one group coming into conflict with the interests of another, and without the one group feeling that the status and development of the other is an undermining of and detrimental to itself. Any middle course or compromise is at best of a temporary nature and purely patchwork." The adherents of this school of thought have held the reins of government in South Africa since May 1948.

The policy contemplates not merely separate political repre-

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sentation, but the setting aside of areas in which the interests of the various racial groups in South Africa shall be paramount. As Dr. W. M. Eiselen, the present Secretary for Native Affairs, has described it, the different groups will be separated into "separate self-sufficient socio-economic units," that is to say, there will be total separation into distinct white and non-white "areas of liberty." But the result of the steps which have been taken to implement the policy of *apartheid* is not liberty for the non-whites.

The Group Areas Act was passed in 1950 and brought into operation in March 1951. It empowers the government, through the Minister of the Interior, to set aside areas for the different racial groups. In such areas, no person who does not belong to the group for which it has been set aside shall have property rights (except under permit from the responsible Minister). A Land Tenure Advisory Board has been set up and local authorities have been asked to consider how the Act can best be implemented in their areas. Under this law the property rights of non-whites have been placed in a more precarious position than ever before. The hard-won earnings of Africans, which have been invested in better homes for themselves and their children, have depreciated in value overnight, for the character of any area may be altered without adequate consultation and without compensation for those affected. Non-European "group areas" which have been in existence for many decades, such as the non-European townships in the western areas of Johannesburg, have come to be regarded as "black areas" which must be removed. The sense of insecurity among those affected is great. This Act purports to be designed to reduce, remove or prevent any *deurmekaarboerdery* (intermingling) between white and black; but experience has taught the non-Europeans that where any such *deurmekaarboerdery* is to the advantage of the European, some plausible reason will be found for not interfering with it. Whenever abolition of it appears advantageous to the non-European, however, it is represented as a menace which cannot be tolerated.

Other laws to implement this policy have been put on the statute books. By the Separate Registration of Voters Act, the Coloreds have been deprived of their ordinary franchise rights and placed on a separate roll; they are to be provided with a system of separate representation similar to that which was made law for the Africans in 1936. The object of this law is to render the colored population innocuous as a political pressure group.

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Much of the discussion about it has centered around the fact that the government did not comply with the two-thirds majority rule laid down for this kind of legislation in the South Africa Act of 1909. But whether any group is deprived of its voting rights by a two-thirds majority or a bare majority is of course irrelevant as far as those who have lost their voting rights are concerned: the Africans do not feel the loss of their franchise rights any less keenly because in their case the change was brought about by a two-thirds majority. The significant development since 1936 is simply that, after one group was deprived of its rights with impunity, it became easier to tamper with the rights of others. The next step may well be that so-called "Communists," of whatever color, will be deprived of their rights merely by inclusion in a list drawn up by an administrative officer, without any reference to Parliament. Those who think they are safe today may, like the Coloreds of 1936, live to regret their failure to make common cause with the Africans in their struggle against the dictatorship of the minority.

And now the system of separate representation for Africans established in 1936 has begun to disintegrate, as African leaders predicted it would. The Native Representative Council which its creators had hoped would develop into a kind of Bantu Parliament is to be replaced, under the Bantu Authorities Act passed in the last days of the recent session of Parliament, with a system which is described as a "Magna Carta for Africans" but which to Africans seems a long step backward. The real effect of the Bantu Authorities Act will be to widen and strengthen European authority. The Bantu will be divided into a multitude of units, each with the shadow instead of the substance of power. The purpose is to delay indefinitely the development of a sense of national unity among Africans. The African people were not consulted about the Act; had they been, their leaders would have rejected it, for the efforts of all responsible leaders of the African people are directed toward welding the different tribal groups together.

The Nationalists have also declared their intention to abolish Assembly representation for Africans, and this will probably be done in the next session of Parliament. But the African people have ceased to be interested in representation by Europeans. Human history has not yet produced a group of men who can so impartially divine what is good for others that self-government

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can be dispensed with. Africans will continue to believe that, in dealing with their white fellow countrymen, they are dealing with fallible human beings. Such schemes as the Bantu Authorities Act and the system which it is designed to inaugurate may be forced upon certain sections of the African people, but will never command assent.

III

The government is proceeding with the execution of its *apartheid* policy in other directions. The Native Building Workers Act which has been brought into operation is intended to protect white labor against non-white competition. It restricts African construction workers to African areas, whether urban or rural, or to working for Africans. The whole community will suffer, for the shortage of white building workers is officially admitted and there is an acute scarcity of housing for all sections of the population, especially in the urban districts. A piece of legislation called the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act makes more difficult the occupation by Africans of land not specifically set aside for them, and the proposed Native Laws Amendment Bill (which, happily, has not yet been passed) would remove the present legal necessity for the Government to find accommodation for Africans who have been rendered homeless as a result of the application of the restrictive provisions of the Natives Land and Trust Act of 1936.

Drastic changes in native education are feared as a result of the recommendations of the Native Education Commission appointed a couple of years ago. The Commission's report has not yet been published, but such previews of it as have been given by responsible Ministers indicate that it will propose that native education be transferred from the departments which deal with the education of other sections of the population to the Native Affairs Department. This is the Department which is entrusted with the administration of the restrictive laws affecting Africans. The Nationalist Party has a program of "Christian National Education" which it believes is particularly suitable for Africans. It has set itself the task of fighting against "such activities on the part of church societies and institutions as tend to undermine constituted authority, or propagate antagonistic and foreign ideologies and which distort the principle of separate development." It is hardly necessary to add that the African people will

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never subscribe to any policy under which artificial limits are set to education. African children are entitled, in so far as the capabilities of each child permit, to enter into the heritage built up for all mankind by the contributions of the best minds of all ages in every field of human endeavor.

Perhaps the most dangerous onslaught upon the liberties of the people of South Africa is the passing of the amended Suppression of Communism Act. This Act purports to strike at the Communist Party of South Africa (now dissolved) and at Communism. South Africa is not alone in regarding Communism as one of the greatest evils of modern times. Few among the African people are in favor of Communism, and the Communist Party of South Africa made no significant headway among the African people or in African organizations. But the word "Communist" seems to have lost all meaning, and the definition of it laid down in the amended Act is so comprehensive that it can take in practically everybody whose expressed convictions happen to be different from those of the government. The Act appears to be intended not only to muzzle future critics of government policy but also to make it possible to deal retrospectively with past critics. African leaders who are not Communists, and who would never be admitted to the company of Communists, may find themselves dealt with under this law.

The policy of *apartheid* is not confined to legislative measures. Its influence is felt in the services rendered to non-Europeans in post offices, railway stations, government offices and other public places. The discourtesy and incivility toward non-Europeans always associated with such places have, if anything, become worse. Uncouth youths who as a rule have little more than their white skins to justify their being placed in positions of authority over non-Europeans have come into their own. Their behavior toward non-Europeans does little to relieve the mounting tension between the races in South Africa.

IV

The assumption of the policy of *apartheid*, in sum, is that Africans are so utterly different from Europeans that common ground upon which black and white can work together politically is forever impossible of achievement. As I have suggested, there has always been a strong flavor of this premise in governmental measures in the Union of South Africa. But in the past there have

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been helpful moderating influences. Now restraints upon the full application of this bitter doctrine seem removed. The pretense that rigid separation in the organization of the national life of the Union will enable Africans to develop their possibilities better is rejected by every lesson of experience. As has truthfully been said, "the economic system of the country depends for its very survival upon the employment of Africans in non-African areas." Studies are available which indicate the degree to which administration schools and services in the Reserves are dominated by Europeans. The purpose of intensifying the principle of separation is to intensify the exploitation of blacks by whites.

The opposition of the other sections of the non-European population—the Coloreds and the Indians—to the policy of *apartheid* is now as strong as that of the Africans. Practically all existing organizations of non-Europeans, both official and unofficial, have adopted resolutions of opposition to it. There have been one or two instances of support for some aspect or other of government policy by bodies with special axes to grind. A group described as the Native Medical Council of Natal, consisting mainly of African herbalists, has come out in support of the government's policy in regard to mixed marriages or sexual relations between the racial groups; and an association of ministers of African separatist churches has declared itself in favor of *apartheid*. These organizations carry little weight.

The two principal African political organizations are the All-African Convention and the African National Congress. The All-African Convention arose out of the agitation of the African people against the Hertzog Native Bills of 1935–36. It purports to be a federal body, seeking to weld social, religious, sporting and cultural associations of various kinds into a fighting unit. It has adopted a ten-point program through which it hopes to achieve democratic rights for all non-European groups. This program involves, among other things, a complete boycott of all separatist political institutions set up for non-Europeans by the government, and a propaganda campaign against all those connected with such bodies. The influence of this body is confined to certain parts of the Cape Province. It cannot be said to offer an adequate reflection of African public opinion.

The African National Congress, a much older body, has been in existence since 1912. It was established as a reaction against the union of white South Africa in 1910. The African leaders of

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the day were convinced that the only defense against a united white South Africa was a united black South Africa, and formed the African National Congress to bring into one body the different political organizations then existing among the African people. Since its inception, the A.N.C. has endeavored, as its original constitution indicates, to place its organization on a mass basis. Chiefs and commoners, literate and illiterate, tribal and detribalized Africans in all parts of the country were sought as members. Although the original constitution has been replaced by a much less pretentious one, the A.N.C. still has as its ideal the welding of the African people into a nation which can stand up to, if not alongside, the white nation established here in 1910. The A.N.C. has not, however, captured the masses of the African people and its accomplishments do not altogether justify its claim to speak for them effectively. But whatever its defects, there can be no doubt that the A.N.C. commands a greater allegiance among Africans than any other existing organization. In 1949 it adopted a program with the following preamble:

> The fundamental principles of the program of action of the A.N.C. are inspired by the desire to achieve national freedom. By national freedom we mean freedom from white domination and the attainment of political independence. This implies the rejection of conceptions of segregation, *apartheid,* trusteeship or white leadership which are all in one way or another motivated by the idea of white domination or the domination of the whites over the blacks. Like all other people the Africa people claim the right of self-determination.

The 1949 Conference of the A.N.C. declared that the adoption of this new program meant that the African people would have to embark upon a policy of non-coöperation. Dr. J. S. Moroka, the President-General of the A.N.C., described the policy more positively as one of coöperation with all on terms of equality only. This formulation is more constructive, and refutes those who accuse the African people of being bent upon establishing here a nation consisting exclusively of Africans, with Africans dominating minority groups. In fact, the African people have no desire to dominate any group. All they wish to emphasize is that in the future their coöperation—with the government or with anyone else for that matter—will be given only on terms consistent with dignity and self-respect, that is to say, equality.

Can South Africa accommodate within her borders two nations —the white nation and the African nation? The A.N.C. stands for

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one South African nation in which all peoples shall enjoy equal rights of citizenship. The African's desire for equality is represented in some quarters as an artificial product of "agitators," or, as they have been recently described, "learned Natives discussing high politics." Every responsible African believes that the political education of his people is a necessary task; but, in fact, African leaders spend much of their time trying to calm the feelings of people who have been enraged by the words and deeds of non-Africans, and in preventing rash actions.

The situation in South Africa is explosive. The two main sections of the community, whites and non-whites, are almost at daggers drawn. Many serious men believe that unless wiser counsels prevail, and emotions subside on both sides of the color line, a clash that could have disastrous consequences for the country will sooner or later occur. The Europeans of South Africa believe that this clash can be avoided by the permanent denial of any political power to the non-white groups; and, as a corollary, by keeping the armed forces of the country a monopoly of the white man. It has recently been stated that in the event of a third world war, the first duty of South Africa's white army will be the defense of the country against its internal "enemies"—the non-whites. In previous world wars, the internal security of the country was never threatened by any non-European group. The government of the day did not have to spend any sleepless nights over the loyalty of the non-Europeans. (The same could not be said about all sections of the Europeans.) The explanation given for doubting the loyalty of the non-Europeans now is that, if there is a third world war, it will be between Communist and non-Communist countries; and the governmental pretense is that all or most non-Europeans in South Africa are potential Communists who will turn against their own country. The African people, and the other non-white groups in the country, do not need any Communists to teach them about the nature of conditions under which they are compelled to live. They ask for reason, and fair dealing. And they hope for peace.

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ALBANIA, SOVIET PAWN

By Vladimir Dedijer

ONE of the most serious threats to world peace today is the pressure of the Soviet Union on Jugoslavia. This will be examined here from the angle of Albania, which although the smallest Balkan state and smallest Soviet satellite, holds a much more important place in the plans of the Kremlin than is generally realized. The reasons for this are two. First, the Soviets aspire to make the Balkans a passageway to the Mediterranean, and in Albania they have already secured a small window opening in that direction. Secondly, they foresee the possible usefulness of Albania as a propaganda weapon in confusing and dividing their opponents.

There is a widespread belief, particularly in the West, that Soviet expansion is simply the result of a Soviet desire to spread Communism. There could be no greater mistake, as we Jugoslavs have particular cause to know. Soviet aims are exclusively imperialist. Besides being expansionist geographically, the Soviet Union is hungry for economic exploitation. Those were the motives which dictated the Soviet attitude toward Jugoslavia during and after the war; and they are the motives which dictate the Soviet attitude in the Albanian question today.

Not merely in Jugoslavia, but among hundreds of millions of people the world over, Communism or Socialism is the expression of the desire to achieve a position of equality—national, political and economic—alongside more developed countries. This is a noble aim, which started in the modern world as far back as Thomas More. It has nothing to do with the Soviet Union's ambitions to extend its dominion as a Great Power.[1]

II

What, then, is in fact the driving force behind the present Soviet expansionism? Is it different from the Russian expansionism of Tsarist days? The old Russian imperialism, of course, was set

[1] One slogan of Soviet expansionism which recalls the Pan-Slavism of Tsarist days has been, especially in the immediate postwar period, "the Brotherhood of the Slavs." Congresses were held and an All-Slav organization was set up. The concept of "the Brotherhood of the Slavs" served until the brother Slavs had been enslaved, since which nothing has been heard of the All-Slav organization. Its chief organizer, the Russian General Gondurov, is at present touring Europe, speaking enthusiastically at peace congresses.

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in motion by a social order composed of feudalism and capitalism. This was destroyed by the October Revolution. There followed an attempt to develop a Socialist order, which should logically have meant a curtailment of the expansionist drive.

What Moscow has achieved, however, is not a Socialist order but a system of state capitalism. With the inception of the first Five Year Plan for Soviet industrialization, Socialist growth stagnated in the Soviet Union owing to the lack of Socialist democracy. A new bureaucratic ruling caste sprang up, composed of members of the party machine and the *chinovnik* (state official) system. A great gulf opened between the people and this new caste, whose standard of living, expressed as income, could be as much as 40 times higher than that of the common man. In other words, the worker was now mulcted of surplus value to the advantage of a new ruling caste instead of the old bourgeoisie.

In the foreign field the same structural features of a state capitalist order led inevitably to the resumption of imperialism. In due course, the U.S.S.R. has assumed the old Tsarist imperialist traditions, with the one difference that, just as at home the basis has changed from primitive feudal capitalism to a highly developed system of state capitalism, so the new imperialist expansion which results is proving tougher and much more vigorous. However, as neither forms nor methods have changed essentially, the Balkan nations should study carefully the history of earlier Russian expansion in their part of Europe. Albania is a case in point.

Albania, though small, is a country of considerable wealth. It also has always been, and still remains, a country of great strategic importance, for it dominates the approaches to the Adriatic. The well-protected natural harbor of Valona, with its important island fortress of Saseno jutting deeply into the Ionian Sea, is only 42 miles from Otranto, on the Italian side of the Adriatic. On the land side, too, Albania occupies a key position in the mountainous Balkan peninsula. The Romans, driving into the Balkans, struck through Albania. The Via Appia crossed Italy from Rome to Brindisi; and on the eastern side of the Adriatic, the great Via Egnatia, beginning at Durazzo, penetrated the Balkans, leading through the very heart of the peninsula towards Salonika and Constantinople. By this route, not only Thessaly, Thrace and Macedonia, but also the Danubian plains, lay open to the Roman legions. By the same route the Normans moved from southern Italy under Robert Guiscard in the eleventh cen-

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tury; and after the Fourth Crusade, Albania served Venice as a base for Balkan expansion.

In the modern era, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Albania became a bone of contention among many contestants. When Catherine II of Russia and Joseph II of Austria conferred about their respective spoils from the decaying Ottoman Empire they were able to agree on many points; but the fate of Albania remained among the open questions. After Russia's victory over the Turks she presented to the world, in 1878, the abortive treaty of San Stefano. Clause Six proposed to establish a Greater Bulgaria, plainly a Russian puppet, which would have included a large region of south Albania, extending as far west as Mt. Tomori and as far south as Mt. Grammos. This would have brought Bulgaria—and through Bulgaria, Russia—to within an inch of the Adriatic. But Russia's westward expansion threatened the British "life line" through the Mediterranean. The Congress of Berlin resulted. On the eve of this Congress, Britain was quite prepared to hand Albania over to Italy in order to prevent Russia's emergence, virtually in the heart of the Mediterranean. For Italy since the 'eighties had set herself up as a Great Power and also was staking out a claim to Albania.

The Congress of Berlin ended, as we know, without handing over Albania to Italy. Nevertheless, after Italy had experienced momentary setbacks in Abyssinia, at the close of the nineteenth century, her eyes again turned seriously in the same direction. Her aspirations toward Albania clashed with those of Austria-Hungary, however, and the Triple Alliance was continuously rent with disagreements over this question. As a result, Tsarist Russia and Italy came somewhat closer together. Also, the Germanic *Drang nach Osten* through the Sandzhak and down the Vardar valley had begun, and this cut across both the Russian expansion westward and the Italian aspirations eastward. A plan was discussed to link the Adriatic and the Danube by a railway, to run east and north from the Albanian port of San Giovanni di Medua; and at one time the Banca d'Italia actually was ready to advance 48,000,000 lire for this project.

However, 1912 set Russia and Italy again at loggerheads. Russia sponsored negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria for a joint war against Turkey and agreed to support the division of Albania by these two countries in the event that they were victorious. At the same time Greece appeared as another aspirant

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for part of south Albania. As a countermove, Austria-Hungary proposed an "independent" Albania, under a German princeling. Reluctantly Italy agreed.

One of the very few voices raised against all this bargaining with Albania's future came from the progressives of Serbia, who vigorously condemned proposals which ran counter to the centuries-long libertarian traditions of the Jugoslav peoples. "Much as the concern of the Austrian property-owners for the right of the Balkan peoples to self-determination is a pitiless mockery of the nationality principle," wrote the leader of the Serbian workers' movement at that time, "the Serbian bourgeoisie by proclaiming its own policy of conquest has for the first time stripped from the face of the Serbian nation the veil of an oppressed people fighting for liberation. . . . For this reason, social democracy, as the only resolute adversary of these policies of conquest, which are the root cause of all these ills, cannot let pass without comment this moment in which our property-owners have reached out for the lands and freedom of other people, and in which men who once were heralds of national liberation have now unfurled the banner of national oppression, and the interests of capital have swallowed up the interests of the people."[2]

However, much heavier stakes were soon to be played in the game of Balkan power politics. Though Tsarist Russia purportedly had entered the world war to protect the little "brother nation" of Serbia, she readily joined the other Great Powers—by the secret Treaty of London in 1915—in purchasing Italy's participation by promising her not merely parts of Jugoslav lands but control of Albania. The provisions of the London Treaty concerning Albania (Italian annexation of strategic Valona, Italian protection for the "independence" of the rest of Albania, etc.) opened the way for Italian imperialism in the Balkans.

In the critical days preceding the Second World War, Albania served Italy not only as a gate of entry to the Balkans but also as a springboard for the projected Italian drive into the Middle East. On April 7, 1939, Count Ciano proclaimed King Victor Emmanuel "King of Italy and Albania and Emperor of Abyssinia." Eighteen months later Italian armies deployed from Albania, first against Greece and later against Jugoslavia, striking from the west at the same time that the Germans struck from the northeast and east from their bases in Rumania and Bulgaria.

[2] Dimitrije Tucovich, "Serbia and Albania." Belgrade, 1914.

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III

Today it would be a mistake—and a dangerous one—to view Russian moves in the Balkans as merely a revival of Tsarist aims and methods. For there are certain important differences between the old military-feudal imperialism of Tsarist Russia and the new expansionism of the Soviet Union. The old Russian Empire did at least set itself aims which were relatively limited, *e.g.* it made specific demands in Manchuria in the Far East, in Persia in the Middle East and to control the Dardanelles in the Balkans. The new Russian expansionism, however, has no limits. In fact, the aim of the all-embracing state capitalism of the Soviet Union is total world domination.

Specifically, then, Soviet domination of Albania does not constitute an end in itself. Moscow is not interested in using that country merely to help attain the old Tsarist goals in the Balkans, of which the chief seems to have been the protection of the Russian passage to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. In Soviet plans today, Albania is intended to be a springboard for the complete penetration of the Balkans in a general strategy of expansion toward the Mediterranean and beyond. To the realization of such plans there is in the Balkans one important obstacle—independent Jugoslavia.

Although there is no direct land contact between the Soviet Union and Albania, the southern tongue of Jugoslavia which separates Bulgaria from Albania is only about 125 miles wide at the narrowest point. If contact were established across this neck Greece would be cut off from Jugoslavia; all sea lines between Jugoslavia and the Mediterranean would be severed; and Trieste, at the head of the Adriatic, would be blocked. In short, Russia would be able to strike from Albania by sea and by air against vital points throughout the Mediterranean.

One of the specialities of Tsarist foreign policy was to accuse prospective victims of committing the very crimes which were being prepared against them. Today the Soviet Union avails itself of Tsarist experience and improves upon it. Thus when it launched the attack on Jugoslavia through the Cominform resolution of June 28, 1948, it made out that Albania was to be the victim of precisely the sort of domination and exploitation from Jugoslavia which, in truth, the Soviet Union intended itself to impose on Jugoslavia. In order to condition world public opinion,

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Moscow gave the signal to the pro-Soviet elements in Albania, led by Mehmet Shehu, a "grey eminence" behind Prime Minister Enver Hoxha, to seize power and eliminate all independent-minded members of the Albanian Communist Party. Then when the time came Hoxha and Shehu accused Jugoslavia of having hampered Albania's efforts at freedom during the war and of having exploited her economically afterwards.

Much space would be required to give even in outline the real story of Jugoslav-Albanian relations. On the Jugoslav attitude toward Albania during the war I shall give two quotations only, the first from Moscow, the other from Enver Hoxha himself. "The military-political successes of the Albanian people," wrote the Moscow *Izvestia* on January 11, 1948, "would have been impossible without the decisive aid given them by the National Liberation Army of Jugoslavia, and without the defeat of the main Hitlerite forces in the Balkans by units of the heroic Soviet Army." Prime Minister Enver Hoxha, in a letter to Josip-Broz Tito, of September 23, 1944, said: "The correct and clear line of the heroic Communist Party of Jugoslavia served us not merely as a beacon of anti-Fascism, lighting up our hard and arduous road, but at the same time provided us with a firm support in the work we had only just begun."

So much for the war years. On the economic side I shall simply compare Soviet economic relations with the satellite nations and Jugoslavia's economic relations with Albania.

It was no small surprise for the East European countries, Jugoslavia included, when they found after the war that the Soviet Union put its economic dealings with them on a purely capitalistic basis, that is to say, regulating them by prices on the world market. This meant that those countries where the means of production were less developed—in other words, where the productivity of labor was smaller—were to be exploited by the more developed countries which traded with them. This general form of exploitation was supplemented by special forms suited to particular conditions in particular countries.

The most characteristic of these special methods of extortion has been for the Soviets to export capital to a given country and then to extract profit from it by means of joint stock companies. Soviet propaganda made out these joint stock companies to be a "new type of economic partnership, in principle essentially different from capitalist forms." But in actual experience the East

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European countries, including both Jugoslavia and Albania, found that instead they were instruments of savage economic exploitation, reminiscent of capitalist methods of accumulation. An old-fashioned capitalist who decided to invest in an economically backward country would normally introduce there the basic means of production—machines for the factories, and so forth. The Soviet method is to take over "enemy" industrial property, for example in Rumania, and count this as the Soviet capital contribution to the new joint stock companies. These companies are exempted even from the local nationalization laws. As a result, the property "rights" of foreign capital by which the Rumanian and other East European proletariat were formerly exploited have merely changed hands and become the property of the Soviet Union. The exploitative function has not been abated.

Again, the Soviet Union has refused to permit these mixed companies to pay ground rent. For example, when Russian delegates were negotiating a mixed Soviet-Jugoslav shipbuilding company, they refused to agree that the ground rent of the site on which the shipyards were to be built was to be part of the Jugoslav capital participation. Jugoslavia was strong enough to resist such exploitation. Rumania and other nations were not.

By way of comparison, let us examine Albanian-Jugoslav economic relations. Though Jugoslavia was herself economically underdeveloped, she still was more developed than Albania and therefore could have exploited that country if world prices had been made the basis of trade, as they were in Soviet dealings with the East European countries. Instead, Jugoslavia bought from Albania at prices ruling on the Albanian home market, and sold to her at domestic Jugoslav prices, that is to say, she refused to take advantage of the wide difference in the two countries' economic development. As Albania lacked trading facilities, Jugoslavia undertook to sell her copper for her on the world market. The world price at the time was 22,000 Albanian leks per ton, but the price of copper in Albania, owing to the primitive methods of extraction used there and the poor quality of Albanian ore, was 81,688 leks per ton. The gap between the two prices was paid to Albania out of special credits which Jugoslavia granted in 1947 and again in 1948.

The Albanian-Jugoslav joint stock companies which were set up to develop the productive capacity of Albania provide another instance of the considerate treatment given this small and un-

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derdeveloped country by Jugoslavia, so different from the Soviet Union's treatment of its satellites. Thus during the two years in which the companies were in existence (1947–1948), Jugoslavia drew no profit whatsoever from them—although entitled to by treaty—and moreover paid ground rent on the company properties. Though in economic difficulties herself in the hard postwar years, Jugoslavia went further, and in 1947 granted a credit in goods amounting to 2 billion leks (approximately $40,000,000) to help Albania get on her feet.

This benevolent policy led Abdul Kelezi, Deputy Minister of Finance, to say in the Albanian Parliament on July 17, 1947: "The present invaluable aid given by the Jugoslav people to the value of 2 billion leks represents 56.73 percent of our budget. . . . The brotherly Jugoslav people are today aiding us without any self-interest, with the sole aim of raising our economy and ensuring our people a better life, since the road of both our nations is the glorious road to Socialism."[3]

After the change in relations between Jugoslavia and Albania, following the Cominform resolution of 1948, the opinion was expressed even in quarters most friendly to Albania that Jugoslavia had been too idealistic, indeed almost naïve, in dealings with her neighbor. That was a superficial view. We consider that our relations with Albania in those years constitute the very first example in the chequered history of the war-ravaged Balkans of real equality of treatment between two Balkan nations. We like to think, too, that its importance transcends the Balkans, showing how a developed country can coöperate with one less developed without exploitation.

IV

A final word on the bearing of the Albanian problem on what is the most important factor of all in the international situation today, that is, the effort to maintain peace. The Soviet Union has compromised itself seriously, especially during the past three years, by acting as an aggressive Power. In 1948 the U.S.S.R. openly revealed aggressive intentions toward a Socialist country, Jugoslavia, and experienced a shattering defeat. Last year Korea

[3] Another credit of 700,000,000 leks' worth of equipment and food was granted by Jugoslavia for the Albanian army. In addition, Jugoslavia made direct gifts to Albania. In 1946, 20,000 tons of maize and wheat were given as famine relief, and when Albania was hit by disastrous floods in October 1946, 57,000,000 dinars were collected in Jugoslavia and dispatched as first aid to the victims.

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provided another indication of the road which the Moscow rulers have taken in the international field.

Since the people of the world today are extremely sensitive regarding everything which involves peace or war, and have shown themselves ready to resist aggression from any quarter whatsoever, the Soviet Union has made frantic efforts to hide its aggressive intentions and is busily organizing peace congresses and peace petitions. At the same time, the Soviet propaganda machine charges that Jugoslavia nourishes aggressive intentions toward the neighboring Soviet satellites, and especially toward Albania. Strangely—and significantly, I fear—these Soviet charges against Jugoslavia regarding Albania are now being echoed in certain sections of the Italian press which otherwise are quite remote from the Cominform.

Another duty of the Soviet propaganda machine is, while accusing Jugoslavia of having designs on Albania, to reëxcite the old appetites of other nations to take a bite into that country. The men in the Kremlin hope that in the resulting confusion and dissension they may be able to swallow everything and everybody concerned. In this connection it is significant that with an air of mysterious innocence the Soviet Government has failed to conclude with Albania one of those pacts of friendship and mutual aid which it has given all its other satellites. Why has it omitted the weakest of them all? Why, too, has Enver Hoxha's Communist Party failed so far to qualify for membership in the Cominform? The exiled Albanian feudalists and their patrons in Italy may know the answer, or may be duped into thinking they know it. But in the long run these Soviet projects will turn out to have been highly myopic. To defeat them it is only necessary that thinking persons everywhere realize that any move which might endanger Albania, no matter what its form, would provide the Soviet Government with a golden opportunity to justify a new wave of aggressions on a broad front.

Meanwhile it can be stated categorically that Jugoslavia, heavily engaged as she is in a struggle both to preserve her own independence and to safeguard peace in this part of Europe, stands firmly by the principle of equality among nations, and especially equality between big and small nations. It is her fixed and determined policy that every nation—and specifically one of the smallest, Albania—has the right to its own free and independent national existence and its own way of life.

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AMERICAN LABOR'S WORLD RESPONSIBILITIES

By Michael Ross

IT IS becoming an accepted cliché that organized labor plays an important part in international affairs, but the idea it expresses is often misunderstood. Some circles both at home and abroad think that the interest taken by American trade unions in foreign relations is confined to devising ways of increasing the production of European industry. Now the experience of American unions is undoubtedly useful in helping achieve that special purpose, but American labor has far wider interests than that. Its work abroad is intended to help create, often against heavy odds, institutions which will enable masses of mankind to rise above the level of subsistence and participate fully in free and democratic societies.

The concern of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in international affairs was well summarized in a statement issued to the press in January 1951, when a small C.I.O. committee, headed by Victor Reuther, left for Europe. Mr. Jacob Potofsky, Chairman of the C.I.O.'s International Committee, explained that the group would study union problems particularly in France, Italy and Germany, and would consult with the leaders of all the non-Communist trade unions. "The consultations," he said, "will be directed toward the objective of finding methods by which the C.I.O. can most effectively further the programs of the non-Communist unions in the three countries to build their organizations, improve their collective bargaining functions and strengthen themselves generally as bulwarks of democratic society." The committee met hundreds of European trade unionists at all levels of administration, and in its report, which was accepted by the C.I.O. International Committee in March 1951, stated that it had not limited its contacts to any faction or movement, but had met with representatives of all the chief tendencies and unions. It concluded:

> We are more convinced than ever, against the background of personal observation of these past several weeks, that the free labor movement of Western Europe is that continent's most reliable and most important bulwark against the inroads of Stalinist totalitarianism.
>
> We are as strongly convinced that neither American policy makers nor the governments of the crisis countries have demonstrated adequate awareness

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of free labor's importance in the struggle for the mind and body of Europe.

We think it is axiomatic that Europe cannot be successfully defended merely by assembling divisions of soldiers and amassing quantities of munitions. It is clear to us, as it is clear to the hundreds of key unionists to whom we talked, that if Europe is to stand up against aggression from without and erosion from within, the metal workers, textile workers, mining and transportation workers, civil servants, clerks, and farmers who will constitute the heart and fiber of any European army must have something to defend more tangible than slogans, more substantial than promises of a better life to come.

The C.I.O. is now proceeding to operate abroad, along the lines of this report, within the limitations of its finance and suitable available personnel. It is fully conscious of the need to build up military strength in the free world against the aggressive imperialism of the Soviet Union, but it does not believe this can be done successfully unless these other goals named above are pursued effectively at the same time. The C.I.O. is fully aware, of course, that it has not made any startling discovery, nor does it have any sovereign remedy for the problems of European labor. But it also knows that not enough has been done by Americans to help solve them, and it believes that it can make a contribution.

II

From its founding in 1936, the Congress of Industrial Organizations rejected the concept of isolationism, both as a governmental policy and in relation to fellow trade-union centers abroad. Its predominant interest in international affairs was the traditional labor devotion to the cause of world peace. This is still the case today, when we are opposed to all appeasement of aggression. In a recent pamphlet calling for expansion of our foreign economic aid program, Walter Reuther proclaimed: "We cannot give up hope for peace. We must not lose faith in the cause of peace. We must be prepared to work and fight for peace." The trade union movement cannot act otherwise.

In a preface to "The C.I.O. and World Affairs," a recent pamphlet, President Philip Murray indicated the wider range of trade-union concern. He undertook to answer the questions of members who asked, for example, "Why should my union get excited about problems in Peru or India or Austria?" He replied: "By helping build the union movements of other lands, by helping their members enjoy a better life, we show that democracy does work. And we prove that Kremlin propaganda—which portrays America as a land of Wall Street imperialism and exploited

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serfs—is a fabric of Communist lies and slanders. In helping others, we are helping our America."

It was natural that the annual C.I.O. conventions in the early forties should adopt resolutions calling for the reëstablishment of close coöperation between the trade-union centers of all the United Nations. In 1944, when American energies were devoted to the winning of victory over the totalitarian Powers, the C.I.O. convention authorized the acceptance of an invitation from the British Trades Union Congress for a conference to explore the possibilities of establishing a World Federation of Trade Unions.

The preparatory conference of December 1944, and those which were held subsequently, paved the way for the establishment of the ill-fated World Federation of Trade Unions in Paris in November 1945. At this time, and throughout the history of the relationship of the C.I.O. to trade-union movements in other countries, the guiding theme has been our determination to remain in organizational connection with other leading free democratic movements. Many of us who participated sincerely in the early organizational work of the W.F.T.U. had grave doubts about future developments. Strong factors in the decision to go ahead, however, were the attitude of the democratic trade-union leaders of Western Europe and the particular quality of the social atmosphere in which they had to function. It is easy, with the aid of hindsight, to condemn the entire endeavor of democratic trade unions to keep in close association with the state-controlled "trade unions" of Soviet Russia in the postwar years, 1945–47. But governments and trade unions alike had to make the effort to coöperate with the Russians before alternative policies became possible. The strength of the universal desire to draw the Soviet Union into the United Nations organization at the San Francisco Conference illustrates the situation that existed when the W.F.T.U. was founded.

The democratic trade unions in the W.F.T.U. were greatly disadvantaged by the fact that their own organizations were not ideologically secure. Powerful trade-union groups from democratic countries echoed the line of Soviet foreign policy, and, in some cases, did so without realizing it. This was particularly true on all questions affecting Asia and the "backward" areas in general. Not until the Marshall Plan for European recovery made the issue plain in Europe were the lines clearly drawn. Then the W.F.T.U. split wide open.

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Nowadays, when all international problems and relationships are necessarily related to the all-pervading East-West conflict, it is easy to forget the social climate of 1945–47. The economic and military might of the United States and the absence of any strong Left ideology in the United States labor movement rendered this country relatively immune from factors which were extremely important in the rest of the world. It is well to remember that our native Communists obtained what influence they had because their ideology was hidden. Their impotence was revealed when they were forced into the open by the Marshall Plan and the Wallace campaign. It is also worth noting that in most other countries, Communist trade-union leaders were known openly as Communists, whereas here that was so only in exceptional cases. For the defeated or war-shattered countries, however, the military might and potential industrial strength of the Soviet Union were impressive. At the same time, a steady, subtle revival of half-lost illusions about the Soviet state took place among progressive groups throughout the world. These two influences, which reinforced each other, have origins deep in the history and traditions of the world labor movement.

The ideological attraction of Soviet Russia has now vastly declined, but it has been a major obstacle to the rebuilding of a strong international trade-union movement with positive aims, devoted to strengthening the free-democratic world. It was the conviction of the C.I.O. that the obstacle could be overcome by working along with other national movements with tolerance and patience, rather than by contemptuous opposition to beliefs and attitudes treasured abroad. When the rift in the W.F.T.U. widened, the C.I.O. joined all the other major trade-union centers in the formation of the E.R.P. Trade Union Conference and Advisory Committee. Then having quit the W.F.T.U., in company with the British and the Dutch in January 1949, the C.I.O. proceeded to join with them and others in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, established at a conference in London, December 1949.

III

The I.C.F.T.U. presents some interesting differences from the prewar international labor movement, and these directly affect both the development of the new organization and the activity of the American trade-union movement in other countries. A large

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number of affiliates, although retaining the control of their own policies, do have a relationship to the governments of their countries unlike that of the members of the defunct International Federation of Trade Unions. Through the relative success of allied political parties, Labor or Socialist, which either form the national government or participate in government coalitions, the trade-union centers of many countries have acquired more power, more rights and more responsibilities. No longer, as in the prewar days, do the delegates to international labor conferences invariably come from opposition minority groups within their own countries. The delegates represent trade-union movements which have voluntarily assumed a certain degree of responsibility toward their own governments.

The sweeping generalizations developed by Socialists who were, it appeared, condemned to perpetual minority opposition are absent from the program of the I.C.F.T.U. Its decisions reflect the varying national social and economic development of the affiliated organizations. The Socialist tendencies are basically as strong as ever, but now lead to constructive, responsible and positive programs.

Coincident with the full emergence of the United States as a World Power, the American trade-union movement has become a major force in the world labor movement. The A.F. of L., the C.I.O. and the independent United Mine Workers make a solid and dynamic addition of 16,000,000 workers. Not only is this American affiliation to the international organization much larger than ever before, but the American movement is more sure of itself, partly as the result of its own development and partly because of the setbacks suffered by so many other national groups. The ideological gulf between the old American trade unionism and socialistically-minded groups from other countries has also almost disappeared. What remains is a matter of terminology rather than of any striking differences in practice.

The Socialist tradition still persists and presents some problems. Although it is correct to say that, on the whole, the tremendous faith in democracy of European Socialists makes them the best fighters against Communist infiltration, there has been a crippling ambivalence among some of them in the face of Soviet Communism. Even today (though with decreasing persuasiveness) the Russians claim to be the spokesmen and heirs of a hundred years of Socialist agitation, propaganda and theorizing—a

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century of thought and work which is cherished by all Socialists. This, of course, explains the enormously greater appeal which red totalitarianism has for workers as compared with the black variety, despite all the similarities between the two. It is natural that the terrible reality of Soviet practice is the determining factor in the judgments of American trade unionists, who lack strong Socialist traditions. But in many countries, social theory and Socialist traditions have enormous importance in labor movements, particularly when the local democracy is weak.

Many left-wing Socialists are so subject to this influence that the facts of Soviet life which conflict with their theoretical beliefs are minimized or ignored. It is this attitude which leads a number of European labor leaders to attribute all the undeniable horrors of Soviet Communism to the lack of culture and general backwardness of Russia. If only they, these West Europeans, composed the Politburo, how wonderful things would then be! Happily this kind of thinking is becoming less and less common as trade unions abroad become conscious that the preservation of political democracy is the prerequisite to further progress on the road to social justice.

In short, the international labor movement has come out of the postwar doldrums, and is regaining its democratic energy and faith. That is why American trade unions must find ways of assisting the struggle of their fellow groups to win back the workers' allegiance from Stalinist control.

The C.I.O. Committee which recently visited Europe reported that the most striking aspect of the French labor scene is the continuing grip of the Stalinists on the largest segment of organized workers, through their control of the General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.). There are, of course, local exceptions to this rule, but the fact is that the non-Communist French unions have not made substantial inroads on Communist strength.

It is disheartening to see the conditions under which the free French labor movement must work in the provinces. Some of the fault for the situation lies with the national officers; but the dingy, cold, barren, unequipped local union offices are a reflection of the general lack of funds. In many areas, there was not a single mimeograph machine to enable the non-Communist workers to hold their own with the Communists in publicity and propaganda. There were no full-time organizers in situations where the equivalent of $25 a week would keep them in the field. Help from

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American trade-union sources is essential in these cases if free European labor is to be more than a paper movement. But permanent subsidy is not a practical solution. The root cause of the poverty of the French labor movement is the poverty of the French workers, and their failure to pay regular union dues.

In Italy, as in France, the Stalinists control the largest single segment of organized workers, through the General Confederation of Italian Labor (C.G.I.L.). This ascendancy of the Stalinists does not flow from any traditional loyalty of the workers to a particular organization, as in France where the C.G.T. has been the classic instrument of the workers. Both the Italian Confederation of Labor Unions (C.I.S.L.), the Italian trade-union movement headed by Pastore, a Christian Democrat, who has made a powerful effort to build a nonsectarian, non-political movement, and the Italian Union of Labor (U.I.L.), the newer movement of Socialist tendencies, should be assisted and encouraged to develop joint activity against the Stalinists whenever possible. U.I.L. leaders argue that the masses of Italian workers, with their militant tradition, having abandoned the C.G.I.L. because of its subservience to the Communists, will not permit themselves to be captured by any movement which, in their opinion, is so bound by right-wing, official allegiance that it lacks the force to press home the just demands of wage earners.

With the prospect of a cleavage within Italian Communism, U.I.L. may now prove an attractive refuge for the homeless dissidents. American labor should seize this opportunity to support a movement which, in the present crisis of Italian Stalinism, may have enough appeal to attract a large section of the disillusioned and embittered wage earners and unemployed, who have no basic loyalty to Communism or the Communist-dominated C.G.I.L. In Italy, as to some extent in France, one sees the paradoxical situation of a Communist-controlled trade-union federation, at the service of a foreign Power, enjoying facilities provided by governmental authorities. In Italian small towns it is usual to find solid, commodious buildings at the disposal of the Communist union organization, often with banners and posters proclaiming that the top floor is the headquarters of the regional Communist Party. The C.G.I.L. also enjoys a favored position in the administration of the social security system, including the all-important unemployment benefits. Many of these advantages date from the wartime united resistance movement and are continued under

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strongly anti-Communist governments because one out of every three Italians still votes Communist.

Corrective action would be much easier to take if the non-Communist movement gained more strength. It is important that American labor, together with the European regional organization of the I.C.F.T.U., find ways to help the genuine Italian trade unions to build up their membership. Governmental action against the C.G.I.L. must not have the appearance of being simply anti-trade union. The C.I.S.L. and the U.I.L. must be strong enough to assume the functions of defending Italian workers in their economic and social struggles. Then the Italian authorities will be able to act without making the situation worse than it now is.

In the outlying areas of both France and Italy there is an almost pitiful eagerness on the part of local leaders and active members to learn the facts about the American labor movement, its history, its recent progress, the details of union activity, the provisions of contracts, the life of the shops. The C.I.O., through its European office, will endeavor to meet this need and bring the story of American labor to the attention of the great political audience of Italian and other European workers.

Throughout continental Europe, the old antagonism between nonreligious (predominantly Socialist) and Christian (predominantly Catholic) unions is a thorny problem, and one, of course, relatively unknown in our American experience. Although reports suggest that direct and close relationships with the Church hierarchy continue in the Dutch and to a lesser extent in the Belgian groups, evolution in France and other European countries has been away from such ties. In Italy and Germany, the old, separate, religious organizations were not reconstructed after the war. Since the Socialist groups have lost much of their dogmatism during recent years, it is often as hard for Americans to understand why these two groups cannot unite as it is for Europeans to understand why the major divisions of the American trade union movement cannot do so.

The C.I.O. is determined to be even-handed in its treatment of the different democratic non-Stalinist unions. Unity of organization has long been a compelling motive for workers in most countries, but this desire for unity need not hinder advances toward the practical goal of helping all democratic forces which are capable of drawing strength away from the Communists. The prin-

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cipal aim of American labor is to galvanize, not simply to unify. This policy is consistent with the I.C.F.T.U. effort to gather into its ranks all divergent democratic trade-union centers. It seems possible that French and Italian leaders, and officials of the I.C.F.T.U., can work out ways of developing organizing drives in vital industrial centers, in conjunction with the International Trade Secretariats concerned with the respective industries. A similar campaign in some ports has already been initiated by the International Transport Workers Federation, the local unions and the A.F. of L. But a large number of such centers are still controlled by the fifth column agents of the Soviet Union and militant trade unionism is neglected in favor of political adventurism.

IV

The spread of trade unionism in the Middle East, Africa and Asia has naturally vastly modified international labor work. Both the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. maintain permanent representatives in Asia and send other trade-union leaders out there whenever possible to attend conferences, survey the situation and make recommendations as to future programs. The vast revolutionary upsurge throughout the East makes this activity of great importance. Labor movements in the East are compounded of national, social and economic strivings; they have always had Marxist tinges, and have received the closest attention from the Stalinists. The relatively successful stabilization of the Soviet Union, coupled with the internal troubles of the West European Powers, reinforced and speeded up Asia's revolutionary development. At the same time, the new techniques of the Soviet Union for infiltration have been used to gain control of many of these mass movements.

The fact that Soviet-inspired propaganda is insincere and is designed to spread Soviet totalitarianism, not to promote national development, does not, unfortunately, militate against it in these turbulent areas. It tends to be accepted at its face value, and thus achieves its purpose—the creation of fifth columns for use in promoting revolutionary upheavals. In the immediate postwar period, before the Russian Communists had openly revived their Cominform activities, their fronts in this part of the world were rechristened "trade unions." All of these swelled the membership of the W.F.T.U. Subversive and revolutionary ac-

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tivity, in accord with Soviet policy, acquired the respectable name of "trade-union work" in the council halls of the Federation: members of that organization were asked, for example, to protest to the United Nations Economic and Social Council and other bodies the arrest of any subversive agent, on the grounds that he was a trade-union leader and that trade-union liberties were being attacked.

The unmasking of this myth of "trade-union" activity is the major work of the free trade-union movement in these areas. All the reports which the C.I.O. receives from its representatives, however, emphasize that it can be carried on successfully only by building up organizations strong enough to struggle effectively on behalf of their members, and to compel their own acceptance as normal forces in democratic society. There seems room for considerable gain in sophistication by members of the American Foreign Service in this respect, as well as for a thoroughgoing re-examination of labor programs by American corporations established in these areas.

American technical assistance by itself is relatively useless in meeting this situation. A familiar saying in Southeast Asia is: "We want a social revolution, and you give us D.D.T." Even when American aid is substantial and results in better economic conditions for the workers in these countries, it is often successfully disparaged by Communist propaganda, which describes it as a sop to divert the Asian people from the riches that could be theirs were they to follow Communist leadership. That this is an appeal to irresponsibilty is true enough—and that indeed is just the point. Such Stalinist techniques can be countered only by the development of responsible labor organizations. That means organizations widely based among the local populations, working for the legitimate aspirations, both political and economic, of the peoples, and able to achieve results.

The debates of the Second World Congress of the I.C.F.T.U. held in Milan last July illustrated some of these difficulties. The Congress itself surprised even the more optimistic of its supporters by the extent to which it showed that after only 18 months the free world union was firmly established and well started on its mission of strengthening genuine trade unionism throughout the world. The most impressive achievement reported to the Congress was the progress made in setting up regional organizations, not only in Europe and the Americas but particularly in Asia, the

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Middle East and North Africa. Headquarters of the Asia group will be in Colombo, Ceylon.

The proportion of delegates from these areas at the Milan Congress, and the emphasis in the proceedings on their problems rather than on those of Europe, revealed the world nature of the I.C.F.T.U. It is worth noting also that the delegates from Asia, North Africa and the Middle East were outspoken in their resentment of any implication that they had not come of age. They did not hide their need for assistance from the more experienced and richer movements, but were quite obviously suspicious that limitations might be placed on their freedom and self-determination.

Following the visit of a delegation to Asia in July 1950, the I.C.F.T.U. appointed an able Indian trade unionist, Dhyan Mungat, as its representative in the Far East. Already familiar with the scene, he was able to prepare the way for the regional conference called in Karachi, May 1951. The trade-union movement in Asia, although still young, acquired importance as a vital force in the struggle for national independence. The Karachi Conference was attended by more than 30 delegates representing 10,000,000 union members in India, Pakistan, Malaya, Ceylon, Formosa and Japan. Most of the delegates revealed a strong "political" bias, but they also showed the decline in appeal of Stalinist slogans and the desire to carry on the industrial and economic functions associated with trade unions in the West. Plans were drafted for a permanent regional organization to coördinate activities and assist in further educational and organizational work.

The Asian regional organization of the I.C.F.T.U. provides a real opportunity to prevent Stalinist inroads among the mass movements of Asia. It will require much material help and disinterested technical assistance. But above all it will require patience and understanding. It will make mistakes and even follow what many in the West feel are illusions, but it is an important force in world affairs. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions will establish labor colleges in Asia, and will reprint its publications in the local languages. Meanwhile tolerance is required for the healthy development of organizations free from foreign control—as the Asian unions intend to be—and devoted to securing as quickly as possible a greater measure of economic and social justice for their members. Their struggle is part of the fight to defend and expand the free world. American labor is determined to do what it can to assist them.

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THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL MIDDLE EUROPE

By Jan Wszelaki

AN industrial revolution is taking shape in Europe behind the Iron Curtain. The western boundary of peasant Europe is retreating eastward beyond the Vistula, the Carpathians and the Danube, and when a few more years have passed the majority of the population in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Rumanian Transylvania will no longer live by agricultural occupations. This half-enforced and half-spontaneous industrialization of the mid-European area is a major event in European history. The Communist system may endure or perish, but what has already been done can hardly be undone: Middle Europe will not return to its pastoral era.

The plan of this transformation, directed from Moscow, is a comparatively recent development of Russian policy. When, with the tacit consent of the West, the Russians occupied the present European satellite area, they had no economic program for the nations they were to control. They were not sure that the West would allow them to regard Europe beyond the Elbe as a prolongation of the Soviet Union proper, and since their hold on the captive nations was uncertain, they did not wish the region to be strong industrially. For a time it seemed that the Soviets intended to turn the satellite area back to the primitive ruralism of 100 years ago. In Eastern Germany, Hungary and Rumania the Red Army dismantled and sent to Russia a large part of the existing industrial plant; and much of what remained was also declared war booty and administered by the so-called mixed companies. In the part of Germany which is now Polish, little that could be moved was overlooked; according to a story that went the rounds in Warsaw, a Russian general, when transferring an area in western Pomerania to the Warsaw administration, remarked: "You Poles lost this province in the twelfth century; we return it to you exactly as it was then." Most of the present satellite area was stripped of machinery, installations, transportation and raw materials. The main exception was the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, which for political reasons escaped Soviet plunder.

A year or so after the end of hostilities the Soviets began to

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feel more secure in Middle Europe. The Western Powers had demobilized and there was no likelihood that they would intervene. The satellite governments, not yet quite Communist, insisted that their war-ravaged countries be rebuilt. A new Russian policy was needed, and a precedent was found for it in the New Economic Policy of the years shortly after the revolution in Russia, when the destruction of the civil war was made good by a system combining state ownership of industry and some freedom for private initiative in trade and lesser production. The N.E.P. lasted for some six years, when it was replaced by the Five Year Plan of 1928. In the captive countries the comparable policy lasted until 1948, when the satellite area was considered ripe for long-term plans. Under the N.E.P. policy Czechoslovakia regained almost her normal production, and economic conditions in Poland and Hungary were much improved. The UNRRA aid to Czechoslovakia and Poland—and to Jugoslavia as well—was, of course, a powerful stimulant.

During this period, short-term national rehabilitation plans were instituted in all satellite countries. They were as a rule prepared by non-Communist planners who were permitted to work under Communist supervision, but since all large and medium industrial plants were nationalized the plans could not, perforce, differ much from those recommended by Moscow. While rehabilitation was being carried on, the political situation changed greatly. After Moscow forbade the satellite governments to participate in the Marshall Plan the satellite countries were tightly linked with the Soviet Union and the façade of Communist "cooperation" with the leftist democratic groups was pulled down.

The American ban on strategic materials to Russia and her satellites, and the unexpected refusal of the World Bank to grant loans to Poland and Czechoslovakia made the implementation of the rehabilitation plans impossible, for they depended to a large extent upon international credits and American machinery. The Communists who replaced the original planners made fundamental changes. They bought what machinery could be obtained outside of the United States and put relentless pressure on local industries to deliver more capital goods, at the expense of consumer goods and the general standard of life. Details varied from one captive country to another, but the general picture was the same in all of them. In due course it was declared that the objectives of the plans had been fulfilled ahead of schedule, save

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for a few items such as pig iron. The quota for steel was exceeded.

In 1949 a series of long-term plans was begun, coördinated with the fifth Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union. The current plan for Bulgaria is scheduled to end in 1953 and the plans for Eastern Germany, Poland and Rumania in 1955, but they will almost certainly be speeded up by a year or more. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian plans are already 18 months ahead of schedule and are to be fulfilled by the middle of 1952 and 1953 respectively. All these plans aim at the development of heavy industries; the ultimate goal is a totally industrialized, urbanized and mechanized Communist society. They bear the clear imprint of the policy which the Soviet Union has followed since 1928. They are justified by the same theoretical arguments, enforced by the same police state methods and serve the same strategic ends. The Soviet theory is that the key to the victory of the Socialist system is heavy industry. The "people's democracies" must therefore build heavy industry, concentrating on those branches which are not yet sufficiently developed in the Soviet Union; in other words, on fuel and power, steel and basic chemicals, heavy engineering and precision tools.

The effort is directed by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, known as Comecon, created in January 1949 by the Soviet Union and the six satellite governments, including Albania but not Jugoslavia. Eastern Germany adhered to the Council in September 1950. The Comecon performs the functions of a central planning office, a clearing-house and a central agency of control for the entire European satellite area. It is presumably run by A. I. Mikoyan, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade. It publishes no reports and works in silence; but an article by Boleslaw Bierut, the Communist President of Poland, in *Bolshevik*, October 1950, left no doubt that Soviet specialists had the last word in the preparation of the current Six Year Plan in Poland. Unquestionably Soviet experts are in control everywhere else in captive Europe. The plans have been formally voted by the local quasi-parliaments and are now national statutes. They may be, and are, revised upward on Moscow's initiative.

II

The satellite area has 90,000,000 inhabitants, with an annual population increase of more than 1,000,000. The region is not identical with prewar Central Europe, generally understood to

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be the area located east of Germany and Italy, and west of Russia. In 1940–1945 it lost its essentially rural provinces—the Baltic States, eastern Poland, eastern Rumania and Carpathian Ukraine—to the Soviet Union. The self-exclusion of Jugoslavia and the acquisition of highly industrialized Eastern Germany gave the area a more balanced semi-agricultural and semi-industrial character. Even so, it was an artificial economic unit embracing areas ranging from industrial to purely rural and primitive territories. It was characterized by under-investment, and was potentially capable of producing much more than it did before World War II.

Since 1948 the area has been molded into a well-knit Russian dependency, and its industrial potential is much more substantial than is generally assumed in the West. The 90,000,000 satellite population produces as many basic industrial goods per capita as the 200,000,000 or more inhabitants of Soviet Russia. Roughly speaking, the captive European countries produce one-half as much hard fuel and electric power, about one-third as much steel, and more than one-fifth as much oil as Russia. If the satellite long-range plans are realized, their share of the production of the Soviet empire will become even larger.

Within four years, the output of hard fuels in satellite Europe is to be increased by some 40 percent; that of steel, electric power, basic chemicals and shipbuilding doubled; that of liquid fuels more than doubled; that of fertilizers and many types of machinery tripled. The alleged rate of industrial growth in the captive countries during 1950 was as follows: Czechoslovakia 16 percent, Bulgaria 22 percent, Poland 31 percent, Hungary 34 percent, and Rumania 39 percent. The corresponding official figure for the Soviet Union is 23 percent. In 1950, the per capita industrial production of Poland and Hungary is said to have exceeded that of Italy, and Czechoslovakia's that of France. The current long-range plans aim to raise the Rumanian per capita output to the present per capita production of Italy, that of Hungary and Poland to the present output of France, and that of Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany to the prewar per capita industrial output of Western Germany.

Poland alone is scheduled to produce 100,000,000 tons of coal, not an impossible figure since in 1943 the Germans squeezed that much coal from Silesia. The satellite area as a whole is to produce 133,000,000 tons of hard coal. About 290,000,000 tons of

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lignite are supposed to be produced in 1954, mainly in Eastern Germany. The caloric value of all this fuel would be equivalent to some 212,000,000 tons of coal—a figure comparable to the present output of the United Kingdom. The satellite figures for oil and natural gas are less imposing, but, even so, an output of some 13,000,000 metric tons of oil is projected, including production from the fields in Albania and the Soviet zone of Austria. The output of natural gas is to be several times higher than before the war. Moreover, some of the 17 synthetic oil plants which the Nazis erected in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia are in operation and others are being rebuilt; these plants may supply more than 1,400,000 tons of fuel. Electric plants are being feverishly expanded; most of those which are new are supposed to utilize low-quality coal. Many hydroelectrical plants are also being constructed. The total electric power supposed to be produced in 1954–1955 in the entire area may be estimated at 80 billion kwh—more than the war output of Germany.

The heart of the industrial program is its production of steel. In its best year before the Soviet occupation the satellite area produced some 7,000,000 tons of crude steel, much of it for export. After the reconstruction of the plants dismantled by the Russians, the 1950 steel output exceeded 8,000,000 tons—about one-third of the steel production of the Soviet Union during the same year. The goal for 1954-1955 is about 16,500,000 tons, a figure which the British steel industry reached only in 1950 and which is comparable to the present output of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. With a production half this size, Japan built her immense fleet and embarked upon the conquest of Asia and Oceania, and Germany used less than 16,000,000 tons of steel in direct and indirect preparation for World War II. It should be borne in mind that the satellite countries are not constructing many railroads and highways, are building few houses and are turning out an insignificant number of vehicles. There is no question at all of making the innumerable domestic appliances containing steel which the United States produces. Nearly all steel produced in the satellite area will be used in building factories, making machines and perhaps in making weapons of war, or else the steel will go to Russia and be used there for the same purposes. Sixteen million tons of steel in America, and a similar amount in captive Europe, connote two different things.

Almost all prewar steel plants in the Iron Curtain countries

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have now been rebuilt, and many of them are being enlarged. Moreover, work is now proceeding on six huge new plants with a total output of some 8,000,000 tons of steel. These plants are being erected at Fürstenberg on the Oder, in Brandenburg; near Ostrava in Czech Silesia (a mill not to be confused with the great prewar Vitkovice plant nearby); north of Kosice in Slovakia; at Dunapentele in Hungary; at Czestochowa and at Nowa Huta near Cracow in Poland. This last plant is expected to have an annual capacity only a little less than that of the Fairless plant now being built at Morrisville, Pennsylvania, which by United States standards is considered huge. A Socialist city of 100,000 inhabitants is being built around the Nowa Huta plant in Poland, and there will be large new cities elsewhere. A number of lesser works are also being constructed, mainly for the production of special steels. All these projects will use Ukrainian iron ore and most of them will use Polish coke; an enormous effort is being made to discover a practicable method for converting lignite into coke. The plants are being built to Russian specifications and under Russian supervision. The construction of another series of huge steelworks is planned in Saxony and Poland after 1955. It is hoped that the total steel-making capacity of the satellite area will ultimately exceed that of the Ruhr.

The steel giants will have their counterparts in the plants producing power, machinery and chemicals. Some of these, too, would seem large even in America. A power plant the Czechs intend to erect on the Danube will have a capacity almost equal to the one at the famous Dnieper Dam. The new cement plants in Poland, either completed or under construction, are described as among the largest in Europe. Much emphasis is laid upon the production of substitutes: artificial yarn, synthetic oil and rubber, and plastics. But the number of trucks and passenger cars to be built annually by 1954–1955 will not exceed 125,000 units, and there will be only 52,000 tractors—an output far below the Western European figure.

The construction of the Danube-Black Sea canal—a prewar Rumanian project—is being carried on rapidly, mainly by the use of political prisoners, but the Oder-Danube canal and the Dnieper-Vistula-Oder canal system are making rather slow headway. Few new railroads will be built, but the East-West trunk lines north and south of the Carpathians, linking the Ukraine with Germany, will be modernized and partly electrified. A map

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of the principal projects under construction would show that most of them were concentrated in a broad belt stretching from the Black Sea to Saxony and Thuringia.

All satellites are to produce almost every kind of industrial goods, but each will have to stress certain types of production. Thus Czechoslovakia is intended to become the principal steel-maker, and to supply heavy machinery for the entire area. Czechoslovakia will also manufacture precision tools, though Eastern Germany's long tradition of specialization in electrical, optical and electronic equipment gives that region first place in this field. About 60 percent of prewar German production of precision tools was concentrated in what is now the Soviet zone; these plants are being rapidly restored. Eastern Germany will also be called upon for making heavy machinery, shipbuilding and the production of synthetic oil and rubber. Hungary is slated to produce aluminum, rolling stock and much machinery. Poland, which provides coal and coke for the entire area, will become the principal producer of chemicals, as well as a large manufacturer of medium machinery. Rumania is to concentrate on the output of oil and natural gas, and to develop new industries, based on electric power, serving mechanized agriculture. Bulgaria's industrial rôle is inconsequential for the time being.

The Russians have not overlooked strategic factors. The Soviet Empire has little heavy war industry west of the Leningrad-Moscow-Dnepropetrovsk line. The principal industrial areas of the Soviet Union were deliberately located further east, in the eastern Ukraine, the Urals and Asia, in line with traditional Russian concepts of defensive war. But now Russia's reach has extended several hundred miles to the west, and the Soviet divisions on the Elbe and Danube are stationed far from their Russian arsenals. Obviously, Soviet theory now finds room for concepts of offensive war. For such a war, the Soviet command needs an arsenal nearer the presumed theater of military operations. Satellite Europe is thus being developed as a counterpart of the Donets, Ural and Kuznetsk industrial areas. This western arsenal would not form an important source of supply of tanks, planes and other new weapons of war, for Russia reserves the manufacture of these to herself, not least for reasons of secrecy. But the satellite plants will probably produce parts of modern weapons for assembly in Russia, will make artillery and munitions, and, above all, will serve as repair shops for the Red Army; from the

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Russian view it would be far preferable to recondition a damaged tank in Saxony or Bohemia than to take it for repairs to Moscow, 1,500 miles away along vulnerable railroads. To perform this function adequately, the satellite area needs a broadly based but likewise specialized industrial plant.

III

Will these plans be fulfilled? Can satellite industry be developed as planned without foreign capital (or, for that matter, any capital) and without plant equipment from the West? Can the satellite countries develop enough technicians and skilled workmen to construct and operate so large and diversified an industrial plant? Can their manpower stand the ever-increasing pressure, the long hours, the inadequate wages, the lack of freedom and incentives? We should not assume that the answers to these questions must be in the negative. Some people made the mistake of supposing that Hitler could never make the German people work and produce for him. A generation ago Russia was a backward rural country and today she is the second industrial power of the world. Given time, what could be done in Russia could undoubtedly be done in the captive countries, whose manpower is perhaps more intelligent, and where, as in Eastern Germany, there is already a great deal of industrial experience. The crucial question is whether it can be done at such fierce speed.

Although satellite Europe cannot now buy capital goods from the United States, nor expect credit from this source, Switzerland, Sweden and other European countries make deliveries behind the Iron Curtain and do it partly on credit. Western European industry and railroads depend on Polish coal, and the British need mid-European foodstuffs; these imports must be paid for in industrial goods and raw materials. The resources of the satellite bloc are expanding constantly, and it is more self-sufficient than the West is inclined to believe.

Capital comes from "internal accumulation," a euphemism for a ruthless enforcement of a low standard of living, particularly in the villages, and a no less heartless exploitation of labor. In the West, men are regarded as ends in themselves, but behind the Iron Curtain a human being is merely an economic unit, one of several components of economic activity. A Communist state has many methods of squeezing out of the people a substantial part of the national income and reinvesting it in industry: full control

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of consumption, inflation and devaluation of currency, compulsory loans, "voluntary" contributions in working time and money, arbitrary taxation. One way or another, capital will no doubt be raised.

As to the effect of working conditions on the productivity of labor, we must remember that the Russians have had a good deal of experience with forced labor. The Russian imperial capital of St. Petersburg was built by slaves, as was the White Sea-Volga canal under the Soviets. The majority of the satellite workmen are not slaves, but they are not free men, and those in the labor camps are slaves in the full sense of the word. Semi-free labor under severe control can apparently compete with the free labor of the West—in the short run at least—though the per capita production is less. It should also be borne in mind that some of the workmen behind the Curtain have been stimulated to a sort of frenzy for their task. In the West, industrial production and the well-being of the people are considered two sides of the same coin. But in Russian-controlled Eastern Europe, in spite of lofty Communist theory, they have little in common: life is cheap, freedom no longer known, and the pursuit of personal happiness deferred to a misty future. The average workman or technician lives in constant fear of reprisals from the omnipotent state, and in the long run has no choice but to deliver the goods. There can be important differences in the qualities of specialized goods, but there is no difference between cement or fertilizer made by free or non-free labor.

Industrial production in satellite Europe nevertheless does suffer from many diseases which are more or less chronic under Communism: the impossibility of planning, at once and in detail, on a national and supra-national scale; monstrous red tape and occasional corruption; and, indeed, confusion, maladjustments and bottlenecks of every kind. Now one item becomes scarce, now another, and entire lines of production suffer, not to speak of the hardships which these shortages have on the ordinary citizen. Since the middle of 1950 there has not been enough coal, oil, electric power or iron scrap for the mushrooming factories; the people have been shivering from cold in the coal basin of Silesia, and there is an extreme shortage of gasoline in oil-producing Rumania. Last fall in a village behind the Iron Curtain there was a waiting list for a needle, or rather *the* needle—the only one available: it was being rented against deposit 24 hours a day, and that

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in a country producing plenty of special steels. And yet, despite incompetence, waste and irresponsibility, there is sufficient evidence that the satellite industrial plant is growing fast.

Though directed by Russia for her own benefit, the industrial revolution of Middle Europe is also of profit to that area. This statement needs qualification, but it embodies a truth which the West should take pains to understand. With the exception of the areas which were German prior to 1918, and of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, the mid-European region had missed the industrial progress of the nineteenth century. It remained essentially rural. As a result of the destruction during World War II, and the curtailment of emigration to America, the national states which inherited that backwardness were unable to cope with the problem of rural poverty. Foreign capital was unwilling to invest in so turbulent a region, and local capital was weak and too often sought safety abroad. Though some industrial progress was made during the inter-war period and cities were growing, there was not enough employment for the ever-increasing number of peasants. The higher the birth rate in the various countries, the more insoluble the problem; the agrarian reforms of the 'twenties did little more than ameliorate it temporarily. The situation was not so critical in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia and Estonia because of their low birth rates; elsewhere, the outlook was bleak.

Only intensive industrialization could improve the situation, and most mid-European governments had prepared plans for industrial development. Some were put in motion in the late 'thirties, and were enthusiastically received by the rural populations. The war interrupted that process, but it solved some of the difficulties. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania many new industries grew under German occupation, and in Poland and Jugoslavia the pressure was reduced by a large decrease in population through terror and war casualties. At the same time, the destruction during World War II and the plundering by the Russians set the clock back. The drastic agrarian reform imposed by the Red Army solved nothing, economically speaking, and merely reduced agricultural production; the Russian objective in the introduction of collective farms was the destruction of the independent peasantry. But, paradoxically, the enforced industrialization of the mid-European area may, under certain conditions, lead to a solution of the problem of rural poverty.

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The villages are being drained of their surplus population. It is a harsh surgical operation. No less than 6,000,000 men and women are expected to be recruited in the captive countries during the next five years, half of them for factory work, the other half for the various services of the Communist state. Most of these will come from the countryside, and many will leave the villages voluntarily, since they cannot expect much improvement by staying on their small farms. They feel socially promoted when they join the supposedly privileged urban working class. That process of urbanization is already on its way; in many rural districts the population is actually decreasing, and the December 1950 census of Poland showed that the proportion of population living by agricultural occupations has fallen from 61 percent in 1931 to 45 percent. The same process is going on everywhere behind the Iron Curtain.

There is, of course, such a thing as over-industrialization. The Czech part of Czechoslovakia, and southeastern Germany, may suffer from too much concentration of population in cities, if the present enforced tempo of factory building is continued. But the industrial development of the rest of satellite Europe is a step in the right direction, making possible a better utilization of manpower and of economic reserves. This is the one hopeful fact which stands out against the somber background of captive Europe. Of course the workers resent being exploited and terrorized by the local Communist bosses; and the Russian "advisers" are even more hated. The standard of life is far below that of the West. Neither individuals nor nations are free. But the urban working class, now or soon the majority of the population, is proud of the new mines and factories and cities.

It would be erroneous, and perhaps even dangerous, for the West to underrate the powerful appeal of industrial creation for the new generation of intellectuals in the captive part of Europe. Many of these young people sincerely believe that, at the cost of immense efforts and privations, they are laying foundations for the future prosperity of their countries. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted, that the Russians will go (or be sent) where they belong, and that they themselves will then deal with the local Communist rulers. When that day of liberation comes, the belated industrial revolution of backward peasant Europe will have been accomplished: the mines, plants and factories will remain as the heritage of strong and free nations.

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IV

Thus satellite Europe, now a dependency of Soviet Russia, has become a single large producing and consuming region. Within this area, private industrial interests have disappeared, and customs duties have lost their meaning. Trade relations with the outside world are withering away, while new trade links have been forged between the captive countries themselves and between the captive countries and Russia. The mutual economic interdependence of the satellite nations grows with the expansion of their industries. In a broader sense, the captive area is undergoing social engineering which tends to level down differences between its national units. Abandonment of the principle of economic planning could henceforth lead only to chaos. Should the Iron Curtain be raised, no power on earth could keep the captive nations within the Russian orbit—no matter what the immediate economic cost of breaking away. Eastern Germany would likewise at once fall away and reunite with the bulk of Germany. But Russia's victims would have been integrated economically. They are now in the same boat; and they will always be. After liberation, economic necessity will keep them integrated within a united Europe. They would have much to lose and nothing to gain by reverting to their prewar national economic sovereignties.

The industrial revolution in Middle Europe is more painful than any the world has ever seen, save the one in Communist Russia herself. The transformation might have taken place in due course without the Russian intervention, and it would then have been more gradual and far less brutal. But as things happened, the doctrinaire and imperialist interests of Soviet Russia coincided, in the industrial domain, with the interest of most of the captive countries in ridding themselves of their primitive economies and overpopulated countrysides. That much is gain; all else is loss. In every respect save this, the interests of Communist Russia are opposed to the interests and secular traditions of the captive part of Europe—as they are opposed to all humane considerations. But Western thought must rid itself of the notion that Middle Europe is still primarily an agricultural area. Any sound policy toward captive Europe requires the recognition of new facts. The industrial revolution of that area is a reality.

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DEMOCRACY TAKES ROOT IN TURKEY

By Kasim Gülek

THE transition from autocracy to democracy is a difficult process: most countries have achieved it to the accompaniment of revolution, terrorism and bloodshed. Turkey is one of the rare cases where the transformation has taken place in an orderly way without any violent upheaval. Where else in history has a firmly entrenched authoritarian single party peacefully handed over power to another party as a result of free elections held under its own supervision? This is what happened in Turkey in 1950. The reason it could happen was that the ground for democracy had been slowly prepared during a hundred years by successive reforms, but even more because the foundations of the Turkish social structure were favorable. Social democracy existed in Turkey long before political democracy appeared in the world. There were no set social distinctions there—neither serfdom, feudalism nor hereditary nobility.

The Ottoman Empire remained outside the political advances which took place in Europe after the Renaissance, and instead devoted its energies to expanding its territorial dominion. Throughout the period of its decline, beginning with the second failure to conquer Vienna in 1683, its political administration and social organization were stagnant. It was not so much that it retrogressed as that Europe by comparison advanced in great strides.

Following the French Revolution, however, the Ottoman Empire, a theocracy under the rule of an absolute monarch, began to experience the impact of the new political ideas as well as of the new social and legal institutions brought into being by the industrial revolution. In particular it was affected by the idea of nationalism, which appeared in Europe in the nineteenth century. This aroused separatist ambitions among the different elements of the Ottoman Empire and speeded its disintegration more rapidly than did its characteristics of despotism or autocracy.

Turkish statesmen and diplomats who were able to have European contacts came to realize the necessity for adopting Western ideas and methods. Under their influence the Charter of Reforms, known as the *Gülhane Hatti Hümayunu,* was proclaimed in 1839.

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This was an Imperial Edict which restricted the absolute powers of the Sultan, guaranteed the life and property of all citizens without distinction of race or religion, created a Council of State with consultative powers, and placed military service on an equitable footing.

The first experiment in modern representative government in Turkish history came in 1876 when Abdul Hamid II was forced to put into effect the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire. This constitution, which instituted a House of Representatives and a Senate, was a great improvement over the Charter of Reforms, but the indirect election system which it provided was rather primitive. The experiment was in any case of short duration. In 1877 a disastrous war with Russia broke out and the Sultan, seeing an opportunity to resume his autocratic power, dismissed both Houses of Parliament. Absolutism once again ruled. But dissatisfaction could not be suppressed, and under pressure from a patriotic revolutionary group called the Young Turks, Abdul Hamid II was forced in 1908 to revive the Constitution of 1876 and convene Parliament. The parliamentary system reëstablished at this time remained in effect until the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces in 1920 at the end of the First World War.

Turkey's defeat in that war ended all idea of reviving the Ottoman Empire. Instead, undaunted Turkish patriots determined to create an independent Turkey in their own homeland in Asia Minor. The desperate national struggle for liberation was led by Mustafa Kemal, later titled Atatürk. The House of Representatives, dissolved after the Allied occupation of Istanbul, was called to convene in Ankara. The new parliament, calling itself the Grand National Assembly, met on April 23, 1920. At first it functioned in accordance with the old Ottoman constitution, but in 1921 a new constitution was adopted, and this in turn was amended and perfected in 1924. At about the same time the Treaty of Lausanne (signed in 1923) formalized the liberation of the country from the occupying Powers and marked alike the end of foreign domination and of the historic theocratic rule of the Sultan. The national aims of independence and territorial integrity were achieved.

Far-reaching reforms were now initiated, inaugurating what is known as the era of Atatürk reforms. The Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished and the Republic proclaimed. A reform

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in dress prohibited the wearing of the fez, symbol of the old superstitious religious backwardness. Women were emancipated, polygamy was abolished, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted. The old Arabic alphabet was replaced by a new one with Latin script. The age-old theocratic concepts of the state were abandoned and the principle of a secular republic accepted. All these reforms were sanctioned by laws voted by the Assembly.

II

The modernization of Turkey and the establishment of a new way of life still left a gap which had to be filled if the country were to become a truly modern state. There remained the greatest of reforms, the establishment of real democracy.

Obviously it was most difficult to put democratic principles into practice along with radical social reforms in a country steeped in autocratic and theocratic traditions, and soon the problem was further complicated when free criticism of the government resulted in the development of factions in the Grand National Assembly. Differences of opinion about policy among members of the Assembly led to opposition to Atatürk himself. Actually between 1920 and 1923 there were two parties in the Assembly, though called groups since they did not wish to give themselves formal political names.

Finally in 1925 certain of Atatürk's colleagues separated from their leader to form the Progressive Party. The leading personalities in the new party were experienced patriots. However, the political struggle occasioned by the appearance of this opposition coincided with the anti-reform political and religious reactionary uprising which occurred in that same year in eastern Turkey. This uprising took a dangerous turn and spread to a considerable part of the eastern provinces before it was suppressed. This unfortunate coincidence of events led to the decision to dissolve the opposition party.

Atatürk at this time enjoyed prestige and popularity unprecedented in Turkish history. His enormous personal magnetism and the general convicton of the people that the military and political victories between 1920 and 1923 had been achieved by his genius enabled him to exercise more authority than even the Sultans of the old Ottoman Empire. The constitution of the state was democratic. The formation of political parties was not forbidden. But it took courage to oppose Atatürk.

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Nevertheless, a new attempt to form an opposition party was undertaken in 1950, when, with Atatürk's encouragement, some of his close friends founded the Liberal Party. He hoped and expected that his person and the reforms he had introduced would not be attacked by the new party. But as its popularity grew its relations with the dominant party became more and more tense. The struggle ceased to be purely political. Religious reaction developed, and opposition to the Atatürk reforms got beyond the control of the Liberal leaders. Atatürk came to the realization that there can be no such thing as controlled democracy. On their side, the Liberal Party leaders themselves realized eventually that the reforms (in which they sincerely believed) were endangered by the reactionary movement. They saw, too, Atatürk's constantly increasing anxiety about the situation. Before long the Liberal Party dissolved voluntarily. Once again the experiment of creating an opposition party had failed. From this time on, although Atatürk ardently desired the formation of an opposition party, he did nothing actively to encourage it.

In this period the new totalitarian régimes established in Europe were acclaiming the merits of dictatorship and calling democracy a degenerate principle. Although certain of their features might seem to have resembled those of the Turkish régime as it then existed the two systems were indeed very different, and this is a fact of prime importance. Certainly, the practice of democracy fell short of the ideal. Universal suffrage was adopted for local elections, for example, but in general elections the system of the electoral college was retained, with a single list of candidates nominated by the only existing party. Yet the Turkish constitution retained its democratic form. Dictatorship was always rejected in principle. The eulogy of democracy and the aspiration for it never ceased.

III

On Atatürk's death, in 1938, Premier Ismet Inönü was elected President of the Republic by the Grand National Assembly. From this time on new efforts were made to establish real democracy. For one thing, the great reforms which had been made were taking root, and this made it possible for the country to withstand the shocks of free criticism and discussion. Moreover, it was advisable that Turkey's foreign policy in the face of growing complications in the world should be determined not by an au-

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thoritarian government but through the free expression of the nation's will. Also, Turkish leaders felt that it was indispensable to move further in practice as well as in theory toward adopting the way of life of the community of nations in whose ideals, culture and political structure the Turkish people sincerely believed.

These considerations led the People's Republican Party in 1945 to attempt to establish a truly democratic system; and as a first step, although the single-list system of elections was continued, the decision was made to enable the electors to express their individual preferences by placing on the list more candidates than the number to be elected. Greater freedom of discussion was allowed also within the Party and serious criticism of government policy and actions took place on an increasing scale.

World War II slowed the progress of the democratization effort. But in 1945 a new stage was reached—and it is of particular significance because it was lasting. In May of that year President Inönü made a declaration recommending the introduction of the democratic system with all its implications. Later in the same year, in his annual message to the Grand National Assembly, he pointed out the necessity for an opposition party and the adoption of the direct universal election system as essential features of democracy.

Meanwhile, Turkey had been faced by a more serious menace than during the Second World War. In March 1945 Soviet Russia denounced the nonaggression pact which had been in existence between the two countries since 1925 and demanded cession of three eastern provinces and the establishment of "common defense" bases on the Straits as the conditions of a new friendship and nonaggression pact. It is important to note that when Russia made these aggressive demands Japan had not yet surrendered and the Kremlin's prestige with the democratic Powers was at its zenith. The attitude of the Western Powers implied that differences with Russia should be avoided and that a direct settlement of pending issues should be sought. Greece meantime had fallen prey to Communist agitation. Under these circumstances the Turkish Government, after exhausting all possible efforts for a friendly agreement with the Soviets, emphatically rejected their unjust demands. It took this courageous act at the risk of being left alone by the Western democracies.

The first result of the new political freedom was the foundation of the National Rehabilitation Party in 1945. Soon after,

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certain members of the Grand National Assembly who were members of the People's Republican Party proposed the abolition of various laws which they considered anti-democratic. Later they resigned and early in 1946 founded the Democratic Party.

In the meantime, Turkey's situation as neighbor to the Soviets was becoming more and more critical. Russia was building up a system of satellite states on her borders. The integrity and patriotism of the leaders of the different political parties in Turkey were above suspicion, but inevitably political discussions between them sometimes took dangerous turns.

It was under these conditions that the general elections of 1946 were held, under a new electoral law providing for the first time for the direct election of representatives. The new law had been hastily prepared. Moreover, the country was without experience in democratic electoral procedure, even such a simple matter as voting alone in an election booth being unknown both to the man-in-the-street and to the intellectual. Of the 465 representatives elected, 60 were members of the Democratic Party. The fact that the opposition parties had not presented candidates for even half of the constituencies made a People's Republican Party majority inevitable.

Soon after the elections, dissension arose within the ranks of the Democratic Party, which constituted the main opposition. The Party leaders were accused of having come to a secret understanding with the government. In the ensuing split the Nation's Party was born. This new Party, announcing itself the real champion of liberty, denounced both the Democratic Party and the People's Republican Party.

Complete freedom of the press was secured at this time both by law and in practice, and continues unhampered up to the present. The burning question which remained was the reform of the electoral law and safeguards for fair elections. After careful study and combined effort on the part of all the political parties a new electoral law was enacted which satisfied the keenest critics and allayed the doubts and anxieties of the opposition.

When we recall that none of the previous attempts at democracy (1876, 1908, 1920, 1923, 1925, 1930) survived more than a few months, we can see that the latest democratic experiment, which has lasted more than five years in the face of external dangers, is really a significant achievement. It shows that in these years Turkey has attained strength and maturity.

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IV

Until the results of the 1950 elections became known the opposition parties did not believe that the party in power would conduct honest and fair elections. They had voiced their anxiety in all parts of the country and demanded all sorts of measures against possible irregularities. In the event, everyone who witnessed the elections, including foreign newspapermen and others, stated that they were held in complete freedom, in strict observance of the principles of the new electoral law.

The result was the defeat of the People's Republican Party and the triumph of the Democratic Party with a majority far surpassing any expectations. The Democratic Party obtained 55 percent of the votes (4,500,000) as against 42 percent for the People's Republican Party (3,330,000). The other parties and the independents received 3 percent (220,000). No one, even in the Democratic Party, had expected the People's Republican Party to lose. But its leaders were determined to live up to the guarantees of the new electoral law even if this involved the possibility of defeat; and the fact that this determination was carried to the point where they actually were defeated proves their sincerity. Some critics like to claim that the leaders of the party in power were obliged to act as they did through pressure of public opinion; and certainly it is true that public opinion did exert a considerable influence. However, if those in power had not believed sincerely in democracy there were adequate means at hand for them to retain office regardless of consequences.

A comparison of the number of votes obtained by each party with the number of seats which it secured in the Grand National Assembly reveals a great disparity between the two sets of figures. The Democratic Party won 410 seats with its roughly 4,500,000 votes, as against 69 seats for the People's Republican Party with its roughly 3,330,000. The peculiarity of the Turkish election system thus revealed has brought demands that it be improved to give fairer results in future elections.

How did it come about that the People's Republican Party, builder of the new Turkey, founded by Atatürk himself and headed by Inönü, could lose? The reasons are as follows:

(1) The People's Republican Party had been continuously in power for 27 years. All the hardships and resulting discontents of these years were laid at its door.

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(2) The fundamental changes in the social and political life of Turkey had been introduced by the People's Republican Party. Although these reforms were accepted by the people in general and had become part of the normal national life there still remained some who were unreceptive to the new ways, clung to cherished old customs and hoped to return to them. These voted against the People's Republican Party.

(3) During the electoral campaign the Democratic Party made extravagant and exceedingly attractive promises to the voters. The Turkish people were not used to judging campaign pledges of political parties and took all these promises literally.

(4) Considerable numbers of adherents of the People's Republican Party were overconfident about the Party's success and did not trouble to go to the polls.

(5) Great numbers of citizens who had no party affiliations shared the view that the People's Republican Party would win anyway. They felt that a stronger representation of the opposition would strengthen democracy, and therefore decided that it would be both safe and advisable to vote for the small opposition party.

The Democratic Party has now been in office for over a year. The general expectation had been that by this time Turkey would have assimilated the difficulties of this stage in her democratic development, and that further advances would follow smoothly. Judging from press comments and expressions of public sentiment, the results of the past year have been somewhat disappointing. The Democratic Party has shown distrust of the opposition parties and these in turn have not relented in their attacks on office holders. Local elections were held after the general elections, between July and October 1950. They were declared by Democratic Party spokesmen to indicate that the opposition had been "liquidated." Nevertheless, the results of the elections reveal that the opposition parties have held their ground.

One healthy result of these experiences has been to emphasize that the Turks have the inherent resoluteness and self-reliance necessary to enable them to recognize their political rights, and to require that the relations of government and opposition contribute to the development of true democracy. The average citizen and the free and independent press have consciously taken the cause of democracy to heart. They understand that it is their duty to defend the rights of the opposition.

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There is, however, another side to this encouraging picture. Although 30 years have gone by since Turkey abandoned theocratic rule, the forces of religious reaction are not dead. The freedom of discussion natural in a democracy has given opportunity for the development of unforeseen hostility to the reforms of Atatürk and the new Turkish way of life.

Most regrettably, elements in some political parties have thought that this offered an opportunity to catch votes, and with it in mind they have, from time to time, courted the reactionary agitators. This tendency might constitute a danger for Turkish democracy. It is reassuring, however, that progressive and enlightened groups within those same parties have taken a firm attitude in the face of this possible danger. They have seen that in certain neighboring countries foreign ideologies and influences have infiltrated through the channels of religious reaction. Although this danger does not at present exist in Turkey, farseeing Turks urge that watchful care be taken that it does not develop.

Certain gestures of the leaders of the party now in office have been taken as encouragement by the reactionaries. Thus a superstitious, fanatical group has made open attacks on statues of Atatürk. The sect is small but its actions are spectacular, and these have perhaps attracted more publicity than was warranted. The attitude of the people as a whole, regardless of religious sympathies and political affiliations, showed strong disapproval of this sect's activities. Measures were soon taken and pronouncements made which indicated that the courting of reactionary tendencies was being abandoned. The government's object must be to curb the destructive and unlawful activities of pseudo-religious groups without impairing the religious freedom which has always existed in Turkey.

V

Since Turkey has had no claims upon territories outside her present borders her relations with the successor states of the old Ottoman Empire have been normal. A natural understanding exists between Turkey and these nations, especially the Arab states. They practise the same religion as Turkey and have lived together with her for centuries. They have a common heritage of traditions and culture. The People's Republican Party always considered it to Turkey's advantage that the Arab states be stable and prosperous. The correct and cordial policy which is

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adopted toward them has been continued by the present party in power—a policy based on a realization of mutual interests and not on sentiment or religion. The concept of Pan Islamism is not considered to correspond to modern realities.

An understanding of mutual interests has prompted Turkey to consider Israel an important factor in the political and economic life of the Middle East and to follow her remarkable and rapid development with great interest. Diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel are harmonious. Turkey naturally looks upon the conflict between Israel and the Arab states as very unfortunate. Perhaps as the former senior member of the Ottoman Empire she can yet find a way to help bring about an understanding among these states, all once parts of the same realm.

Turkey is happy to find that she enjoys great prestige in the Middle East, not only in the neighboring Arab countries but in countries more distant still, in Afghanistan, Iran, India, Pakistan and Indonesia, and even in China and Korea. These admire her as one of their own number who has been able to attain real sovereignty and become a modern state. The Middle East countries consider her a pioneer and hope to equal her achievements. This makes the development of democracy in Turkey very significant from an international point of view. The fact that democracy is taking root in Turkey can have a revivifying and instructive effect throughout the Moslem world, helping to persuade theocratic and undemocratic countries that it is after all compatible with their own best traditions. The Turkish example may even demonstrate to other Moslem countries that their cultural and social life will develop better within the democratic framework. And a failure of democracy in Turkey would greatly discourage these countries from trying the experiment.

Historians have often asserted that democracy could not be established in countries with a Moslem and Byzantine heritage. Turkey has refuted this by founding a stable democratic system based upon Western culture. She thus has become a stepping-stone by means of which European civilization, culture and moral values, with all their implications and significance, can penetrate into the East. She takes her place in the international community of nations as a member charged with an important mission. The principle of democracy has been definitely established in Turkey. She will guard it and try, by the power of successful example, to spread its influence beyond her own borders.

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FRANCE, STILL THE THIRD REPUBLIC

By Raymond Aron

THE middle-of-the-road parties, as they would be called in Anglo-Saxon countries, came out on top in the recent French elections, but the Pleven Cabinet formed after long delay does not provide the strong government we all had hoped for, since they are more badly divided among themselves than before. The right wing of the Center has been strengthened at the expense of the left wing, and some of that right wing may be attracted to the Rally of the French People, the Gaullists. The Communists received 450,000 votes less than in the elections of November 1946, a drop from 28.4 percent to 26.48 percent of the total. This is about what they had in the elections of the spring of 1946. The Rally of the French People (R.P.F.) received a little more than 4,000,000 votes, that is, 21.74 percent. Together the two extremes add up to a little less than the majority of the total ballots cast. Thanks to the electoral law which favors the "affiliated" parties of the Center, however, this gives them but 224 deputies out of 625—markedly less than half.

The strength of the Center parties is receding. The Socialist Party lost 650,000 votes, giving it 14.54 percent instead of 17.9 of the total. The Popular Republican Movement (M.P.R.) suffered the staggering loss of 2,650,000 votes, or more than half of the number it obtained in November 1946; it now has 12.38 percent instead of 26.4. The Left Republican Rally (R.G.R.), which includes the Radicals, lost slightly—2,194,000 votes as against 2,381,000 or 11.54 percent instead of 12.4. The moderate groups of the Right, Republican Liberty Party (P.R.L.), Independents and Peasants, gained slightly, with 2,496,000 votes and 13.13 percent compared with 2,466,000 and 12.84. In the Assembly, the Socialist Party increased its deputies by four, the M.R.P. lost 62, the R.G.R. gained 34, and the Moderates of the Right gained 12.

How should these statistics be interpreted? The size of the Communist vote, after three years of the Marshall Plan and the effort to organize an Atlantic army, is not discouraging for the side of freedom but hardly justifies rejoicing. The strength of the Communist Party is declining—and even a slight but plain decline is serious for a party which bases its propaganda on the assumption that it is riding the wave of the future. But its support

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is not seriously weakened in the cities and in workers' districts. Its adherents are particularly strong in three regions: in the southeast, in the west center, and in Paris and the north. Here they constitute more than 30 percent of the voters. Some of the voters whom it lost had become Party adherents in 1946 because of economic troubles and were not aware of the nature of the bond with the Soviet Union. But where Communism had gained a firm hold it was little shaken. The supposition that large numbers of French Communist voters are not authentic Stalinists, but are merely discontented with low living standards, is not borne out by the evidence. The majority of Communist voters really favor the Soviet Union. According to opinion polls, 84 percent of the Communist voters say that in the event of total war their sympathies would go to the Soviet Union. The great majority of Communist voters certainly approve of the Communist foreign-policy slogans.

But there are many questions which opinion polls leave unanswered. Verbal acceptance of the ideas suggested by the Party does not signify that these voters wish for the invasion of France by the Red Army, or even that they would refuse to fight against it. Their attitude in case of war would depend upon a multiplicity of factors—the prospects for failure or success of French arms, the circumstances of the outbreak of war, the firmness of the military and civil authorities. Ideological preferences are not necessarily the most important factor.

Does all of this mean that everything that has been done to combat Communism in France since 1946 has been in vain? I do not think so at all. Even though the Communist vote has not been significantly reduced there are other noteworthy signs of change. For one thing, the Communist press has lost half of its readers. For another, the Party has been having difficulty in organizing political manifestations; the one against General Eisenhower, for example, was a failure. Unless strictly union demands are at stake the workers follow strike orders very reluctantly. The dynamism of the Party has noticeably weakened. This is not to say that any other party has a stronger appeal; workers who vote Communist do not believe that any other party would espouse their interests more effectively. But it is safe to say that the appeal of the Communist Party today is more negative than positive. Granted the difficulty of accurately measuring such intangibles as the lowering of dynamism, the decline of faith, and

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doubt as to the usefulness of revolutionary action, one living in France still has the impression that such a process is under way among French Communist voters. And some tangible signs confirm it. The fringe of Communist sympathizers—those who used to say, "I am not a Communist, but"—has shrunk greatly. More and more people are for or against. Those who evade the choice are mainly the intellectuals. To sum up, the Communist Party is still a source of trouble and division, but it no longer can paralyze or sabotage the economic or political life of the nation. Exactly what damage the secret army which it maintains would be capable of causing in time of war no one knows.

II

Most observers have up to now looked upon the Gaullist movement as the opposite extreme. But the conventional terms "Extreme Left," "Extreme Right" are no longer meaningful. The notion that the two extremes could ever be assimilated is a device of partisan propaganda. No one really believes it. A coalition of the parties of the Center with the R.P.F. is conceivable in certain circumstances, but a Gaullist coalition with the Communist Party is not. Besides, the R.P.F. is to the "right" of the Moderates neither in social ideas nor in the class of its voters. Communists and Gaullists are both hostile to the Fourth Republic as it functions today, but the common ground ends there.

The R.P.F. might perhaps have obtained a few dozen more seats in Parliament if it had agreed to more affiliations. In any case, it has slightly fewer deputies in the Assembly than it would have had if the proportional system had been maintained intact.[1] Nevertheless, it is the strongest non-Communist party in the country and the most numerous party group in Parliament. It did not exist at the time of the last general elections, but a comparison with 1947, the year of the municipal elections, shows that in three years it has lost between a quarter and a third of its forces. This fact (already revealed by the public opinion polls) was to a large measure the result of the split between the R.P.F. and the Radical and Moderate groups which were allied with it at the time of the municipal elections. The striking thing is that in spite of the campaign against it by the government, business and the Catholic Church, it can still claim 4,000,000 adherents.

[1] Had the law of 1946 remained in force the R. P. F. would have had more than 150 deputies. The Communist Party would have had more than 180.

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These 4,000,000 appear to embrace two different types of people. Partly they are citizens who normally vote for the moderate parties and who are particularly numerous north of the Loire, in the west, the north and the east of France. Partly they are urban voters who formerly voted for the Left. Detailed comparisons would show that a fraction of the votes of deserters from the Communists and the Socialists went back to the R.P.F., especially in the workers' quarters in the large cities. In Paris, the R.P.F. lost fewer votes compared with 1947 in workers' districts than in middle class districts. In 1947 some of the middle class and the "managerial" class inclined to the R.P.F. out of fear of Communism. With that fear attenuated, the old moderate parties have reappeared, and the votes of the middle class which supplies the moral and financial support of management have been cast chiefly for the Moderates, Independents, Peasants and the Republican Liberty Party.

Communists and Gaullists represent the new elements in the traditional system of our parliamentary democracy. The former are characterized less by their doctrine and open activities than by their bond with Moscow and their permanent conspiracy. The latter are distinguished by their desire to modify the constitution both in letter and practice. There is no common denominator in the meaning of a Communist revolution and the meaning of a Gaullist revolution. The first would mark a break with secular tradition; the second would not take France out of the Atlantic world and Western civilization. What is true is that the ballots cast for both were verdicts against the present system itself. Thus the common characteristic of the groups which are called Center is their simultaneous rejection of Communism and Gaullism—of Russian tyranny, and of "adventure," which in France means personal power—"the man on horseback." They are representative of French politics as it was before the irruption of Communism and, later, of Gaullism. Center parties which formerly would have been opposed to each other—Socialists and reactionaries, "Left" and "Right"—now find themselves condemned to govern together.

The electoral grouping called "affiliation" worked out more successfully than was generally expected. In some 30 districts the allied lists (in nearly all cases lists of the parties of the governmental majority) received an absolute majority. Thus, despite the serious loss of votes of the Socialists and the even more seri-

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ous losses of the M.R.P., these two parties, the nucleus of the former governmental majority, emerged less weakened than they had feared (nearly 200 seats instead of 250). Nevertheless there is no question but that the right wing of the Center majority has been strengthened. The Socialists, the M.R.P. and the Radicals must rally at least half of what has been called the Fourth Force.

The elections of June 17, 1951, therefore had a double significance. They showed, first, that the present form of parliamentary democracy in France is being called into question from two sides; and though the victory of the parties representing tradition (more that of the Third Republic than that of the Fourth) was marked in numbers of deputies elected, the margin was much narrower in terms of the popular vote. Second, they showed that within the customary forms the French electorate favors an orientation more to the Right.

A few figures will illustrate the road travelled during the past six years. In the elections at the end of 1945 the Communists and the Socialists together obtained 50 percent of the votes. Today the two Marxist parties have no more than 41 percent. In 1945 the three large parties which together created the Fourth Republic—Communists, Socialists and the M.R.P.—obtained 73.9 percent of the votes, that is, nearly three-quarters. All three recommended a policy with Socialist tendencies; all three were supporters of nationalization and controlled economy. Today, the proportion has dropped to 53.4 percent. Intellectual fashion has changed. On the morrow of the Liberation, socializing watchwords captured the imagination. Experience was disillusioning, and liberal watchwords now have greater success.

The changes must not be exaggerated, as a few figures will suggest. At the end of 1945, the Left Republican Rally (R.G.R.) and the Moderates succeeded in securing together 25.5 percent of the votes; on June 17, 1951, they received 24.67 percent. The change here is insignificant. The "shift to the Right" which everyone is talking about is mainly due to the fact that the Gaullist votes are classified as "Right." Practically speaking, they correspond to the total of votes lost by the three other big parties. If we recall that in 1945 these very parties governed together under the leadership of General de Gaulle we see that, essentially, Frenchmen continue to have about the same preferences they have had for years. The two decisive developments are, first, the rupture between the Communist Party and the rest of the country. This oc-

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curred (or rather became apparent) in the spring of 1947, and was brought about more by factors outside France than within the country. The second major development was the break between General de Gaulle and the Socialists and the M.R.P. Of the 4,000,000 votes obtained by the Rally of the French People, at least half were on the lists of the M.R.P. in 1945; and some hundreds of thousands came from the Socialist Party. From 1945 to 1951 the two principal political losers were thus the Socialist Party, which lost more than 40 percent of its voters, and the M.R.P. which lost 50 percent. This did not prevent these two parties from taking part in the government, and they probably will often or always be in it throughout the life of the next legislature. It is a fairly consistent French custom to be governed by parties whose strength is diminishing.

III

In other words, politics have been and will be determined more by the manœuvring of men and parties than by the opinions of the voters. The opinions are relatively constant; it is their mode of expression which varies. There were Gaullists among the M.R.P. and Socialist voters in 1945. They remained Gaullists in 1951 even though today their Gaullism seems to assume a contrary significance.

The question for the future is not what proportion of the electorate voted for the Right or for the Left, how many for liberalism and how many for controlled economy.[2] Rather it is, what will result from the conflict between the rivalry of groups and personalities on the one hand and governmental necessities on the other? As these lines are written no parliamentary leader has yet succeeded in forming a government. In recent years the Center parties were held together by the fear of the Communist and Gaullist "extremes." Now that this has been lifted somewhat, each Center group, and particularly the Socialist Party, is more demanding; and the relative weakening of the Socialists and the M.R.P. has increased the influence of the Moderates and Radicals, who believe that they have secured the approval of the country for a liberal program. Finally, whereas only one majority grouping was possible in the last Assembly, several are now conceivable.

The important question is whether any conceivable coalition

[2] There are M.R.P. voters who are liberals, and there are some radical electors who voted for M. Mendès-France, an admirer of British Labor and austerity.

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will be strong enough to carry out the program of essential reforms. If fiscal reforms are effected, for example, rearmament will bring an increasing threat of inflation. It is not France's peculiar misfortune that a difference of views exists between liberals and the supporters of a directed economy; the same conflict exists in all the Western countries. Her misfortune is that the French liberals are not acting energetically against the factors which paralyze competition, and that those who demand controls are motivated mainly by a desire to protect the present structure of the economy, irrational as it is. In other words, there is a disastrous tendency toward a conservatism which takes from each program only the measures acceptable to all interests. In the political field, stability demands a reform of parliamentary methods and constitutional practice, though not the decisive revision contemplated by General de Gaulle. As individuals, most French supporters of parliamentary government are in agreement on certain reforms; collectively they seem unable to act on any of them.

For the time being France will not have either a stable or a strong government. She can have that only at the risk of "adventure," and with adventure ruled out there remain only parliamentary combinations, with their unpredictable results. This is a mediocre game, the legacy of another age, most unsuited to the demands of our century. During the war years most of the chief political figures—Léon Blum, Edouard Herriot, Jeanneney—said and wrote that not for anything in the world must France be allowed to fall again into the errors of the Third Republic. But the fact is that France is back in them once more and that the old men of the Third Republic and the new men of the Fourth seem to fit into the old forms without discomfort. Actually, Frenchmen do not mind living without a government, and it must be admitted that for all the political weakness of French governments since the war their accomplishments have been impressive. The present system will survive internal attacks. Whether it could withstand a shock from the outside is another matter.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. New York: Knopf, 1951, 283 p. $3.50.

Professor Morgenthau views American policy from the *Realpolitik* point of view. He is sharply critical of what he calls the utopian bent of American thinking on foreign affairs, *i.e.* the Wilsonian. He contends that "cold war" leads to no solution, that the United States now lacks the "overwhelming power" to force its views peacefully on the Soviets, and hence that war and a negotiated settlement are the only alternatives.

THE POLITICAL COLLAPSE OF EUROPE. By HAJO HOLBORN. New York: Knopf, 1951, 207 p. $2.50.

The author offers a rich and reflective interpretation of the current world scene in terms of the historical evolution of the European states-system. It is his well-argued conclusion that in World War II the "collapse of the traditional European system became an irrevocable fact. What is commonly called the 'historic Europe' is dead and beyond resurrection."

LES GUERRES EN CHAÎNE. By RAYMOND ARON. Paris: Gallimard, 1951, 502 p. Fr. 725.

Writing in a vein somewhat similar to Mr. Holborn and covering many of the same subjects, M. Aron's thesis is that war, like fissionable materials, has its "critical mass," and that since 1914 Europe has been subject to a military "chain reaction." The First World War created the condition for the second, which in turn seems to be setting off a third. In developing his argument and discussing the current situation he strongly criticizes the "imperialist" theory of war and the paralyzing neutralism—*le double refus*—of some of his countrymen.

LAW AND PEACE. By EDWIN D. DICKINSON. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951, 147 p. $3.25.

Four lectures on the community of nations, international law, and the developing relations between law and world peace.

LA SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE. By THÉODORE RUYSSEN. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 240 p. Fr. 440.

An optimistic inventory of the elements promoting or hindering an international society—religious and intellectual activities, political and economic ties, and the hopes of an international ethic arising from a *mystique de l'humanité*.

STRENGTHENING THE FRAMEWORK OF PEACE. By ALAN DE RUSETT. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951, 225 p. $4.00.

An enumeration of and commentary on current proposals for amending, developing or replacing present international institutions for the maintenance of peace.

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DIE TRADITION DER GROSSEN MÄCHTE. By Eberhard von Vietsch. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950, 303 p.

An effort, in the German historiographical tradition, to create a "historical profile" of the Great Powers, relating the West to the scholastic-rational tradition, Russia to Byzantium, and Germany to Luther.

FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION. By Werner Levi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950, 233 p. $3.00.

An examination, more hardheaded and less enthusiastic than is customary, of the obstacles to and prospects for a world organization.

ÉLÉMENTS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. By Jean L'Huillier. Paris: Rousseau, 1950, 432 p. Fr. 1500.

A textbook on international law, but intended for a broader audience than candidates for the law degree.

UNITE OR PERISH: A DYNAMIC PROGRAM FOR A UNITED EUROPE. By Paul Reynaud. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951, 214 p. $3.00.

Politically conservative, diplomatically pro-American, the former French premier argues for a united Europe—a third force in its own right, but not that of the neutralists or Socialists.

L'ÉVOLUTION DES RAPPORTS POLITIQUES DEPUIS 1750 (LIBERTÉ, INTÉGRATION, UNITÉ). By Pierre Duclos. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 344 p. Fr. 600.

A historical examination of the doctrine and rôle of the state, from the serf to the free citizen, from the citizen to the mass-man in the crumbling liberal state, and ultimately to the task of overcoming inter-state conflict through international solidarity.

THE PROSPECT BEFORE US. By John Dos Passos. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 375 p. $3.75.

Observing the state of the postwar world as he sees it in Labor Britain, Latin America and the United States, Mr. Dos Passos expresses alarm over the encroaching powers of the state and other impersonal, corporate bodies, and pleads for increased participation by the citizen. How this is to be achieved is not wholly clear.

THE AGE OF TERROR. By Leslie Paul. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 256 p. $3.00.

The author seeks an explanation for the fact that "over a large part of the world terror has become an accepted instrument of government." Not a particularly original work, but makes intelligent use of insights of earlier writers.

THE FRONT IS EVERYWHERE. By William R. Kintner. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950, 274 p. $3.75.

A student of military affairs brings out the distinctive military features of Communist Party organization and tactics, but without sufficient attention to the evolution in theory and practice since 1917.

LA PROPAGANDE, NOUVELLE FORCE POLITIQUE. By Jacques Driencourt. Paris: Colin, 1950, 282 p. Fr. 570.

The author assumes that public techniques of persuasion are inseparable from the art of governing and that the problem is to direct propaganda toward constructive and peaceable ends.

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POWER AND SOCIETY. By Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 295 p. $4.00.

An effort to define and formulate "the basic concepts and hypotheses of political science." At times the cost of ridding the language of "semantic confusions" seems exorbitant.

A WORLD AIRLIFT. By Elvira K. Fradkin. New York: Funk, 1950, 216 p. $2.85.

An intrepid nettle-grasper, Mrs. Fradkin seeks to convert the menace of air power into an instrument of peace, through the creation of a United Nations Air Police Patrol.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION. By Eugene P. Chase. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 464 p. $4.50.

A nontechnical and general survey.

ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS, 1950. Edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift. New York: New York University Press, 1951, 265 p. $4.50.

Talks and discussions.

THE DIPLOMATIC YEAR BOOK. Edited by Myron Leslie Hurwitz and Others. New York: Funk (in association with United Nations World), 1951, 836 p. $20.00.

An indexed list of some 10,000 diplomatic personnel in the 70 countries having diplomatic relations, plus a useful glossary of diplomatic procedure.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS: 1951. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1951, 428 p. $6.00. (London: Stevens, 30/.)

Thirteen articles on topics of international import, including the Schuman Plan and the Havana Charter.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE DOLLAR SHORTAGE. By Charles P. Kindleberger. New York: Wiley, and Cambridge: Technology Press, 1950, 276 p. $4.00.

As an investigation of the nature of the dollar shortage, its manifold causes and possible remedies must cover a great deal of ground, this book gives Professor Kindleberger an opportunity to examine recent thought on most aspects of international economics. While there are references to experience and to examples of particular phenomena, the approach is principally through reasoning and the application of methods of economic analysis in general terms rather than through a close study of postwar developments. It is not a book for the general reader unless he desires to work his way through a fairly tough course of current economic thought.

PROBLÈMES D'ÉCONOMIE INTERNATIONALE. II: UNE NOUVELLE EXPÉRIENCE: L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DES ÉCHANGES. By Jean Weiller. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 333 p. Fr. 800.

This continuation of the author's study of international economics (Volume I reviewed here in January 1948) deals with postwar problems: the establishment of international institutions, the American effort to restore a free market economy, the difficulties of United States-European coöperation, and the steps toward regional integration.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1919–1939. By W. Arthur Lewis. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1950, 221 p. $3.00.

A popular review of economic trends and national policies.

WORLD GEOGRAPHY OF PETROLEUM. Edited by Wallace E. Pratt and Dorothy Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the American Geographical Society), 1950, 464 p. $7.50.

A very competent, thorough and valuable analysis of the world's petroleum situation. The study deals first with the geological and industrial aspects, continues with an extended regional survey, and concludes with discussions of the economic, political and military implications of the distribution of petroleum supplies.

L'INDUSTRIE SIDÉRURGIQUE DANS LE MONDE ET SON ÉVOLUTION ÉCONOMIQUE DEPUIS LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE. By Maurice Fontaine. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 398 p. Fr. 500.

A competent survey.

PRODUCTION AGRICOLE ET ÉCONOMIE RURALE. By André Garrigou-Lagrange. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1950, 329 p. Fr. 1000.

This revised edition of a treatise on the economics of agriculture contains new chapters on state intervention and planning.

TOWARD FREEDOM FROM WANT. By D. Spencer Hatch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 303 p. $2.50.

More than half of this book on rural reconstruction is taken from the author's earlier works on India. The latter portion deals with his more recent experiences in Mexico. Imbued throughout with the "fascination of compost."

MARX, HIS TIME AND OURS. By Rudolf Schlesinger. New York: Kelley, 1950, 440 p. $4.50.

Behind the somewhat turgid style of this inquiry into "the modifications of the Marxist system made by the further evolution of the social formation investigated by Marx," it becomes apparent that all the author's revisions of Marxism correspond to the present structure and policies of the Soviet régime. For example, the withering away of the state is now seen as a "Utopian extrapolation of liberal ideals."

CAPITALISM. By David McCord Wright. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 246 p. $3.25.

An informal and lively defense of capitalism. Following Schumpeter and Whitehead, Professor Wright's constant stress is upon change, and on the failure of capitalism's critics to take adequate account of the problems of growth in society.

RETURN FROM UTOPIA. By Richard Law. London: Faber, 1950, 206 p. 12/6.

An attack on the economic planners, with acknowledged obligations to von Hayek.

MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE. By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1951, 596 p. $4.00.

A substantial study of the relation of the concentration of economic power to "free enterprise," the limitation of competition by business concerns, the social and economic effects of such actions, and governmental measures curbing—or in some cases fostering—restrictive practices.

A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR. By Frank Tannenbaum. New York: Knopf, 1951, 199 p. $2.75.

The author sees trade unionism as "the great conservative force of our time," giving the industrial worker a needed sense of social status and, if it fulfills its functions, representing the only alternative to an all-absorbing Leviathan, the state.

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THE ONLY WAY. By A. Loveday. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 221 p. $2.50. (London: Hodge, 12/6.)

The Warden of Nuffield College, Oxford, has written a thoughtful analysis of the ideals and ethical principles underlying democracy, the agents for transmitting these ideals, and the dangers to democracy in urbanization, war, inflation and depression. He rejects planning or extended state controls as a solution.

DER UMSTURZ DER GESELLSCHAFT. By Ferdinand Fried. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950, 376 p.

Employing such familiar chapter heads as Alienation from God, The World as Machine and The Rise of the Masses, the author tends, as one reviewer says, "to make the specific German hangover dissolve in a general malaise."

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES OF AN AGE OF CRISIS. By Pitirim A. Sorokin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950, 345 p. $4.00.

A philosopher of culture takes a spin with some other fellow cyclists and criticizes their form. Useful for bringing together Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, Schubart, Berdyaev, Northrop, Kroeber and Schweitzer.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF PEACE AND WAR. Edited by T. H. Pear. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 262 p. $4.75.

Nine psychologists contribute to a discussion of "the mental factors involved in peace and warfare." Some promising leads are given, but at times the authors seem only to be talking to each other.

MEASUREMENT AND PREDICTION. By Samuel A. Stouffer and Others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, 756 p. $10.00.

This fourth volume in the series of "Studies in Social Psychology in World War II" is largely concerned with the methodology of the investigative techniques employed. Not for the casual reader and presumably not for the nonsocial psychologist.

THROUGH VALUES TO SOCIAL INTERPRETATION. By Howard Becker. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1950, 341 p. $4.50.

A collection of essays, unsystematic but at points stimulating, devoted to the methodology of the social sciences.

UNPOPULAR ESSAYS. By Bertrand Russell. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950, 175 p. $2.50.

A collection of spirited observations on politics and philosophy written in the last 15 years.

ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 251 p. $3.00.

Essays written during the last decade, a further addition to this intelligent Socialist's guides.

STATEMENT ON RACE. By Ashley Montagu. New York: Schuman, 1951, 172 p. $2.00.

An interpretative expansion of the "Statement by Experts on Race Problems" issued by UNESCO in 1950.

TWENTY MILLION WORLD WAR VETERANS. By Robert England. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 227 p. $3.50.

A study of the status of the war veterans of Canada and the United States: state aid, physical and economic rehabilitation, the growth of veterans' organizations and the broad implications of these developments.

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The Second World War

A SOLDIER'S STORY. By Omar N. Bradley. New York: Holt, 1951, 618 p. $5.00.

Certainly one of the best World War II military memoirs to have appeared so far. Limited to General Bradley's own extensive rôles, it traces the European war from Tunisia to the Elbe. Most interesting for its frank, frequently blunt but not malicious comments on fellow commanders.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By H. C. O'Neill (Strategicus). New York: Praeger, 1951, 345 p. $4.00.

A reasonably successful compression of an overwhelming mass of material, better in its military narrative than in its political judgments.

LA DEUXIÈME GUERRE. By Pierre and Renée Gosset. Paris: Horay, 1950, 477 p. Fr. 600.

Two French journalists, man and wife, offer their interpretation, a bit too anecdotally, of four critical phases of the war: Hitler's preparation for war and his early successes, the Allied landings in North Africa and Normandy, the German defeats after 1942, and the wartime policy of President Roosevelt.

THE U. S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS WAR. By Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 636 p. $7.50.

Superior to most military histories in its style and impartiality, this work by two Princeton historians (neither of them Marines) is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the Marine Corps' rôle in developing the techniques of amphibious assault.

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END. By Major Carl W. Hoffman. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1950, 286 p. $3.25.

THE ASSAULT ON PELELIU. By Major Frank O. Hough. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1950, 209 p. $2.50.

The sixth and seventh volumes in a series of operational monographs prepared by the U. S. Marine Corps.

THE SPEARHEAD: THE WORLD WAR II HISTORY OF THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION. By Howard M. Conner. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1950, 325 p. $6.50.

Largely the story of Iwo Jima, the division's only—but sufficient—battle.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL SERVICES IN THE ARMY AIR FORCES. By John M. Coleman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 298 p. $4 00.

A careful study of the service and maintenance organization of the A. A. F. in World War II.

SKORZENY'S SECRET MISSIONS. By Otto Skorzeny. New York: Dutton, 1950, 256 p. $3.00.

GEHEIMKOMMANDO SKORZENY. By Otto Skorzeny. Hamburg (British Zone): Toth, 1950, 419 p.

War memoirs of the Nazi Commando who rescued Mussolini. While the English edition is greatly abridged—the sections in the German original dealing with his actions before 1943 and after his surrender are omitted—the loss is not great, since Skorzeny has little but a few exciting episodes to add to our picture of the war.

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DAS GEHEIMNIS DER "BISMARCK." By Fritz Otto Busch. Hanover (British Zone): Sponholtz, 1950, 131 p.

A German naval officer on the *Prinz Eugen* gives a careful account of the pursuit and sinking of the *Bismarck* in May 1941.

ZU SPÄT? AUFSTIEG UND UNTERGANG DER DEUTSCHEN LUFTWAFFE. By Werner Baumbach. Munich (U. S. Zone): Pflaum, 1949, 328 p.

A German flier's reflections and reminiscences on the air war and the collapse of the Luftwaffe.

THE GREAT ESCAPE. By Paul Brickhill. New York: Norton, 1950, 264 p. $3.00.

The absorbing story of an escape from the German prison camp Stalag Luft III.

ZWISCHEN HITLER UND STALIN, 1939–1945. By Peter Kleist. Bonn (British Zone): Athenaeum, 1950, 344 p.

Recollections of an East European specialist in Ribbentrop's Foreign Office, and dealing with the German-Soviet rapprochement of 1939–41, the German occupation of Russian territory and alleged Soviet peace feelers after 1942. To be used with caution.

DER FINNISCHE KRIEG 1941–1944. By Waldemar Erfurth. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Limes, 1950, 324 p.

A revealing account of the joint Finnish-German military operations during 1941–44, written by the chief German representative at the headquarters of Marshal Mannerheim. A Finnish edition, "Suomi Sodan Myrskyssä," has been published in Helsinki by Söderström, 1951, 295 p. M. 600.

NE PERDEZ PAS LEUR TRACE! By Georges Dunand. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1950, 244 p.

An account of the wartime struggle of the *maquisards* in Slovakia against the Germans and the Tiso régime, by a former representative of the International Red Cross.

THE BATTLE OF GREECE, 1940–1941. By General Alexander Papagos. Athens: Scazikis, 1949, 406 p.

LA GRECIA IN GUERRA (1940–1941). By Alessandro Papagos. Milan: Garzanti, 1950, 214 p. L. 650.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces during the war with Italy and Germany gives his well-documented story of these campaigns. The abridged Italian version (the Greek original was published in 1945) has a preface on the background of the Italian attack.

I CAME BACK. By Krystyna Zywulska. New York: Roy, 1951, 246 p. $2.50.

A Polish woman's hellish recollections of the Oswiecim extermination camp.

TUNISIE 1942–1943. By General Georges Barré. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1950, 322 p. Fr. 390.

The former French commander in Tunis defends his military actions in November 1942.

The United States

THE 1950'S COME FIRST. By Edwin G. Nourse. New York: Holt, 1951, 184 p. $2.00.

A brief and disturbing exposition of the dangerous pressures exerted on our economy by interest groups—farm, labor and business—and of their possible consequences in the next few years.

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DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION. By Albert G. Hart. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1951, 186 p. $2.00.

A balanced survey of a formidable problem. The author accepts no single technique as sufficient but investigates the possible usefulness and disadvantages of the whole range of monetary and budgetary controls, tax policies, etc.

THE PURSE AND THE SWORD. By Elias Huzar. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950, 417 p. $4.50.

A scholarly and critical study of the "appropriations process in Congress with special reference to the Military Establishment," covering the years 1933–1950.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. By Harold D. Lasswell. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 259 p. $3.50.

Professor Lasswell is here concerned with the problem "how to maintain a proper balance between national security and individual freedom in a continuing crisis of national defense." He particularly urges the continuation of civilian control over military service and the need to maintain the free flow of information.

THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN. By Alan Barth. New York: Viking, 1951, 253 p. $3.00.

An editorial writer on *The Washington Post* has performed a valuable service in pointing up the current danger of letting legitimate concern over the menace of Communist espionage and sabotage overflow into a "cult of loyalty" which can corrode the foundations of our society.

WITCH HUNT. By Carey McWilliams. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, 361 p. $3.50.

Although Mr. McWilliams deals with the same problem as concerns Mr. Barth, his handling of it is less satisfactory. The implication in the book, as in the title, is that witches don't exist; this assumption robs the present Communist problem of its very disturbing reality.

TWENTIETH CENTURY UNLIMITED. Edited by Bruce Bliven. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950, 315 p. $3.50.

Sixteen articles surveying the American scene at mid-century, most of them remarkably cheerful in outlook.

PERSPECTIVES ON A TROUBLED DECADE. Edited by Lyman Bryson and Others. New York: Harper (for the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life), 1950, 901 p. $5.50.

Papers read and discussed at the Conference held at Columbia University in September 1949.

THE AMERICAN CENTURY. By Ralph E. Flanders. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 101 p. $2.50.

Three lectures by the Republican Senator from Vermont on America's domestic and foreign program.

PRESIDENTS WHO HAVE KNOWN ME. By George E. Allen. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950, 254 p. $3.00.

THE TRUMAN MERRY-GO-ROUND. By Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon. New York: Vanguard, 1950, 502 p. $3.50.

Jests and gossip about Washington and the Truman Administration, with occasional bits of pertinent information.

OUR MORE PERFECT UNION. By Arthur N. Holcombe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 460 p. $6.00.

A professor of government at Harvard reviews with authority and skill the development of the American Constitution and finds it sound.

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THE AMERICAN AS REFORMER. By Arthur M. Schlesinger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 127 p. $2.25.

Lectures on the history of the reforming spirit in the United States.

THE IMPACT OF AMERICA ON EUROPEAN CULTURE. By Bertrand Russell and Others. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 100 p. $1.75.

A series of B.B.C. broadcasts which may mildly interest and irritate the American reader, but do not add up to anything very substantial.

THE NAVY AND THE INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II. By Robert H. Connery. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 527 p. $6.00.

A fitting tribute to Secretary Forrestal's pioneering work in reorganizing and expanding the Navy's procurement organization, and a useful contribution to the study of economic mobilization.

FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY. By Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, 723 p. $8.50.

A weighty analysis and appraisal of the development of national labor policies. Proponents of collective bargaining, the authors in general favor the Wagner Act, though granting the need for certain revisions, and are quite critical of the Taft-Hartley Act.

INDUSTRY'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS. By Sara E. Southall. New York: Harper, 1950, 173 p. $2.50.

A former personnel director of International Harvester discusses the problem of race relations in industrial employment.

A SOCIALIST'S FAITH. By Norman Thomas. New York: Norton, 1951, 326 p. $4.00.

A personal reëxamination of Socialism, which Mr. Thomas with his customary integrity and intellectual modesty still holds to be "our one hope."

ADDRESSES UPON THE AMERICAN ROAD. By Herbert Hoover. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 221 p. $3.50.

A collection of the former President's more important statements and addresses between 1948 and 1950, divided into four categories: domestic policies, foreign policies, reorganization of government, and scientific and cultural affairs.

TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM. New York: Rinehart, 1950, 99 p. $1.00.

Recommendations by a group of political scientists of the American Political Science Association for the improvement of the American political party system.

Western Europe

LES COMMUNISTES FRANÇAIS PENDANT LA DRÔLE DE GUERRE. By A. Rossi. Paris: Plon, 1951, 365 p. Fr. 660.

An extensive treatment of the activities and party line of the French Communists during the "phony war." While clearly published as a weapon in current French politics, its extensive reproductions of party pamphlets and papers provides a fine collection of evidence on the defeatist tactics adopted during the period of German-Soviet collaboration.

ÉPISODES, 1940–1944. By Édouard Herriot. Paris: Flammarion, 1950, 207 p. Fr. 225.

Extracts from memoirs in preparation, largely dealing with events from May 16 to July 10, 1940.

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HISTOIRE DE LA RÉSISTANCE (1940–1944). By Henri Michel. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 127 p. Fr. 100.

A brief and preliminary survey.

GENERALS AND POLITICIANS. By Jere Clemens King. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951, 294 p. $3.50.

A good study of the strenuous struggle for power between the French civilian authorities and the high command during the First World War.

LA CONDITION OUVRIÈRE EN FRANCE DEPUIS CENT ANS. By Paul Louis. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 127 p. Fr. 100.

A compact survey, with a concluding chapter on the years 1944–50.

LES MAINS LIBRES. By Baron Pierre Van Zuylen. Paris: Desclée, 1950, 580 p.

A Belgian diplomat reviews Belgian foreign policy between the wars and defends King Leopold's policy of neutrality with some quite bitter comments on the actions and recriminations of the Western Allies.

DIE KONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION IN DEUTSCHLAND 1918–1932. By Armin Mohler. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Vorwerk, 1950, 287 p.

An intelligent, exploratory survey of the manifold political currents in Weimar Germany which represented a "conservative revolution" and yet are not to be identified with National Socialism. The author sees as the common element in their *Weltanschauungen* a disbelief in theological or historical progress and a return to the symbol of the circle. It has an exceptionally helpful critical bibliography.

MEMOIRS OF ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER. Chicago: Regnery, 1951, 322 p. $3.75.

ERINNERUNGEN. By Ernst von Weizsäcker. Munich (U. S. Zone): List, 1950, 391 p.

Apologia of the head of the German Foreign Office under Ribbentrop. He indicates his opposition to Hitler's reckless rush to war but does not substantially alter our picture of the background of the war or of the forces in Germany which made Hitler possible.

NICHT AUS DEN AKTEN. By Erich Kordt. Stuttgart. (U. S. Zone): Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950, 441 p.

The author of "Wahn und Wirklichkeit" now relates his personal experiences as a civil servant in the German Foreign Office from 1928 to 1945. Interestingly written but with the inevitable touch of apologetics.

RUHELOSES LEBEN. By Rudolf Rahn. Düsseldorf (British Zone): Diederichs, 1949, 298 p.

Like so many recent German diplomatic reminiscences, these memoirs by Herr Rahn, whose wartime posts included France, Syria, North Africa, Italy and Hungary, were written with little consultation (perhaps unavoidably) of other books, and are preoccupied with the effort to shift responsibility.

BEFEHL IM WIDERSTREIT. By Adolf Heusinger. Tübingen (French Zone): Wunderlich, 1950, 396 p.

Decisive turning points in the history of the German Army from 1923 to 1945, in the unfortunate form of a series of reconstructed dialogues.

DEUTSCHLAND ZWISCHEN WEST UND OST. By Hermann Rauschning. Berlin: Christian-Verlag, 1950, 200 p.

Though giving full weight to the disastrous consequences for the world of recent German history, Dr. Rauschning still believes there is a German mission—to be the united center of a new Europe between the utilitarian West and the materialistic East.

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GOLD FOR EUROPE. By Hjalmar Schacht. London: Duckworth, 1950, 125 p. 7/6.

The indestructible doctor proposes a new German "hard currency" based on a billion dollar U.S. loan; the gold can remain at Fort Knox.

VON POTSDAM BIS BONN: FÜNF JAHRE DEUTSCHE NACHKRIEGS-GESCHICHTE. By Emil Schäfer. Lahr (French Zone): Schauenburg, 1950, 239 p.

A handbook on postwar Germany: a brief political sketch, a chronology of events, and a selection of documents.

LEHREN DEUTSCHER GESCHICHTE. By Albert Norden. Berlin: Dietz, 1950, 303 p.

SO WERDEN KRIEGE GEMACHT! By Albert Norden. Berlin: Dietz, 1950, 172 p.

German history and contemporary international relations as currently interpreted in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

THY PEOPLE, MY PEOPLE. By Elisabeth Hoemberg. London: Dent, 1950, 314 p. 12/6.

Diaries and letters of a Canadian woman and her German husband, on duty in the Luftwaffe, from 1940 to 1946.

DER YOUNG-PLAN. By Julius Curtius. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Mittelbach, 1950, 122 p.

The late foreign minister reviews the history of the Young Plan and sharply criticizes Schacht's rôle and views.

CROCE, THE KING AND THE ALLIES. By Benedetto Croce. New York: Norton, 1951, 158 p. $3.00.

Extracts from the noted philosopher's diary commenting on political developments in Italy between the fall of Mussolini and the liberation of Rome.

LA LOTTA POLITICA ITALIANA NEL SECONDO DOPOGUERRA E IL MEZZOGIORNO. By Francesco Compagna. Bari: Laterza, 1950, 332 p. L. 1100.

Reflections on postwar Italian politics in relation to the grave economic and social problems of south Italy, "the proving grounds of Italian democracy."

CINDERELLA OF EUROPE. By Sheila M. O'Callaghan. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 199 p. $3.75.

A strongly pro-Franco account of present day Spain, spiced with references to the "fuss-pot champions of democracy."

Eastern Europe

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY: VOLUME I: 1917–1924. Edited by Jane Degras. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 501 p. $7.00.

This first of three welcome volumes of selected Soviet documents on foreign policy for 1917 to 1941 brings together and translates much material not otherwise easily accessible. The variety of expression and style in the early years of revolutionary diplomacy is in striking contrast to the didactic or catechistic utterances of recent years.

CRACKS IN THE KREMLIN WALL. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: Viking, 1951, 279 p. $3.50.

Mr. Crankshaw's leading themes are the abandonment of normative Marxism and its eventual replacement by Great Russian nationalism, the predisposition of

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Russian society to submit to absolute régimes, and the striking ineptitude of Stalin's foreign policy.

THIS IS RUSSIA: UNCENSORED. By Edmund Stevens. New York: Didier, 1950, 200 p. $2.75.

Good but somewhat disconnected reporting by the former Moscow correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*.

ON COMMUNIST EDUCATION. By M. I. Kalinin. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950, 479 p. (London: Collets, 2/6.)

A collection of speeches by the late Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

LÉNINE ET LA IIIe INTERNATIONALE. By Branko Lazitch. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1951, 285 p.

An anti-Communist Serb reviews the history of the Communist International in its formative years after the First World War.

ASSASSINS AT LARGE. By Hugo Dewar. London: Wingate, 1951, 203 p. 12/6.

The G. P. U. tracking down renegades and deviationists.

ELEVEN YEARS IN SOVIET PRISON CAMPS. By Elinor Lipper. Chicago: Regnery, 1951, 310 p. $3.50.

A former German Communist and Swiss citizen tells of her internment in the Siberian labor camps from 1937 to 1948. An experience lacking the ultimate horror of the Nazi extermination camps but coldly and protractedly brutalizing and degrading. A translation of "Elf Jahre in Sowjetischen Gefängnissen und Lagern" (Zurich: Oprecht, 1950, 278 p. Sw. Fr. 12.80).

L'ÉCONOMIE SOVIÉTIQUE. By Ch. Bettelheim. Paris: Sirey, 1950, 472 p. Fr. 1600.

This twelfth and last volume of the series "Traité d'Économie Politique," directed by Gaëtan Pirou, is both a scholarly and thorough examination of the Soviet economy. Steering clear of political and social questions, the author analyzes the varied aspects of economic life—agriculture, industry, domestic and foreign commerce, finance and credit—and then brings them together in the coördinated movement of the Five Year Plans.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE USSR. By Theodore Shabad. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 584 p. $8.50.

This valuable reference work, designed as a regional survey, provides detailed geographic, demographic and economic data for each of the 150-odd administrative districts of the U.S.S.R.

GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA. By N. T. Mirov. New York: Wiley, 1951, 362 p. $6.50.

A physical geography designed primarily for the college student.

DIE SOWJETUNION. By Werner Leimbach. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Franckh, 1950, 526 p.

A factually rich handbook—for reference rather than reading—on the geography and economy of the Soviet Union.

DAS STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEITSRECHT DER UdSSR UND DER BALTISCHEN STAATEN. By Walter Meder. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Metzner, 1950, 112 p.

A historical sketch and commentary on the development of the law concerning citizenship in the U.S.S.R. and the Baltic States.

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THE SOVIET SLAVE EMPIRE. By Albert Konrad Herling. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1951, 230 p. $3.75.

Most of the new evidence given here on slave labor, in the satellites as well as in Russia, is based on hearings held by the Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor.

TALVISODAN PUOLUSTUSMINISTERI KERTOO. By Juho Niukkanen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1951, 288 p. M. 750.

The Finnish Minister of Defense during the Winter War argues that the interests of Finland and of the West demanded that Finland should have continued the war against the Soviet Union, utilizing the last-minute aid offered by England and France.

EAST WIND OVER PRAGUE. By Jan Stransky. New York: Random House, 1951, 245 p. $3.00.

A former Czech official attempts to convey, through anecdotes and episodes, the impact of the Red Army on Czechoslovakia and the conditions paving the way for the Communist seizure of power.

BALKAN CAESAR. By Leigh White. New York: Scribner, 1951, 245 p. $2.75.

Despite Jugoslavia's westward drift since the break with Moscow in 1948, Mr. White, who is well acquainted with Eastern Europe, is dead set against the Tito régime—its origins, its character, and its probable utility to the United States—and argues his case vigorously and often angrily. The author is, however, presenting a case, and his book provides little new information serving to clarify the more debated issues in recent Jugoslav history.

LE COMMUNISME YOUGOSLAVE DEPUIS LA RUPTURE AVEC MOSCOU. By Louis Dalmas. Paris: Terre des Hommes, 1950, 220 p. Fr. 330.

The author, who favors Tito—ideologically as well as diplomatically—in his break with Moscow, examines the causes and future implications of that rupture.

WHEN GREEK MEETS GREEK. By Sir Reginald Leeper. London: Chatto, 1950, 243 p. 12/6.

The former British Ambassador to Greece gives his story of the conflict with EAM–ELAS at the end of the war. While explaining the author's position and actions, the accounts of some of the critical events should be checked with other sources.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL POLICY. By Richard M. Titmuss. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1950, 596 p. 25/. (New York: British Information Services, $5.75.)

COAL. By W. H. B. Court. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1951, 422 p. 21/. (New York: British Information Services, $4.75.)

STATISTICAL DIGEST OF THE WAR. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1951, 247 p. 32/6. (New York: British Information Services, $7.50.)

Three new volumes of the important and officially sponsored "History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series" (the first volume, "British War Economy," was reviewed here in January 1950). Having full access to an enormous quantity of government documents, Mr. Titmuss has selected three leading topics to illustrate the human and social problems faced in the war—the evacuation of mothers and children, the work of the hospital services, and the social consequences of air attack. The book makes a valuable case study for current civil defense efforts. Mr. Court has written an interesting and authoritative account of the part played by the coal industry in Britain's war effort and of the war's impact

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on that industry. The Statistical Digest was designed "to collate in convenient form statistics on subjects which were of major importance socially, economically or strategically during the war." It is an exceedingly useful reference work.

ENGLAND: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. By Douglas Jerrold. New York: Norton, 1951, 341 p. $4.00.

Writing with much zest from a Christian-Conservative position, Mr. Jerrold is particularly pungent, if not always acceptable, in his judgments of recent British history: the First World War, "a story of epoch-making mistakes;" the policy of the inter-war years, "ill advised;" the Attlee Government's India policy, one of "divide and quit," its domestic position, "totalitarian."

CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By T. H. Marshall. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950, 154 p. $2.50.

A concise, meaty essay upon the relationship and compatibility of the move toward greater social equality in present day Britain and an economy which continues to function on the assumption of free competition.

THE SOCIALIST TRAGEDY. By Ivor Thomas. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 254 p. $2.75.

A confession of disillusionment by a British Socialist M.P. who moved over to the Conservatives in 1948. His effort to minimize the distinction between Socialism and Communism is hardly successful.

BOTH SIDES OF THE CURTAIN. By Maurice Peterson. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 314 p. $4.00. (London: Constable, 21/.)

Diplomatic memoirs—frank ones for the British tradition—of particular interest for Sir Maurice's observations as Ambassador to Spain (1939–40) and the Soviet Union (1946–49).

CONFIDENT MORNING. By Harold Butler. London: Faber, 1950, 192 p. 12/6.

An affable scrapbook of Home Office recollections, carried up to the creation of the I.L.O. in 1919.

HERE'S ENGLAND. By Ruth McKenney and Richard Bransten. New York: Harper, 1950, 378 p. $3.75.

A pleasant guide for the American tourist. Osbert Lancaster illustrations.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CANADA. By G. P. deT. Glazebrook. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 238 p. $2.50.

A HISTORY OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS. By G. P. deT. Glazebrook. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 449 p. $4.50.

Of these two books by a professor of history at the University of Toronto the first is a condensed and balanced narrative of Canada's development from its colonial origins to its present status as a World Power. The second is concerned with Canada's external relations before 1914 (this portion was published separately in 1942) and with the development of an independent and specifically Canadian foreign policy in the years since the First World War.

AGRARIAN SOCIALISM. By S. M. Lipset. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950, 315 p. $4.50.

A perceptive study, in political sociology, of the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan. Valuable for its insights into the characteristics and problems of a radical movement in North America.

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DOES CANADA NEED MORE PEOPLE? By Mabel F. Timlin. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 143 p. $2.50.

A study of the economic aspects of Canada's capacity to absorb additional population.

JUBILEE: OFFICIAL COMMEMORATIVE BOOK OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. Edited by Oswald L. Ziegler. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1951, 256 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, $5.00.)

A handsomely illustrated and moderately informative book in celebration of Australia's 50th year of nationhood.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COLONIES. Edited by Rita Hinden. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 255 p. $3.50. (London: Allen and Unwin, 16/.)

A case study of British local government in eight selected territories—Jamaica, British Guiana, Mauritius, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and the Sudan.

The Middle East

CONTEMPORARY JEWRY. By Israel Cohen. London: Methuen, 1950, 410 p. 25/. (New York: British Book Centre, $5.50.)

A short and not altogether adequate compendium on Jewish life, Zionism and the state of Israel.

WATCH FOR THE MORNING. By Thomas Sugrue. New York: Harper, 1950, 304 p. $3.50.

Sensitive and competent reporting on the establishment of Israel.

FIFTY YEARS OF MODERN SYRIA AND LEBANON. By George Haddad. Beirut: Dar-al-Hayat, 1950, 264 p. (New York: Hafner, $3.00.)

A useful historical introduction, slurring off into handbook, to the two new republics.

MEMOIRS OF KING ABDULLAH OF TRANSJORDAN. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 278 p. $3.75.

An almost medieval personal chronicle, dealing largely with the Arab liberation movement before and during the First World War.

MÉMENTO ÉCONOMIQUE: L'ÉGYPTE. Paris: Presses Universitaires (for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), 1950, 208 p. Fr. 700.

A compact economic and statistical survey.

JOURNEY TO SIWA. By Robin Maugham. New York: Harcourt, 1951, 120 p. $3.75.

A handsomely illustrated journal of a trip to an Egyptian oasis, containing some political observations.

South and Southeast Asia

THE STATE OF ASIA: A CONTEMPORARY SURVEY. By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates. New York: Knopf (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1951, 522 p. $6.00.

A solid survey of recent developments in the Far East, South and Southeast Asia. A diversity of points of view is represented by the 13 contributors.

RED STORM OVER ASIA. By Robert Payne. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 309 p. $5.00.

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RED BANNERS OVER ASIA. By O. O. Trullinger. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 212 p. $3.00.

Of these two unexceptional surveys of Communism in Asia, Mr. Payne's stresses the social roots of Asian radicalism, Mr. Trullinger's the plans and activities of the Communists. Both feel that the West must "understand" Asia and remodel the traditional ties.

INDIA, PAKISTAN, CEYLON. Edited by W. Norman Brown. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 234 p. $3.00.

A collection of factual chapters written as a series of articles for the "Encyclopedia Americana."

THE POPULATION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN. By Kingsley Davis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 263 p. $7.50.

An expert analysis of one of the world's most difficult and pressing demographic problems.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDED INDIA. By C. N. Vakil. Bombay: Vora, 1950, 555 p. Rs. 21.

A statistically rich survey of the economic assets and liabilities of India and Pakistan, with some valuable material on the refugee problem.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF INDIA WITH SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THE FAR EAST. By N. V. Sovani. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1951, 137 p. $2.00.

A somewhat hastily drawn up paper, but with extensive trade statistics for the prewar years.

TALKS WITH NEHRU. A Discussion Between Jawaharlal Nehru and Norman Cousins. New York: Day, 1951, 64 p. $2.00.

Largely a transcript of two recorded conversations with the Indian Prime Minister on matters of mutual Indian-American interest or dispute.

INDIA SINCE PARTITION. By Andrew Mellor. New York: Praeger, 1951, 156 p. $2.50.

A brief but convenient review by a British newspaperman.

L'INDE DEVANT L'ORAGE. By Tibor Mende. Paris: Seuil, 1950, 261 p. Fr. 390.

A quite pessimistic report on India, which the reporter sees sliding into one form or another of totalitarianism, to be rescued, if at all, by "super Lend-Lease" and the popular enthusiasm of a Socialist New Deal.

INDIA AFIRE. By Clare and Harris Wofford, Jr. New York: Day, 1951, 343 p. $4.00.

A young American couple's sensitive and alarmed report of a tour of India in 1949 and their encounter with the overwhelming problems of Asiatic poverty.

AT THE CROSS-ROADS (1885–1946). By Nripendra Chandra Banerji. Calcutta: Mukherjee, 1950, 318 p. Rs. 8.

An autobiography, dealing with the struggle for independence in Bengal.

THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN. By Richard Symonds. London: Faber, 1950, 227 p. 12/6. (Hollywood-by-the-Sea (Fla.): Transatlantic Arts, $3.00.)

The story of the creation of Muslim Pakistan and of its current problems by a definitely sympathetic former member of the U. N. Commission mediating the Kashmir dispute.

THE PROBLEM OF FRENCH INDIA. By N. V. Rajkumar. New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1951, 108 p. Rs. 1/4.

The Foreign Secretary of the Indian National Congress demands that France's possessions be politically incorporated in the new India.

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THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Victor Purcell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1951, 801 p. $11.50.

The author, long a member of the Malayan Civil Service, has written an extended and scholarly study of the emigration of the Chinese into Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines from earliest times to the present. While he does not predict the future rôle of these 8,500,000 people, his work is most useful for its account of the relations of the emigrants with China and with the native populations of the lands to which they moved.

WITH FREEDOM TO SINGAPORE. By O. W. Gilmour. London: Benn, 1950, 227 p. 12/6.

An engineer's useful record of the planning and problems involved in the reoccupation of Singapore and of the British Military Administration after the war.

INDONESIA. By P. S. Gerbrandy. London: Hutchinson, 1950, 224 p. 18/.

The wartime Premier of the Netherlands bitterly sees the creation of Indonesia as "a great calamity . . . under pressure exercised by Britain, the United States and U.N.O."

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE CHINA STORY. By Freda Utley. Chicago: Regnery, 1951, 274 p. $3.50.

The author's case against the U. S. Administration, written before the MacArthur inquiry, and displaying a tendency to shoot from the hip.

LA CHINE: DU NATIONALISME AU COMMUNISME. By Jean-Jacques Brieux. Paris: Seuil, 1950, 443 p. Fr. 540.

An extensive elaboration of the thesis that "China has chosen the Communist way because there has been no other."

MODERN CHINA: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO CHINESE WORKS, 1898–1937. By John King Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 608 p. $7.50.

An annotated bibliography of works in the extensive collection of the Harvard-Yenching Institute.

FAILURE IN JAPAN. By Robert B. Textor. New York: Day, 1951, 262 p. $3.00.

Perhaps underestimating some of the American achievements in the occupation of Japan, the author is principally concerned with what he feels to be the failure to make positive assurances of a future democratic Japan. The author's recommendations concerning the Japanese economy, labor and the peace treaty indicate his own confidence that such assurances are possible.

KAKEMONO: A SKETCH BOOK OF POST-WAR JAPAN. By Honor Tracy. New York: Coward-McCann, 1951, 205 p. $3.00.

The savage Americans and their Occupation were too much for the sensibilities of this British newspaperwoman who spent eight months in Japan in 1948.

BROKEN THREAD. By Major-General F. S. G. Piggott. Aldershot: Gale, 1950, 424 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, $5.00.)

Recollections of a British Army officer much of whose career was spent in or dealing with Japan. The thread is the gradually fraying one of Anglo-Japanese relations from 1900 to 1941.

AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA. By E. Grant Meade. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1951, 281 p. $3.75.

A critical examination, written before the Korean war, of American military government operations in 1945–46.

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OUT OF THIS WORLD. By Lowell Thomas, Jr. New York: Greystone, 1950, 320 p. $3.75.

A well-traveled father and son visit Tibet. Good reporting.

Africa

AFRICA, CONTINENT OF THE FUTURE. By George Edmund Haynes. New York: Association Press, 1951, 516 p. $3.50.

A country-by-country survey of Africa south of the Sahara. Sponsored by and really written for the World's Committee of the Y. M. C. A.

LE MAROC. By J.-L. Miège. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 122 p. Fr. 100.

A compact handbook of the history, administration and economy of Morocco.

LES JUIFS D'ALGÉRIE. By Michel Ansky. Paris: Éditions du Centre, 1950, 374 p. Fr. 600.

A monograph dealing with the Jews in Algeria, and their treatment after the fall of France in 1940.

DIE SAHARA UND DIE SYRTENLÄNDER. By Heinrich Schiffers. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Franckh, 1950, 254 p.

Primarily a physical geography.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICA. By Wendell C. Gordon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 434 p. $5.50.

A substantial general survey, organized by branches of economic activity.

MONETARY PROBLEMS OF AN EXPORT ECONOMY. By Henry Christopher Wallich. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 357 p. $5.00.

A competent investigation of the Cuban economy between 1914 and 1947, stressing the problems involved in the island's dependence upon sugar exports.

L'AMÉRIQUE DU SUD BLANCHE, TERRE DE PAIX ET DE LIBERTÉ. By Jonkheer Henry Van der Meerschen. Paris: Office de Centralisation d'Ouvrages, 1948–50, 2 v. Fr. 975.

Convinced that Europe is destroying itself and dying under weight of its historic hatreds, the author makes an extended investigation of the southern half of South America as an area for European settlement.

BRAZIL: PORTRAIT OF HALF A CONTINENT. Edited by T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant. New York: Dryden, 1951, 466 p. $5.75.

A volume of unequal contributions on Brazilian history and society by a number of Brazilian and American scholars.

BATALLAS POR LA DEMOCRACIA. By Epifanio Mendez and Osvaldo Chaves. Asunción: Colmena, 1950, 304 p.

A selection of political articles appearing in the daily *La Razón*—controlled by the Colorado Party—during the tumultuous months between March and November 1947.

EN PATAGONIE ET TERRE DE FEU. By M.-H. Lelong. Paris: Julliard, 1950, 273 p. Fr. 480.

Travels in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, with particular emphasis on the unhappy fate of the Indian inhabitants.

LET'S GO TO PERU. By Lyman and Ellen Judson. New York: Harper, 1951, 273 p. $4.00.

A nonpolitical tourist guide.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Aeronautics

Memorandum on ICAO; the story of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Montreal, International Civil Aviation Organization, 1951. 53 p.

Belgium

Report on the Belgian coal industry, by Niel Robinson. Brussels, E.C.A. Special Mission to Belgium and Luxembourg, 1951. 27 p.

China

China fights for peace and freedom. New York, Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, 1951. 99 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Analysis of Torquay protocol of accession, schedules, and related documents. General agreement on tariffs and trade negotiated at Torquay, England, September 1950–April 1951. (Preliminary.) Washington, 1951. 474 p. (Dept. of State. Commercial Policy Series 135.) $1.00.

Conferences

The Technique of international conferences; a progress report on research problems and methods. Paris, UNESCO, 1951. 71 p. (UNESCO/SS/3.)

Customs Unions

Report of the Commission on the Establishment of a Customs Union in the British Caribbean Area, 1948–50. London, 1951. 335 p. (Colonial 268.) 7s. 6d.

Economic Conditions

World economic report, 1949–50. New York, 1951. 247 p. (1951. II. C. 1.) $2.50.

Economic survey of Europe in 1950. Geneva, United Nations. Dept. of Economic Affairs, 1951. 263 p. (1951. II. E. 1.) $2.50.

Economic progress and problems of Western Europe. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1951. 158 p. 400 Fr.

Tourism and European recovery. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1951. 76 p.

Overseas economic surveys. London, 1951.

Costa Rica. 28 p. 1s. 3d. Panama. 46 p. 1s. 9d.

Financial Policy and Exchange

Surveys of exchange controls and restrictions in Argentina [and 10 countries]. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1951. 24 p.

Second annual report on exchange restrictions, 1951. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1951. 160 p.

Public finance information papers. New York, 1951.

4. Iran. 102 p. (1951. XVI. 4.) 50¢. 5. Iraq. 43 p. (1951. XVI. 6.) 25¢.

Public finance surveys: Venezuela. New York, 1951. 87 p. (1951. XVI. 2.) 75¢.

Budgetary structure and classification of government accounts. New York, 1951. 100 p. (1951. XVI. 3.) 75¢.

International tax agreements. Vol. II. New York, 1951. 225 p. (1951. XVI. 1.) $2.50.

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Germany

Soviet Zone constitution and electoral law. Washington, 1951. 107 p. 45¢.

Confuse and control; Soviet techniques in Germany. Washington, 1951. 107 p. (Dept. of State. European and British Commonwealth Series 17.) 30¢.

The Socialist Unity Party as the Soviet instrument of power in Eastern Germany. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1950. 13 p.

History of the Allied High Commission for Germany; its establishment, structure, and procedures, by Elmer Plischke. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1951. 122 p.

Visiting Expert Series. Frankfurt, HICOG, 1950–1951.

16. Labor education in Germany, by Eleanor G. Coit. 57 p. *18.* Works councils in Germany, by Paul Fisher. 43 p.

The Integration of refugees into German life; a report of the ECA Technical Assistance Commission on the integration of the refugees in the German Republic. Washington, National Planning Association, 1951. 109 p. 75¢.

Great Britain

Economic survey for 1951. London, 1951. 45 p. (Cmd. 8195.) 1s.

A Policy for secondary education. London, Labour Party, 1951. 15 p. 3d.

Hungary

The Relationship between church and state in the Hungarian People's Republic. Washington, Hungarian Legation, 1951. 48 p.

Labor

Minutes of the 101st session of the governing body, Geneva, 5–8 March 1947. Geneva, International Labour Office, n. d. 176 p.

Minutes of the 102nd session of the governing body, Geneva, 13 June–July 1947. Geneva, International Labour Office, n. d. 307 p.

International Labour Conference, 34th Session, Geneva, 1951. Reports. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1951.

International Labour Organization. Coal Mines Committee. Record of the third session (Pittsburgh, April 1949). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1951. 116 p.

International Labour Organization. Coal Mines Committee. 4th session, Geneva, 1951. General Report. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1951. 108 p.

Co-operation in industry; workers, employers, public authorities. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1951. 238 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series 26.) $1.50.

Freedom of association and conditions of work in Venezuela; observations of the Government of Venezuela on the Report of the Mission of the International Labour Office. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1951. 97 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series 21 A.) 75¢.

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